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Reportage on Gerasimov's 7 Mar Briefing

Hungary Troop Withdrawal

LD0703151590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1431 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 Mar (TASS)—At a briefing for journalists today, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate, commented on the results of the second round of talks that took place in Budapest 28 February-1 March 1990 concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily on Hungarian territory.

As a result of the talks that took place, he reported, the text of a draft intergovernmental agreement about the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungarian territory was agreed, the diplomat said. However, he noted that agreement on the schedule and timeframe for the end of their withdrawal has not yet been reached.

"However," Gennadiy Gerasimov stressed, "in our view it is not worth dramatizing the certain difference that remains in the sides' positions."

Genscher Remarks on Unity

LD0703152990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1411 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 Mar (TASS)—The Soviet Union shares the point of view of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, FRG deputy federal chancellor and foreign minister, that the process of the unification of the two German states should proceed in "unison," simultaneously with the general European process in the framework of the CSCE. This was stated at a briefing here today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, commenting on an article by Hans-Dietrich Genscher published recently in the West German newspaper NORDSEE ZEITUNG. "We welcome the intention expressed there not to pursue a policy of faits accomplis," he added.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher came out in favor of the creation of common security structures in Europe which would absorb the existing alliances, Gennadiy Gerasimov continued. Noting the similarity of those points of departure in this regard with those of the Soviet side, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman recalled that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said in the interview he gave last Tuesday [6 March] "that if NATO and the Warsaw Treaty are transformed into political organizations, there will be no need to haggle over where the unified Germany should be."

Bush Remarks on Israel

LD0703163190 Moscow TASS in English 1624 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov today welcomed U.S. President George Bush's remarks that the United States is opposed to the construction of further Israeli settlements on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem.

He told a briefing that the remarks reflected worldwide concern about Israeli plans to settle immigrants on the occupied territories.

Commenting on Yitzhak Shamir's statement inviting incoming Jews, including those from the Soviet Union, to settle in Jerusalem, Gerasimov described it as "another challenge to world opinion."

"These remarks are counterproductive from the standpoint of the Middle East peace process," he said.

The Soviet Union, he continued, sees East Jerusalem as an inalienable part of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and believes that Article 49 of the fourth Geneva convention of 1949, which prohibits an occupying power to settle occupied lands with its own population, applies to the territory.

Gerasimov recalled Security Council Resolutions 446 and 465, urging Israel to comply with the 1949 convention, reverse its earlier settlement measures, and refrain from any actions that could change the legal status and geography of Arab lands occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and make a substantial impact on the demographic situation there.

Upcoming Horn Visit

LD0703232990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2300 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] According to a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, the questions that have arisen around the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary can be solved. Gennadiy Gerasimov spoke about this at his Moscow press conference, and announced that Foreign Minister Gyula Horn is to arrive in Moscow on Saturday for a working visit, at the invitation of Eduard Shevardnadze.

The spokesman did not reply to the question of whether the Horn visit is connected with the latest round of troop-withdrawal talks held in Hungary.

TASS Summary

LD0703172690 Moscow TASS in English 1639 GMT 7 Mar 90

["Soviet Foreign Ministry Briefing Round-up"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Romanian Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac arrived in Moscow on a working visit today, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov announced.

Speaking at a news briefing, the spokesman supported West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's idea that the reunification of two Germanies should proceed in unison with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process.

Commenting on Genscher's views on the issue, published in a recent article in the West German NORDSEE-ZEITUNG newspaper, Gerasimov said: "We approve of the declared intention not to follow a policy of fait accompli."

He also welcomed U.S. President George Bush's remarks that the United States is opposed to the construction of further Israeli settlements on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem.

Gerasimov told the briefing that the remarks reflected worldwide concern about Israeli plans to settle immigrants on the occupied territories.

Commenting on Yitzhak Shamir's statement inviting incoming Jews, including those from the Soviet Union, to settle in Jerusalem, he described it as "another challenge to world opinion".

"These remarks are counterproductive from the standpoint of the Middle East peace process," Gerasimov said.

The Soviet Union, he continued, sees East Jerusalem as an inalienable part of the Israel-occupied West Bank and believes that Article 49 of the fourth Geneva convention of 1949, which prohibits an occupying power to settle occupied lands with its own population, applies to the territory.

An intergovernmental agreement on the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary is now ready, except for the pull-out schedule which is still to be agreed, the spokesman said.

He was commenting on the second round of negotiations on the issue, which took place in Budapest from February 28 to March 1.

Gerasimov said that "to our view, one shouldn't dramatise the few remaining differences in the sides' positions".

Shevardnadze Interviewed on German Unity Issues

LD0703164490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1427 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Report on interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, by NEUE BERLINER ILLUSTRIERTE (GDR); place, date unspecified]

[Text] Moscow, 8 March (TASS)—An interview USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze gave to the Berlin magazine NEUE BERLINER ILLUSTRIERTE (GDR) is devoted to the most acute aspects of the problem of unification of the two German states.

Concerning the juridical aspect of this issue, the Soviet minister noted that the attempts of certain circles in West Germany to apply Article 23 of the fundamental law of the FRG are essentially "plans for the 'land' annexation of the GDR; they ignore the sovereignty of the GDR and its Constitution and create a direct threat to the security of the neighbors of the two German states." In this connection, he stressed that the Soviet Union supports the concept of Hans Modrow, head of the GDR Government, concerning a stage-by-stage movement toward German federation, excluding mere annexation and an "anschluss" of the GDR to the FRG. It is important, Eduard Shevardnadze indicated, that the construction of German unity "should be the result of genuine self-determination of all Germans and not a 'blitz game' played off hastily by certain over-ambitious politicians."

Having touched on the mechanism for discussion of the German problem according to the "two plus four" formula coordinated in Ottawa, the minister said it corresponds to the main criterion: There should not be a decision on the German issue by the victorious powers or by anyone else behind the back of the German people. The German question cannot be decided without the participation of the countries that opposed German aggression, and without the participation of all European peoples. At the same time, in his opinion, the work of the new mechanism should be based on principles of consensus. A peace treaty, within which the question of the rights and responsibilities of the four powers—the USSR, the United States, France, and Great Britain—should also be resolved, could serve the purposes of settling the complex issues arising in connection with the unification of Germany.

As the USSR foreign minister noted, the guaranteeing of security in all its component parts—recognition of borders, exclusion of a military threat from German soil, demilitarization, guarantees of the non-revival of Nazism, resolution of the questions concerning the place of Germany in military-political alliances, and concerning the quadripartite responsibility, the foreign troops on its territory, and the settlement of financial and material claims to Germany which emerged as a result of the war, etc—is primarily understood in the Soviet Union as comprising the external aspects of the German problem.

Eduard Shevardnadze called "tactless" and "hasty" the declarations of some Western politicians that a unified Germany will invariably be included in the composition of NATO because none of them, after all, has asked the opinion of the citizens of the GDR— a country which is a member of another organisation, the Warsaw Pact. The minister stressed: "The prognosis about NATO membership for a unified Germany does not correspond to our ideas about our own national interests, and about a reliable structure for a peaceful 'all-European home.'"

Answering a question about the military-political status of the future Germany, the leader of the Soviet foreign policy department said: "By demilitarization we naturally understand not the total disarmament of a new European colossus, but the creation of conditions whereby aggression from the territory of Germany would become impossible. I think the current dynamism of European development, and the successful course of the talks about the reduction of conventional armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals make such a task totally realistic."

Speaking about the concept of "synchronization" of the unification of the two German states with the process of all- European rapprochement, Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that the essence of the "synchronization" means that the German question should be resolved within the all-European process and should proceed in the same direction that all Europe is proceeding, toward the strengthening of security and the development of cooperation. The formation of a committee of foreign ministers and the establishment of standing working organs, like a Secretariat, would in his opinion promote further "consolidation" of all-European political contacts.

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Two Germanies Should Maintain Allied Ties

90UI0400A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 7, 9-15 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Tolpegin: "Not Only a German Issue"]

[Text] Just three or four months ago politicians in the West and the East believed that unification of the two German states was a thing of the more or less distant future. Now the German question is on the agenda of practical politics.

Back on 28 November last year FRG Chancellor H. Kohl put forward his 10-point plan for the unification of Germany. In response H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, proposed the creation of a "treaty association," within whose framework the two states could cooperate closely, preserving, however, their sovereignty. On 1 February this year Modrow went further: He made public the concept of the gradual convergence of the GDR and the FRG up to and including the formation of a single German state (the full text of the document is published on page 2).

It is essential in evaluating Modrow's initiative, it would seem to me, to take account of the domestic political circumstances under which it was put forward.

The GDR is experiencing a serious social and political and economic crisis. On the one hand a break with the out-of-date command and administrative system is under way and democratic, humanitarian values are being restored. On the other, negative phenomena are growing. The massive outflow of skilled manpower to the FRG continues. Over 58,000 persons left the GDR in January alone. As a result not only is the fulfillment of production programs in jeopardy but with every passing day people's living conditions deteriorate. And this, in turn, is leading to an intensification of the resettlement mood. Many people in the GDR see as a way out of the vicious circle the speediest unification of the two states.

Practically all influential political forces in the GDR advocate a rapprochement with the Federal Republic. But opinions differ on the pace and form it should assume and, what is most important, on its ultimate purpose. While supporting the Modrow plan on the whole, the Democratic Socialism Party (such is the new name of the SED—the PDS) emphasized in its statement that it needs further specification. Immediate unification, the PDS believes, is impossible. Respect for the GDR's independence is necessary given a stage-by-stage rapprochement, and interference in its internal affairs must cease. A "progressive, social, democratic, humanitarian and consistently anti-fascist Germany" should ultimately emerge. As far as the majority of other political parties and associations is concerned, they are, it would seem, strongly influenced by the prevailing concepts in the FRG.

And on the other side leading politicians, to judge by everything, no longer see the border, which has become penetrable, but does actually exist nonetheless, as an obstacle to unification and are insisting on the latter's accelerated realization. There is no question here of "respect for the GDR's statehood," and the simple extension of the FRG Constitution to the territory of the other republic is contemplated.

Of course, it is up to the GDR itself to decide the question of its future. Germans, like other peoples, have the right to a free choice and independent path of development. I would allow that under the current harsh circumstances the GDR has altogether no other solution than the utmost rapprochement with the other German state. But it is important here to display concern to ensure that the lessons of history be taken into consideration, that the interests of other European countries are not violated and that a new threat in the center of Europe not arise.

Everyone, it would seem, agrees with this. The danger, in my view, is that the actual process of Germany's unification could be more rapid than the finding of joint answers to many of the questions which remain open and that the old security structures will be done away with before new ones have been created. In other words, might we not encounter a situation where a militarily and economically powerful state arises in the center of Europe and where we would lack safeguards against it at a moment it deemed suitable for making territorial or other claims against neighboring states?

What undesirable consequences such a development of events could evoke is well understood by politicians in the West also, those who absolutely could not be ranked as supporters of socialism included. For example, British Prime Minister M. Thatcher believes that the unification of Germany "should proceed at a pace which... affords us time to settle problems for this could otherwise lead to general destabilization." But this is what former U.S.

Secretary of State H. Kissinger writes: "Like many of my contemporaries who experienced the Hitler regime and WWII, I would not have been sorry had the question of German reunification not been at issue for some time yet. But inasmuch as it has now been raised, we have no chance of postponing its solution to a more convenient time."

The highly experienced politician is right. And although any haste here is impermissible, it is essential that all the parties concerned—and these are, aside from the GDR and the FRG, the four victorious powers responsible for German affairs and the other participants in the all-European process—act and make decisions. On the German question, as in the discussion of other international problems, it is important to seek and find a balance of interests. Realization of the national aspirations of the Germans must not create a situation wherein anyone fears for his future.

Among the questions to which complete clarity must be introduced is that of borders. Having signed the Moscow and Warsaw treaties and also the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, the FRG recognized the inviolability of the postwar borders. At the same time, however, Bonn maintains that the FRG cannot speak for a future pan-German Government. The decision of the federal Constitutional Court according to which the German Reich continues legally to exist within the 1937 borders remains in force.

Another important question concerns the attitude of the two German states and, subsequently, a united Germany toward the current military and political alliances. The Modrow concept presupposes the military neutrality of the GDR and the FRG for the period of the creation of the federation. The PDS, in addition, insists on the demilitarization of Germany. These ideas were, however, immediately rejected by the FRG and the other Western powers as "unrealistic". In exchange some politicians are proposing the incorporation of all of Germany in NATO. But such a formulation of the question is in principle unacceptable to the USSR and its allies.

Where is the solution? I incline to the opinion of those who consider inexpedient insistence on German neutrality. It is not just a question of the position of the Western powers. This idea would be difficult to realize in practice. The FRG would, in any event, remain a member of the European Community, in which increasingly great attention is also being paid to security problems. After all, the objections to Austria joining the EC amount to the fact that it would, whether it liked it or not, forfeit its neutral status. In addition, it is still a question as to which united Germany would represent the greater potential danger: linked by allied relations or going its "own way."

The two German states should evidently remain members of the corresponding alliances, fulfilling the commitments they have assumed. But the alliances themselves here would have to change their nature, changing from military-political into mainly political alliances. It would simultaneously be necessary to accelerate the progress of disarmament negotiations and seek radical reductions in conventional arms in Europe, on the territory of the GDR and the FRG included.

The rapprochement of the two German states should be synchronized with the process of the creation of a new European security system. Particular significance in this connection is attached to the speediest organization of a "Helsinki-2" conference, at which discussion of the German question would surely occupy a prominent place. After all, the German question concerns not only Germans. It is a European, more, a world problem.

Balebanov on Place of United Germany in Europe

LD0803101790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 7 Mar 90

[By TASS political observer Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow, 7 March—The process of the unification of the two German states has moved onto the practical plane. A meeting between representatives of the GDR and the FRG is due to take place in Berlin at the end of the week. This is the first stage towards talks under the "two plus four" formula, which are expected to begin on 14 March. The talks, which were agreed upon in Ottawa by the NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers will not be simple. For German reunification is linked with the solution of great and complex problems, which affect not only the GDR and the FRG, but the world community as a whole.

Discussion surrounding the question of the position that a united Germany is to hold in the military and political structure of Europe has become quite prickly recently. It would appear that this indeed will become the key issue at the forthcoming "Two Plus Four" talks. Certain circles in Washington and Bonn, which for some unknown reasons have decided to substitute a "one plus one" formula for the "two plus four" formula without asking for the views of other states, have already rushed to announce that a united Germany must belong to the NATO military and political bloc. This is not just a hasty position, but to put it bluntly, it is a pointless one, too, for that kind of option is unacceptable for our country, it is resolutely rejected by the Soviet public. In one way or another, it is also rejected by the public of other countries in Europe.

Many observers stress, quite rightly, that the very idea of Germany's belonging to NATO is being thrust vigorously at Western politicians by rightwing radicals, nationalists, and even blatant revanchists who are in favor of the "rebirth of the third reich" and the redrawing of European borders. And this, especially, is something that cannot fail to put one on one's guard.

Nor is the situation changed in principle when those who adhere to the idea of a "Germany in NATO" make out that they are supposedly making "concessions", putting forward so-called "interim" options, for example that a united Germany joins NATO, but the Armed Forces of the bloc are deployed only in the Western part of the new German state. These are nothing but attempts to secure by hook or by crook the selfsame objective—to break the equilibrium of forces which has come into being in Europe which is the foundation of stability, security, and mutual trust.

Failure to take into account the realities and the position of others is a bad and hopeless policy. This should be stated with all certainty once again today in the run up to the "Two plus Four" meeting.

The task today is to look for a scheme or an option of a kind that would be acceptable not only for all those taking part in the talks, but for all participant states in the Helsinki process. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed during his meeting in Moscow with the GDR Government delegation on 6 March, "an essential condition for movement towards a united Germany is that the rights and interests of the four powers and of other states, especially neighboring states, are taken into account; that currently existing European borders are recognized unconditionally; and that revanchist territorial claims of whatever kind are rejected."

German Question Requires Analytical Approach

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[Interview with Vyacheslav Dashichev, head of the Moscow World Economics and Socialist Systems Institute, by correspondent Elfie Siegl in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] [Siegl] Professor Dashichev, when recently GDR Premier Hans Modrow conferred in Moscow with Mikhail Gorbachev, the Kremlin head said that the German question is on the agenda in practice, but one has to approach it analytically. It will not be decided in the streets. However, in the GDR demonstrations by the grassroots brought about the upheaval.

[Dashichev] The expression "in the streets" does not mean neglecting the will of the people. The referendum, the right to self-determination of the people play the decisive role in this respect. I understand Gorbachev's words in the sense that he meant peaceful unification without extremist excesses, such as the events around the building of the State Security Service. On principle, Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed that the German people in the two German states have to decide themselves and have to come to a consensus.

But how? Stage by stage, in an evolutionary manner, and peacefully.

When elections take place in the GDR on 18 March and the power goes to a government composed of coalition parties, and even in the case that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] becomes a minority and loses its position of power, this will be by the people and must be recognized. Gysi also said that the SED will accept the results of the elections.

[Siegl] SED chief Gregor Gysi also was in Moscow recently and at a press conference advocated the unification of the two German states in stages. The first stage is to be the community of treaties, then there is the confederation, and as a third stage Gysi cited demilitarization. He said that it cannot be that one part of Germany—the FRG—is in NATO and the other one is neutral. And he told me that Gorbachev agreed with him. Is there a concept of a united, neutral German in the USSR today?

[Dashichev] This is a controversial question. In my view, it would not be appropriate to solve the German problem in a one-sided way, to see united Germany as part of NATO, for instance. This means: If the western Germany remains in NATO, this does not mean that then the powers of this alliance will be extended to the territory of today's GDR and that NATO troops will stand at the Polish-German border. The problem must be solved by negotiations. There are many varieties. One can arrive at compromises on this question.

From the viewpoint of our politicians and, particularly, of our military men, the shifting of power in the case of German unity within the framework of NATO would destroy the existing balance. Basically, this is true, but I think that one can find compromises here.

[Siegl] But do you think that the Gorbachev leadership has a concept for its Germany policy? Or is it not rather the case that until recently they thought that the question of German unity is not topical? However, then the developments in the GDR took place at such a speed that now they are simply helpless.

[Dashichev] This concept is in the process of developing. The old ideas and stereotypes of thinking have paralyzed many of our politicians to such an extent that it was very difficult to approach new ideas. Under the pressure of events, one has now understood that one has to approach the problem of reunification in a realistic way. Two years ago there was no concept at all. One did not want to hear anything about the topic—I say this from my own experience.

[Siegl] You yourself do have a concept for the unification of Germany?

[Dashichev] Already two or more years ago I advocated the positive solution, that is, the first easing of procedures at the borders and reducing difficulties concerning human contacts and economic and cultural relations between the two German states. Already at that time I imagined a confederation of the two German states. I have written several memoranda on this issue and I talked about it in my lectures in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, but I was not listened to at that time.

[Siegl] And what about today?

[Dashichev] Today everything has changed. Today one is thinking very intensively about how the problem can be solved in the interest of all sides.

[Siegl] At present, Soviet experts on Germany have completely different opinions on this problem. I am thinking, for instance, of Valentin Falin, head of the international department of the CPSU Central Committee, and his associate Nikolay Portugalov, who claimed in a newspaper article on the German question at the end of January that there are reasons in favor of the continued existence of two German states. They result from the requirements of all-European stability. He personally is convinced that the best solution of the German question consists in good-neighborly relations between two independent, sovereign German states. This is diametrically opposed to what you think.

[Dashichev] Yes. I proceed from the premise that the division of the German nation is not only immoral and inhuman, but also very dangerous for the future of Europe because the division harbors great danger to the stability and security of Europe. It can also give rise to nationalist feelings, and therefore I do not agree with this opinion. It is time to eliminate this hotbed of unrest in the center of Europe. This can be done only through the unification, the joining of the two parts of Germany.

However, this joining must take place gradually. Of course, this cannot be done immediately because the economic and political structures of the two German states are not the same. They have diverged very much in the course of 40 years, and now we are experiencing a transitional period of adjustment and approach, not only between the two German states but, in general, also between the USSR and the East European states and the West European states.

The USSR left European civilization about 60 years ago, the East European states 40 years ago, and now we return to the European cradle, to European civilization. This must be based on all-European values. These basic values are now being worked out and formulated in politics, economy, and ethics. Perestroyka also means the return to these basic human, I would say, European values.

[Siegl] But how strong are the conservative forces in the USSR, also particularly in the Army, who say that the GDR came under Soviet influence as a result of the USSR victory in World War II and we must not permit ourselves to lose—I do not want to say this bounty of war—"that"? I can imagine that in the Kremlin leadership, too, there is considerable resistance to a future confederation or unification of the two German states, that one wants to keep in particular the GDR in one's own sphere of influence on the basis of imperial superpower ambitions.

[Dashichev] There are different movements, opinions, and views in our country concerning the German question. Our leadership in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze understand the problem, but the middle echelon is very conservative. They were educated in Brezhnev's time of stagnation, made their career at that time, and can no longer change their thinking and get rid of their dogmas.

In this respect, I speak from my own experience. Over the past years I have encountered great resistance against any unusual ideas concerning the German question. One did not want to accept new realities; even the approach of the political and economic crisis in the GDR was not recognized.

The experts foresaw this, but the officials, also those in the Foreign Ministry, did not want to understand or accept this. Now they have bowed to the realities and recognized that one can no longer react to them in the old way.

[Siegl] Have they also realized that very little time is left? The German question might solve itself by having more and more people from the GDR move to the FRG. The numbers are frighteningly high. This year 3 million resettlers are expected. No society, no economy can tolerate this.

[Dashichev] This is also a result of incorrect politics. Politics lagged behind the events and were unable to think ahead. This is not correct politics. One should have taken the measures earlier in order to prevent such processes. But this failed because of the resistance of the conservative politicians, also in our leadership.

[Siegl] Last September Politburo Member Yegor Ligachev was in the GDR, and, upon his return, he praised the smooth socialism in the colors of the GDR.

[Dashichev] Ligachev, Honecker, and Mittag were the best of friends. Ligachev always presented the GDR as an example for all socialist countries, in particular in the field of agriculture, and in the struggle with those reformers who wanted to thoroughly change our agricultural conditions. He said that the cooperatives in the GDR are very capable, have stood their test, and therefore, we need not change anything concerning our state agriculture.

However, this opinion was completely wrong: German agriculture did not experience what ours had to live through in the years of collectivization, when the backbone of the peasantry was broken.

Today Ligachev would have to admit his wrong assessment of the conditions in the GDR, but, unfortunately, he does not do so. All mistakes and omissions leave him cold. He does not feel responsible for them, and also not to our public. Brezhnev, Suslov, and all the others—they were blind to reality, irresponsible, went unpunished, and considered themselves infallible. Everything they did was always right in their eyes. This also goes for Ligachev.

I always thought that one cannot carry out perestroyka with people like Ligachev. There is a fable by Krylov in which a swan, a crab, and a pike are put in front of a coach and pull in different directions. This is precisely the image of the selection of cadres in our country. One has to put real horses before the coach. But with the opponents of perestroyka, who are right in the middle of the leadership, one cannot carry out perestroyka.

[Siegl] What is the effect of the enormous economic problems of the GDR, which have developed not least because many people leave the GDR, on cooperation with the USSR?

[Dashichev] It is unavoidable that the GDR economy orients itself toward the West, toward the FRG. The vacuum which has formed in the economic relations between the two German states in the course of decades must be filled. Of course, this will lead to economic difficulties between the USSR and the GDR. However, those are only temporary, because the reconstruction of the national economy of the GDR will require big investments, also on the part of the FRG.

However, in the future, the GDR can serve as a mediator for the export of durable goods to the USSR. When the economic crisis has been overcome and the economic situation in the GDR stabilizes and consolidates, the USSR can only benefit from the German economy. Thus, there are very good prospects for economic cooperation between our two countries.

'International Observers Roundtable' Aired

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["International Observers Roundtable" program with Nikolay Agayants, Boris Andrianov, and Gennadiy Vedenyapin, all-union radio foreign-political commentators]

[Excerpts] [Agayants] Hello, esteemed listeners. International Observers at the Roundtable is on the air, with its chairman Nikolay Agayants at the microphone. With me in the studio are my colleagues, all-union radio foreign-political commentators Boris Andrianov and Gennadiy Vedenyapin. [passage omitted reporting that Vaclav Havel visited the USSR from 26 to 27 February]

[Andrianov] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Vaclav Havel called for Soviet-Czech relations to be built on the principles of sovereign equality and noninterference and be free from the fluctuations of the political and ideological situation. They also examined the possibilities for developing economic and cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

[Vedenyapin] And that was reflected in the Soviet-Czechoslovak declaration, which stresses that only on a footing of equality and full mutual respect for state sovereignty can voluntary cooperation, beneficial on both sides, be implemented in all spheres of public life. And this, in turn, will open vistas for strengthening the friendship of our peoples.

[Agayants] The Soviet side expressed regret over the unjustified military incursion in 1968, which had negative consequences for Czechoslovakia's development and an unfavorable effect upon the international situation.

[Andrianov] It should be noted that Vaclav Havel responded with understanding to this statement, and said the Czechoslovak public is conscious of the positive significance of the current foreign policy of the Soviet Union, based on the principles of the new thinking. He said that important steps were taken during the visit toward renewal and the building of mutually advantageous relations between our two states on democratic, humanitarian principles.

[Vedenyapin] And, of course, one of the most important accords reached in the course of the Soviet-Czechoslovak dialogue in Moscow was, without doubt, the signing of an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

[Agayants] Yes. At the press conference held at the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Center, the Czechoslovak president dealt with this problem in detail. You will remember that the agreement contains specific dates for the withdrawal of our troops, which must be completed in full before 1 July of next year.

[Andrianov] Vaclav Havel told the journalists that, during his talks with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, he requested that the Soviet military units and their equipment leave Czechoslovakia within a year, in other words, before 26 February 1991. He explained this action by its enormous importance both for the CSSR and for the whole of Europe. The chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet replied to this request that this was possible on condition that cooperation between the two countries in carrying out the withdrawal of the Soviet troops is successful. [passage omitted: Vedenyapin says Havel made various suggestions to facilitate the withdrawal. Andrianov agrees. Havel appreciated Gorbachev's arguments as to the impossibility of effecting the pull-out sooner than agreed. Agayants and Andrianov agree that the important thing is that the agreements have been reached. A source of trouble will be removed and it will become possible to have done with the past. Agayants mentions briefly some of the more general subjects touched on during the talks]

[Agayants] The process of change in East Europe could hardly be ignored, of course, during the 30-minute telephone conversation that was held this week between George Bush and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the framework of the regular exchange of views. They discussed current international issues—among others, of course, problems of European security including its German aspect, and the situation that has come about as a result of the recent elections in Nicaragua. They also touched on matters connected with the preparations for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit.

[Andrianov] To me there's nothing surprising in the fact that the German question was one of the main issues discussed during the conversation between Moscow and Washington on 28 February. For the sake of justice it must be said that for a long time we pretended there was no German question at all, as such. But it has begun to knock imperiously on Europe's door, and as we all know, you can't argue with history—the drawing together of the two German states followed by their probable unification, is, of course, historically inevitable. It's another matter that this process of drawing together is constantly gaining pace, while haste in this sort of thing is, as we know, fraught with numerous threats.

Without going into detail I will say that the GDR is already suffering the adverse consequences of this, and the idea of a stage-by-stage reunification put forward by the GDR's head of government, Modrow, seems logical. It creates a constructive foundation for Germany's future and has much in common, incidentally, with Helmut Kohl's well-known 10-point plan.

[Vedenyapin] You will agree that the drawing together and unification of the two Germanys' fundamentally different infrastructures is not by any means something that can be achieved in a few months, as some people think. It's not even something that can be achieved in a single year. Perhaps just one group of questions is enough to put paid to that idea: Will all of the future Germany, for instance, be a NATO member for a certain time, or will it be a special case with the eastern territories remaining with the Warsaw Pact and the western territories in NATO? Or will the GDR join the North Atlantic Alliance, but without NATO's military structure being extended to the east and with some of the Soviet troops remaining there as a guarantor of security? Will the idea of neutrality triumph, or will perhaps some intermediate option emerge?

[Agayants] It's true that one gets the impression that certain quarters in the Federal Republic of Germany, and indeed in the GDR, are not exerting themselves much in search of recipes that would suit Germans in both parts of Germany, and indeed the continent as a whole.

Take, for instance, the platforms of the GDR's bloc of conservative parties on the run-up to the 18 March parliamentary elections. They are of the opinion that socialism should be done away with in the GDR on that day. And in its place, by way of an alternative, they propose fully and immediately introducing the FRG's political, legal financial, and economic system on the territory of the GDR, where state enterprises must be denationalized and property returned to the previous owners, including those resident in the FRG.

[Andrianov] Let me mention in passing that these kinds of measures—and this was not concealed by the organizers of the press conference at which the election platform was announced—these measures will have severe social repercussions for the citizens of the GDR, and the population is quite justifiably apprehensive over this; particularly since what's at stake is, to all intents and purposes, the absorption of the GDR by extending to its territory the basic law of the Federal Republic. Chancellor Kohl, too, has placidly agreed to this, maintaining that this would be the most acceptable way. And he reasserted once more than in his view the future united Germany must definitely be a member of NATO and that there can be no question of neutrality. A categorical stance.

[Vedenyapin] On the other hand, the same degree of ambiguity remains in the West German chancellor's stance on the future of the Oder-Neisse boundary. He still insists that the inviolability of that border can only recognized, if you please, by the bearer of supreme authority, which can only recognize, if you please, by the bearer of supreme authority, which can only be a freely elected all-German parliament and a correspondingly formed government. The chancellor is stubbornly rejecting Tadeusz Mazowiecki's proposal that both German states should, even before unification, draw up a treaty on the borders which should be subsequently ratified by the all-German parliament.

[Agayants] Quite so, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich. What, if would seem, is preventing the FRG Bundestag and the GDR People's Chamber from making a corresponding statement regarding recognition of the Polish western border without delay? But, nonetheless, as you see, Bonn prefers to get off with evasive declarations, and Washington, in the words of Secretary of State Baker, having expressed its understanding of Helmut Kohl's point of view regarding the borders, is against the inclusion of Poland among the number of direct participants in the negotiations on the problems of German unification.

[Vedenyapin] Well, there are many hypotheses as to why Helmut Kohl does not now want to cross the Rubicon which the border issue represents. Many surmise that, during a year of parliamentary elections, the chancellor does not want to give a reason for the so-called expellees to leave the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Party and desert to the far right, to the republicans. It is also assumed that he would like to exploit the border issue as a sort of interim security, in order to block excessive expectations with regard to Germany's capacity for compromise.

[Agayants] Incidentally, the absence of a clear-cut position on the part of the federal government gives an excuse for certain forces to make extremely dubious statements and claims. An example of this may be provided by the demand of Koschyk, general secretary of the League of Expelled Germans [Bund Deutscher Vertriebenen] of thousands of millions to be paid in compensation to former owners of estates in Eastern Prussia. In the opinion of Vogel, the chairman of the Socialist Democratic Party, this can only be regarded as juridical nonsense.

[Andrianov] Concluding this subject, I would like to remind you that the universal desire to include the German problem in the pan-European process and the system of relations between east and west as logically as possible has already led to the beginning of negotiations according to the "two plus four" formula—that is, between the FRG, GDR, France, Britain, the USSR, and United States. Under discusion are the external aspects of the development of German unity, including security issues of neighboring states. It is evident that the best results can be achieved on this path, neutralizing all apprehensions and ensuring that the new Germany will become the genuine center of the unification of Europe.

[Vedenyapin] Talking to journalists, George Bush—I am returning to his telephone conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev—reported that he was satisfied with how Moscow received the results of Sunday's elections in Nicaragua. And the results, one must say, turned out to be really somewhat unexpected. You see, it was thought that the main participants in the confrontation, the Sandinista National Liberation Front and the opposition national alliance, would reach the finish of the election marathon without any particular gap between them as to the number of electors' votes.

And, of course, preference was more frequently given to the Sandinistas. But, nevertheless, the outcome of the ballot turned out to be in favor of the opposition. It unites, if you recall, 14 parties, from left-wing to extreme right-wing ones, who, in their turn, are only united in their opposition to the Sandinistas. Well, consequently, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, candidate of the opposition national alliance, has become the new president.

[Agayants] Well, having conceded at the elections, the Sandinistas, nonetheless, remain an influential political force in the country, without which the decision of any problem is impossible. It is considered that at best the former opposition will have 15 more seats in parliament, but this is clearly insufficient to put its program into life by constitutional means.

You see, any constitutional amendments demand a 60 percent majority in parliament. And this means that the ruling coalition will have to compromise with the Sandinistas, particularly on the issues concerning cutting the army, control over the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the privatization of banks.

[Andrianov] Now they will have to act in fundamentally new conditions, to analyze and draw genuinely constructive conclusions from their past mistakes. But, evidently, the main thing is that the Sandinista Front, even having lost the elections, has in no way become broken and even its opponents agree with this. [passage omitted: Agayants says that like Nicaragua, Cambodia needs free and democratic elections. Andrianov notes that Thai prime minister's proposal for a cease-fire and the Soviet and U.S. proposed moratorium on military supplies. Vedenyapin says that the shift in the Chinese position has removed the problem of legal recognition of the Khmer Rouge. However, the problem of the Khmer Rouge remains. The speakers note that the 21 February meeting between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in Bangkok was a positive shift in the spirit of national reconciliation. Andrianov hopes that progress can be made in the third series of talks in Jakarta although, he says, the Khmer Rouge does not want a peaceful settlement because it has nothing to gain from fair elections. Agayants sums up by saying that Cambodia is one of the oldest and most difficult world conflicts. Agayants then brings the program to a close]

Journalists' Approach to Foreign Coverage Debated

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[Unattributed report on 26 February meeting at PRAVDA editorial office of journalists specializing in international affairs addressed by, among others, I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and PRAVDA chief editor: "Mouthpiece or Mirror? After Meeting at PRAVDA Editorial Office, International Affairs Journalists Decided To Set Up Their Own Press Club"]

[Text] Let us be frank—journalists, too, feel a need for mutual contact. We saw this for ourselves once again when we held a meeting of journalists specializing in international affairs. As already reported, observers and commentators gathered in the PRAVDA conference hall. They included: V. Korzin and I. Fesunenko (Central Television), S. Kondrashov, A. Bovin, and A. Ostalskiy (IZVESTIYA), A. Drozdov, P. Vedenyapin, and L. Yuferova (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA), S. Volovets (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI), S. Morozov (ZA RUBEZHOM), D. Pogorzhelskiy (NOVOYE VREMYA), and V. Ovchinnikov, B. Averchenko, G. Vasilyev, V. Drobkov, and A. Lopukhin (PRAVDA).

There was a debate and exchange of opinions. There were questions addressed to I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, who took part in the conversation. There was tasty tea from a samovar. And, in the general opinion, there was a frank, interested discussion at the meeting, which was chaired by PRAVDA Deputy Chief Editor A. Karpychev.

What was the result? A desire to make such meetings a regular occurrence was expressed. Moreover, it was decided to create a press club for international affairs journalists, defining its location as the PRAVDA editorial office. What the club is to be like has yet to be discussed, but one thing is clear (this too is the common opinion of the meeting): We expect trusting conversations with those who are in on the formation of Soviet foreign policy and those who implement it, with diplomats and academics, with guests from foreign countries, too, with competent people. Not letting the grass grow under its feet, the press club invites USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze to its first meeting, at a time convenient to him.

The Off-the-Cuff Interview That Began the Meeting. I.T. Frolov Answers Questions

[Question] You have instituted a "Discussion Pamphlet" in PRAVDA. There is discussion of the party and of preparations for the congress. All this is timely and necessary. I have a question for you as chief editor: Are you prepared to institute a discussion club or rubric like "Free Opinion" or "Our Position" for international affairs commentators? So they can express their own opinion—not the government's, not that of the paper's chief editor, but their own. Of course, no one has any intention of inflaming "passions." You're a party paper, you have more "latitude" than anyone else.

[Answer] For me personally this question has long since been settled. It was settled over 30 years ago, and I am not going to change in this respect, although I received many bitter lessons in the past. Whatever publication I have worked for, the first thing I have done has been to institute a discussion section. This was the case, for instance, in the journals VOPROSY FILOSOFII, PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, and KOMMUNIST. We also raised international, global problems in "roundtables." As for the "Discussion Pamphlet," we should ensure that as many readers' letters as possible are published in it. The "Dialogue" feature devoted to international topics is based on letters. So I am in favor of debates, in favor of debates reflecting the opinion of authors and readers rather than the chief editor. Let's try to learn to conduct debates on international topics, too. I see no insurmountable obstacles here.

[Question] I have a question for you not only as PRAVDA chief editor but also as Central Committee secretary. Yes, the "limits of glasnost" have broadened. We can even say specifically how far they have broadened. But we have no tradition of more or less regular press conferences by the country's leaders. "Off-the-record" [na rabochem urovne] briefings are sometimes not enough. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev holds press conferences when he is abroad. The foreign minister also does this abroad. This does not happen inside the country. Yet such press conferences would provide an opportunity to link particular events in domestic and international life. Yes, journalists may ask sharp questions. The questions that interest the people. What do you think, is there any chance of getting more or less regular press conferences?

[Answer] So far as I am aware, the question is now being studied in the following context.... Party leaders will meet regularly with correspondents. I am holding press conferences here at PRAVDA. The last time we did this was after the Central Committee February Plenum. Over 100 correspondents were there. They ask very tricky questions.

[Question] But once again, this was for foreign correspondents accredited in Moscow. We are fighting on our own account.

[Answer] If you want to and have some time free, come along. I'm prepared to answer your questions. Next time we will notify our papers about the press conference. But you tell your editors that this is being done at your request, not mine.

[Question] How do you determine for yourself the "limits of glasnost" in international journalism?

[Answer] I think the terms "glasnost" and "limits" are incompatible. I believe everyone must feel free. Especially now, during the period of perestroyka and glasnost, although even today a great deal depends on the personality of the editor and journalist, on their principledness and responsibility. But a great deal has still not been smashed in the actual mechanism for implementing glasnost. A great deal is still based on the inertia of what I would describe as apparatus thinking. I hope that much will change as a result of the 28th Congress, including the Central Committee structure. It will be a living, working Central Committee, and the Central Committee members will decide questions, not the apparatus. And then, I think, we will also make very substantial progress in the sphere that interests us. I think that the essence of party leadership can develop most effectively in only one form. I am referring to cadre policy. The leaders of the mass news media must be fully trusted, and not insulted with all kinds of suspicions and instructions.

[Question] Is this principle applied in your editorial office? What about department editors—do you trust them, are they completely free?

[Answer] The chief editor remains the chief editor. Including with regard to the fact that the main areas of the paper, its ideas, its position, and so forth lie within his competence, and of course he has the decisive say here. But I would say that any editor who does not provide independence and a free creative quest for his staffers is doing a bad job. We must learn this, and that naturally goes for the PRAVDA chief editor, too.

Igor Fesunenko: Don't Fear Debate

Our colleagues dealing with domestic problems can freely criticize whoever they like! But we still have to be circumspect. By being such sticklers for etiquette regarding the socialist countries, we have created a peculiar complex in our television viewers. We are now receiving masses of angry letters: What's going on—you used to say Romania is a wonderful country, see what order there is there, everything seems to be fine, although there are a few problems. But now everyone is making concerted attacks on Ceausescu. Where were you before?

I had an illustration of this that is really quite a joke: On 20 December I was presenting "The World Today"—note the date. We know what was happening then in Romania. But what could I say at the time? I merely said that the great leader of the Romanian people was clearly feeling very confident, because at this grave hour, when such dramatic and even bloody events were taking place in Timisoara, he had ventured to set off on a visit to Iran.

I said this sarcastically, making no secret of my attitude. But in early January I got an angry letter from one of our viewers who indignantly asked: What right has this political observer to speak of the leader of a socialist country in that kind of tone and to comment on why he went on a trip or not? What right has he?

Maybe it is time to expand the range of publications where we can discuss acute problems more or less freely. After all, there are also a number of problems which we could meet to discuss in our international journalism. Each of us could mention a mass of controversial, sore points that we should obviously debate and discuss comprehensively without immediately going for our gun, inviting specialists and academicians and maybe even diplomats along.

Stanislav Kondrashov: Supremacy of Truth

The dangers of international journalism include the danger of creating new stereotypes. The world is changing more rapidly than we comprehend, and not only at a journalistic or even scientific level, but also at the official level. Take East Europe. The changes there have not been analyzed profoundly and truthfully enough. We failed to provide a model of society ensuring a good life for our own people, but we foisted this worthless model on other countries. And when we ourselves rejected this model, when we refused to support it by force any longer in East Europe, a swift chain reaction began.

Our country is seeking, maybe without realizing it itself, a new, more realistic place in the world. We are casting off the redundant, burdensome armor of a superpower. The world is at a stage of dramatic changes. Barricades are being erected in their path—and this is another part of the mass consciousness—out of the very myths and stereotypes that our propaganda long foisted on our people. They are boomeranging against us in the editorial mail. I agree we should be objective and not distort the picture of the world. And at the same time we must uphold the personal—our own position, our own opinion. In a process of overcoming ourselves, as it were, we must rid ourselves of the stereotypes that have eaten into our flesh and blood even when we have been skeptical about them.

In general, an extremely simple yet most difficult principle is the supremacy of truth over everything else. Responsibility to society, not only to your bosses.

Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: The Human Dimension

Developing Fesunenko's though[illegible]ant to say that our problem is identification. No[illegible]ly Soviet readers, viewers, and listeners, but also o[illegible]al circles in foreign countries (especially friendly countries) have been accustomed to identify the opinion of any Soviet journalist with the position of the Kremlin. It is important to accustom our audience to the idea that we are entitled to have our own opinion.

One Sovietologist formulated his idea of the perestroyka of the mass media in the USSR as follows: "turning the mouthpiece of the leadership into a mirror of life." I think that is a revealing and accurate metaphor. A mouthpiece means information traveling vertically. But a mirror is more like a two-way street. The grassroots can see the aims that their leadership is summoning them to achieve. The leadership can see the range of sentiments existing within society. So far as international topics are concerned, the task looks like this: revealing to readers and viewers a truthful and full picture of the world in order to enhance the role of public opinion in shaping USSR foreign policy; not only providing our own interpretation of international events but also more extensively showing what people abroad think of our country and how they see its actions in the international arena.

Two. As we abandon the "black and white" vision of the world, it would be a mistake to replace it with a "white and black" one, that is, to indiscriminately "whitewash" foreign reality and equally indiscriminately "blacken" our own. That would be to replace one half-truth with another. The most important thing is to get rid of the blinders, of the habit of noticing only what we want to see while ignoring whatever is unpleasant to see. As I see it, an international affairs journalist must be objective and must not be indifferent. His journalistic vision is not like a lens. After all, you can look at the world around you through the eyes of Dostoyevskiy, who regarded even the most perfect structure of the world as unacceptable if it was based on the tears of a single child. Or you can assess our time from the standpoint of social darwinism: survival of the fittest.

The third topic I would like to touch on is the "human dimension" of international life. In emphasizing the general laws of historical development, we have often lost sight of the fact that these laws forge ahead in a specific environment in each country.

Valeriy Korzin: The Right to an Opinion

We have accustomed not only viewers and readers but also officials to identify journalism with interstate policy. Here is a specific example. One evening I was presenting "The World Today." There had been a coup in a distant country. We had got documentary shots: severed heads, rivers of blood. Naturally, I provided a commentary.

The next day we received a telegram from the ambassador. His main argument was: What was the point in mentioning this? We have got to work with them—with the military men who have come to power. What is the point in damaging our relations with this country?

I think this kind of approach is of no benefit. I am astonished that the people who determine our policy refuse to grasp that if different viewpoints and different positions were expressed on a particular issue, this would only benefit both our public and our diplomacy.

Aleksandr Drozdov: Time To Unite

We, I mean our paper, are very worried by the fact that the market for international information has narrowed quite sharply. One factor here, of course, has been the switch in readers' interest toward domestic problems. But the decline in both the quality and the level of coverage of international events is particularly marked. We thought the level was perfectly okay, but, from the reader's viewpoint (our mail has shown this very clearly), matters were somewhat different. Nevertheless, we are gradually getting back into this market. I think the following criteria can help us gain a firm place in it.

First there is an individual attitude toward international events. I think the most interesting thing for any reader is above all the journalist's own attitude toward a particular event. Unfortunately, we have very few such "individual" journalists, this is our "front rank" individual journalism. But I must say that there are different approaches and views regarding international journalism, and the more vigorously the "second rank"—young people—are promoted in the mass media, the more interesting it will be.

In order to win readers' trust, you need assessments containing elements of prediction. Without such prediction ahead of events, it is very hard to maintain a professional reputation. The following rule applies: Whoever offers the first assessment gets the propaganda gain.

Why have we met for a "roundtable"? Judging by the speeches, we do not diverge greatly, or maybe even at all, in our views. I think it is no accident that the question has been put here: Are we ready to travel further along the path of glasnost? And the fact that we have gathered together is further evidence that we feel a little bit afraid on our own.

Today we will finish our meeting in the awareness that any bold step by our colleagues—whether on television, in PRAVDA, or in IZVESTIYA—will be not merely understood, but supported.

Sergey Volovets: Resolving the Overriding Task

A little while ago Graham Greene was giving a television interview and he was asked why he writes, is he trying to make people kinder, braver, or better. He said: I don't want anything, I don't want to change people at all, I want them to read my little books and to be entertained by them, and to be happy. That is my task. And I would pick up the royalties.

In all our speeches today, without spelling it out, we have been speaking of our profession as an applied field, as serving something, as not being self-sufficient. You might think our task is to allow people to satisfy their hunger for international information. This would give them pleasure like that of satisfying physical hunger, and we would regard our mission as fulfilled. But in fact in our trade you constantly sense that there is an overriding task.

The point is that, just as in old ballets the men mostly played the supporting role, international journalism was previously regarded as simply serving our foreign policy and supporting specific actions by the leadership.

One more difficulty still exists in our international journalism, although to a far lesser extent: direct support for the leadership of the countries that we used to describe or continue to describe as fraternal. This is now receding into the background, but we still observe some rudimentary survivals of this trouble on the surface.

I think that when we now speak of extending the limits of glasnost in international journalism, we should clearly finger the factors hampering this. One of the main ones, in my view, is fact that the applied, service nature of our profession continues to exist to this day.

Aleksandr Bovin: In the Risk Zone [subhead]

What does an international affairs journalist need in order to work well? First, the right to write the truth, that is, to portray facts, events, and processes as they really are. Both in our country and abroad. And, second, the right to offer his own assessment both of events and of actions, of policy, including our own policy. Without this a journalist cannot perform his professional duty.

The journalist's position must be separated from the state's position, this gap must be broadened and reinforced. Theoretically everything is clear in this respect. A very great deal has also been done in practice. However, both the USSR Foreign Ministry and the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, operating from a position of strength, are still continuing to narrow journalists' possibilities.

Should we wait for everything to "turn out fine"? No way! Our task is to be able to work in the risk zone. Everyone must try to force open and broaden the entrances to the zone of glasnost in their own place and with their own "personal" head. Of course, there is a risk of collecting a few lumps. The price of honesty, so to speak....

There is also the question of our professional skill. Overall, it is not very high. Because there was no real school of journalism. There was quite the reverse. Every effort was made to destroy any tendency to independent, original thought. And many people were broken. We are not to blame for this, it is our misfortune.

Gennadiy Vasilyev: External and Internal Inhibiting Factors

I would like to return to the topic raised at the beginning, about the limits of glasnost in international journalism. I believe that there are limits nevertheless, and they do not lie in primitive understanding but in something very simple that immediately comes to mind: Certain people are preventing us from telling the truth. Of course, this too has its place. The administrative edict system, though it has been shaken, still fundamentally remains in existence, and it is continuing to operate in the press. But I want to make a different point—that there are other restrictions preventing international affairs journalists from working properly. The information we receive is very limited. That is a very serious problem for us.

The second thing that I think hampers us and establishes limits of glasnost for international affairs journalists is our internal inhibiting factors, which are maybe far stronger than the external ones. After all, it used to be easy to work. There was a set of maybe five or 10 themes for correspondents in the capitalist countries: rich and poor, contrasts, the strike movement, the military-industrial complex. But now you have to get to the nitty-gritty of life, in all its complexity and diversity.

And there is a third matter, a specific one, I would like to mention. A question has been asked here about a discussion pamphlet on international themes. I don't think this need necessarily be done in such a formal way. But, in my view, there is a need for variant analyses of international events and, if you like, for debate.

Vladislav Drobkov: Abandoning the Sack Race

I remember a foreign colleague remarking that the difference between Soviet and foreign journalists is very marked. The Western journalist can freely run his "distance," but the Soviet journalist tries to cover the same ground, but he does so...in a sack. A sack made up of all kinds of instructions and restrictions. Now glasnost has made a little hole in this sack. We have been able to stick one "leg" out, but the other is still quite firmly stuck in the sack. And in order to really run as fast as our foreign colleagues and compete over both short and long distances, we need to free our other leg, too. And solidarity among journalists can help us here....

At one time we were very happy to have ideologized news. We were happy that every piece of news in our country already contained some commentary. We reached the point where in a five-line piece four lines would essentially be commentary and only one would be news. We contrived to present any news in such a way as to offer an assessment of it in advance, thereby depriving our readers of the opportunity to chew on "real meat" and palming them off with predigested "mush."

One more point. We all know how foreign policy actions are prepared abroad. We know that if the U.S. President is going to put forward an initiative, some journalist close to the White House will write about this a week in advance. Arguments will develop five or six days in advance. Someone will ask a question in Congress. Then news will come in that the Pentagon is said to be unhappy with the upcoming demarche...and so forth. In other words, a purposeful propaganda campaign is mounted in advance. And the "seeds" of the President's initiatives fall on carefully prepared ground. But in our country our initiatives often come out of the blue.

Pavel Vedenyapin: Avoiding One-Sidedness

We are now stewing in our own juice, as it were. We have many interesting ideas and interesting assessments. And there is nothing to take issue with here, so to speak—it is a meeting of people of like mind.

So in this situation, for instance, I would like to hear what people who have nothing directly to do with our profession have to say, I would like to hear what readers have to say—what they think about all the questions that have been raised today.

In particular, the question of the danger that threatens international journalism has been raised. I would like to hear readers' answer to the question of what they think this danger is. I would describe the stereotype of smashing stereotypes as one of these dangers. We began to smash these stereotypes and, in my view, we got well and truly carried away. We are so carried away that we are like someone who has been crawling for ages through a desert and has at last come to a container of water, has thirstily fallen upon it, and has forgotten about everything else. He cannot tear himself away from the container and look around, he is thinking only of water.... Thus we have sometimes begun to be uncomfortable about writing about things like, say, unemployment, drug addiction, and homeless people abroad. For some reason we seem to have forgotten about all this, fearful of gaining a reputation as conservatives in international journalism.

I think that the hardest thing will be to find the golden mean of objective coverage of life in foreign countries. We should not slap white paint on black marks or the other way round. We must write about everything, then this will be the truth. One-sidedness breeds mistrust.

Dmitriy Pogorzhelskiy: The Global Nature of Problems

You can see from our magazine what a transformation has occurred in our country. International politics used to be the only thing we dealt with, and there would be articles about the Soviet Union just once a year. But now even structurally all these problems have come to the fore for us. This can be seen even from the way we present articles: the Soviet Union, East Europe, problems connected with us. And everything that occurs elsewhere, be it Haiti or the United States, interests by no means all our readers.

Because NOVOYE VREMYA is a weekly, we have long tried to be a journal of opinion rather than news. We cannot keep up with the news. We try to record particular phenomena and trends in world politics. In my view, events in our domestic life should also be approached from this angle. It inevitably appears that when we receive information about a particular country or particular problems, we project all this onto ourselves, so to speak. Take "Europe 1992," the "Common Market." What does this mean? Where will we come in? We are beginning to speak of an economic and legal space from the Atlantic to the Urals. That is all fine and dandy. What does this actually mean? What is our place?

Sergey Morozov: Toward New Thinking

It is important for us international affairs journalists to be precisely aware of the state of public opinion in the country: how people assess various events and phenomena taking place in the international arena, what shifts are occurring in these assessments, how international news is greeted. It is true that events in East Europe have again sharply intensified public interest in international affairs, although we know that they are interpreted in various ways. I think that journalists should draw conclusions from this for their long-term work. We should do this because we must—in the good sense of the term—engage in educational work and foster and strengthen the new thinking, the new perception of the world, and, I would say, breadth of view.

Section 6 of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th Party Congress, which is called "Toward Peaceful Development for Mankind," in my view lacks one principled formula that I would propose be included. Namely, regarding the openness of the Soviet Union and our whole society with regard to the surrounding world as a component of our long-term foreign policy course.

This openness must also be extended to international journalism and, in particular, be strengthened by it. **From the Editorial Office**: So opinions were voiced, sometimes contradictory and controversial. But how else could it be when such a complex problem was under discussion—what should international journalism be like? We invite not only professionals but also our readers at large to speak out. After all, our work is for them.

Sturua Discusses Nicaraguan, Lithuanian Elections

PM2802091490

[Editorial Report] London BBC Television Network in English at 2230 GMT on 26 February on BBC 2's "Newsnight" program carries a live interview with Melor Sturua, IZVESTIYA's foreign editor, in Washington, by news presenter Donald MacCormick in London. The program also includes an interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger in New York, after which Sturua returns to make a final statement.

After introducing Sturua, MacCormick asks: "First of all, Dr. Sturua, let me put this to you: Taking the Lithuanian election result together with the Nicaraguan one, is there anywhere left in the world where people will actually vote communist if they get the choice?" Sturua answers: "Well, to begin with, we have to distinguish the elections in Nicaragua and the elections in Lithuania. For me the results of elections in Nicaragua were unpredictable, and I must confess that my first subjective reaction is that I am disappointed. I wished well, certainly, Sandinistas—and Daniel Ortega, in particular. But on the other hand, if we evaluate the results of elections in Nicaragua, we'll see that objectively they have some positive sides: To begin with there is a chance to end their bloody civil war in Nicaragua and fights between Sandinistas and contras...."

MacCormick asks: "Do you see any positive sides in the Lithuanian result?" to which Sturua replies: "Well, as to the elections in Lithuania, they were quite predictable, and Sajudis won a majority in a...for a...in a future parliament. It seems to me that nowadays we are paying the old debt not only of Stalin and his successors—immediate successors—but also of Stalin's predecessors. Because under the czar Russia was called 'the prison of the peoples,' and unfortunately for us, Stalin tried to keep the Soviet Union as a 'prison of the peoples,'—and that's why the idea of federation of independent states was abandoned. And instead of this union, we had a unitary, authoritarian government and state which was ruled from Moscow. And that's why it seems to me that this reaction—not only in the Baltic Republics but in other republics—is very healthy, because it shows that without changing the system of the union, without changing the very sense of our federation, we will never succeed to build—or to rebuild—a new Soviet Union."

MacCormick asks him: "Would you regard the process as just as healthy if some of the much bigger republics—like Georgia, for example, or even the Ukraine—caught the fever for independence from Moscow from the Baltic states and demanded an end to control from Moscow?" Sturua replies: "The point is that every people has right for independence, and in our constitution this right was written, but unfortunately, there was no mechanism to implement this right because nobody paid attention to it. Well, it seems to me that every people—not only outside the Soviet Union but also inside the Soviet Union—has a right to choose, and this right of choice was proclaimed by Mr. Gorbachev in 1986 when he addressed the United Nations. And it seems to me that if you are really the supporter of this basic fundamental idea, you must apply it not only for foreign countries like in East Europe, but also you must apply to the republics which are parts of the Soviet Union."

At this point, MacCormick thanks Sturua and goes on to talk with Dr. Kissinger, who discusses the nationalities issues, saying: "I could conceive, for example, that in the Russian Republic, which is over half of the population, that free elections would bring to power an extremely nationalistic group of representatives—nationalistic in a Russian sense. Russian nationalism has usually been repressive and expansionist vis-a-vis neighboring nationalities so that the collapse of communism would not necessarily mean that the Soviet Union as we know it—or the Russian Empire as it was before—would disintegrate into its constituent republics. That, I think, is the big challenge in the Soviet Union." MacCormick thanks Dr. Kissinger and returns to Sturua for a final statement.

Sturua concludes by saying: "Well, it seems to me that political reforms never succeed if they are not supported by economic reforms, and vice versa. And I think that perestroyka must deliver as soon as possible, because if it doesn't deliver—if it doesn't improve the living conditions in the Soviet Union—of course frustrated people will say: We don't need such a glasnost and perestroyka. Glasnost and democratization—glasnost means "openness"—are more a gift for the intelligentsia. But at the same time, the population of the Soviet Union says: Well, you intelligent people, you get your freedom of speech, freedom to demonstrate. What about consumer goods? What about food? And the point is that we will never succeed to build a new society if we don't succeed to build consumer society in our country."

Zakariya Cited on International Labor Movement

90UI0401A Moscow TRUD in Russian
23 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Ibrahim Zakariya, secretary general of the World Federation of Trade Unions, by I. Shevtsov, TRUD correspondent; in Prague, February: "A Dialogue is Needed More Than Ever"]

[Text] Ibrahim Zakariya, the secretary general of the WFTU [World Federation of Trade Unions], was asked by I. Shevtsov, TRUD correspondent, to give an evaluation of certain facts in today's international trade union movement.

"The second half of the 1980's of this century," I. Zakariya began the interview, "was marked by a whole series of unprecedented events and important political changes in many countries, which also had a direct effect on the development of the international trade union movement. And this is a serious addition to the challenge that was leveled at the trade unions of all countries by the scientific and technical revolution. The broad prospects for economic cooperation, regional integration, and the new political thinking, which is continuously getting stronger in the modern world, also have a strong influence on the condition of the international trade union movement.

[Shevtsov] And how does the WFTU assess what is occurring in the trade unions of the countries of Eastern Europe?

[Zakariya] In each of these countries, the trade unions themselves determine their own future development, which in many ways will depend on the internal political situation that develops. At the same time, it is impossible not to see one of their common features. This concerns the growing role of the basic and branch organizations, which are more and more actively influencing the policy of the national trade union centers.

Practically all of the trade unions in these countries have already determined their own relationships with various institutions in society, including the governments, on the basis of adopting their own decisions which correspond to their own plans and programs of actions. This fully responds to the concept of the independence of trade unions, which is stipulated in the WFTU statutes. Finally, trade union activity is being more and more actively reoriented to the protection of the interests of the workers, against whom the reforms being implemented must not turn.

Today, we are becoming witnesses of how, within the framework of the national trade union movement, political and ideological pluralism is being asserted, and how several trade union centers are emerging in one country. We think that these processes should in no way splinter and weaken the national trade union movement. For them and for the entire international trade union movement as a whole, it is necessary, as never before, to get a dialogue going. Undoubtedly, all questions associated with the present condition of the trade unions in East European countries will be examined in detail at the forthcoming 12th World Congress of Trade Unions.

[Shevtsov] In your opinion, what are some of the other problems that the international trade union movement will have to encounter?

[Zakariya] The development of interdependent processes in today's world, first and foremost in the sphere of economics, can lead not only to positive, but also to negative social consequences for the working masses. Thus, instability in international trade and foreign economic relations today can lead to the loss of millions of jobs. Therefore, on an international level, in defending the interests of the workers, the trade unions must continuously coordinate their activities. They must demand their own active involvement in the planning and implementation of inter-state economic relations. On an international scale, the trade union movement must create its own mechanism for watching and intervening in the development of the foreign economic processes.

Also a problem is the fact that even in countries where conditions have been established for the active participation of trade unions in economic processes, they will, nonetheless, encounter specific difficulties because of their lack of clear concepts and necessary practical skills. That is why the development of specific methods of activity under new conditions takes on special significance, which, of course, is not a simple matter. And here also there is a need for a broad exchange of experience between the trade unions of various countries and the establishment of a dialogue within the framework of the entire international trade union movement.

The WFTU proposes to begin such a dialogue in the course of preparations for the 12th World Congress of Trade Unions. On the way toward it, several working groups of experts have already been set up and are engaged in the development of documents on various aspects of the world economy and the social situation in the world.

[Shevtsov] How can trade unions contribute to social progress under present conditions?

[Zakariya] As is well-known, the 12th World Congress of Trade Unions is being conducted in the year of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of May Day. All these years the international working class and the trade unions have substantially influenced the entire course of social development. In our time, when the problems of a post-industrial information society come to the fore more and more, the international trade union movement should continue to take an active role in the matter of scientific-technical development, and also in the resolution of contemporary global problems, and, most of all, in the strengthening of general peace and security.

In this connection, I would like to note that the observed important positive changes in the international situation, which became possible owing to the initiatives of peace-loving and realistic-thinking forces, first and foremost in the USSR, create a good foundation for promoting international cooperation and universal progress.

'Secrecy' of Higher Party School Ends

90UI0395A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 7, 24 Feb-2 Mar 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Yu. Krasin, dean of the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute, by V. Romanenko: "'Secrets' of a Party Institute"]

[Text] Glasnost is today throwing light on the spheres of our life which were until recently hidden from the people's eyes. The higher party institutes are revealing their "secrets." Were there things to hide? This is the topic of the interview conducted by our correspondent V. Romanenko with Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu. Krasin, dean of the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute.

[Romanenko] For a long time your institute was a "secret under seven seals" for the uninitiated, and no one could figure out who was being taught what there. Its building did not even have a sign. What was the reason for this secrecy?

[Krasin] Truly, our institute was an educational institution of the "closed" type. And the process of its "declassification," which is today practically complete, began just two years ago.

To some extent the institute's "secrecy" was justified. It was formed in 1962 to assist the communist and workers parties of capitalist and developing countries train party cadres. At that time many of these parties were illegal or semi-legal. Naturally, their representatives had no need of publicity. The closed nature of the institute had its negative aspects and engendered exclusiveness. The orientation solely toward the Communist Party impeded a broad exchange of opinions and contacts with representatives of other democratic movements and parties in these countries.

However, life does not stand still. At the present time practically all communist parties have emerged from clandestine activity. Therefore now such secrecy serves, I believe, no purpose.

[Romanenko] The world communist movement is in crisis, and a process of dismantling "authoritarian socialism" is under way in East Europe. Do you believe that the institute at the present time justifies its purpose?

[Krasin]. Yes. First, in many countries and regions communist parties remain an influential force. Second, we are responsible to a considerable extent for the crisis processes in the world communist movement. Many of its representatives were taught here, and we shaped their views. In the years of perestroyka our country has abandoned "barracks" socialism and has in its theoretical quest moved far ahead. Some of our former students, however, have stuck at the level of the old dogmatic ideas. I therefore consider it our moral duty now to help them.

The main thing, however, is that under the conditions of molding and disseminating the new political thinking, our institute can and should become an arena of broad contacts and creative debate with progressive social and political forces overseas. This work is already under way. We have established good relations, for example, with socialists and social democrats. On the basis of a broad comparison of views, we are conducting scientific research making it possible to comprehend the complex processes of world development.

[Romanenko] The lack of objective information gives rise to inventions. Some people believe that you are training some kind of international terrorists who accomplish revolutionary coups.

[Krasin] Such assertions are simply ridiculous. It is a question of theoretical courses in social and political disciplines and debate and an exchange of opinions with representatives of communists, socialists, and other democratic parties.

[Romanenko] Analyzing the trends of development of the world communist movement, many Western experts are predicting its collapse.

[Krasin] A great deal depends on the parties themselves. I believe that we have a reserve of political space and prospects and possibilities of emerging from the crisis. The experience of the Italian, Spanish, and other communist parties testifies to this. Many people have understood that we need today to give priority to values common to all mankind, to emphatically rid ourselves of sectarianism, and to move toward a broad coalition of forces of the left, not orienting ourselves only toward the working class as traditionally understood.

[Romanenko] Who finances the institute?

[Krasin] The financing comes from the party budget. The state does not spend one kopeck. Inasmuch as we deal, in the main, with parties which have limited financial possibilities, we, naturally, spend our own money. The institute pays its students a grant on the order of R180 a month and pays for round-trip travel. These are considerable outlays.

[Romanenko] Do you intend to continue being oriented toward the party budget?

[Krasin] We have plans to switch the institute to financial autonomy. Austerity is now the watchword on all lines of the party budget. However, attaching great significance to the institute, the CPSU Central Committee is creating no financial difficulties for us. We appreciate this. Nonetheless, we are seeking ways to transfer the institute to self-support.

We plan on the basis of the institute to develop an international contacts and research foundation. We have even found sponsors ready to allocate money, in foreign currency included, to set it up. The farsighted businessmen are not chasing immediate advantages. In their opinion, such a foundation, acquiring international celebrity, would repay sponsorship activity in the future. Realization of our program will make it possible to switch in two or three years to a fully commercial basis and self-support. Our proposals are being studied in the CPSU Central Committee.

[Romanenko] Many people who have affection for our country are asking: How can we teach others without having put our own house in order? What do your students think about this?

[Krasin] The majority of them have a profound understanding of the reasons for the processes which have been occurring in our country. Gloating is a rarity even in circles hostile toward us. On the contrary, we sense profound affection for our people and sympathy with perestroyka.

Of course, the crisis of so-called authoritarian-bureaucratic socialism has struck at the socialist idea also. Whatever the interpretation, both these concepts are firmly linked in the mass consciousness nonetheless. There is no doubt that we are now experiencing a period of a decline in the influence of socialism.

But I am profoundly convinced that socialist ideas have deep roots, in the system of social production primarily. Two value systems are clashing. Neoconservatives in the West, and with us also, are speaking about the freedom of the individual, too. But this is freedom for the strong. The best that the weak can hope for is a system of social welfare.

The socialist value system, on the other hand, regards freedom of the individual in accordance with the collectivist tradition, which aspires to afford the weak also an opportunity to find their place in life and an opportunity for self-expression.

[Romanenko] Theoretically, possibly, you are right. However, in real life the Western system of man's social protection works better.

[Krasin] The Western system of social protection is not a product only of liberalism but also the result of the long struggle of the worker and democratic movement oriented toward the socialist value system. I believe that the crisis will be overcome. The socialist system has a future because it is rooted in the age-old aspiration to social justice embedded in man's nature.

UN Committee Discusses Racial Discrimination

PM1802103090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 5, 30 Jan-5 Feb 90 pp 26-27

[Interview with UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination member Agha Shahi, by unidentified correspondent; first two paragraphs are introduction: "A Simple Answer to a Difficult Question. The U.N. About Chauvinsim and Residential Qualification"]

[Text] The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination consists of 18 members, usually prominent public and political figures acting in this case as independent experts. The body functions on the basis of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which was adopted by the 1965 U.N. General Assembly and came into force in 1969. The Soviet Union is one of the 125 signatories to the convention. At present it has its representative on the committee—Doctor of Law Yuriy Reshetov.

At its regular 38th session, the committee examined about 30 reports by signatory states. The discussion is held in the form of a dialogue between the committee members and representatives of a country, officials of its foreign and justice ministries and prosecutor's office.

New Times. The majority of countries admit that they have quite a number of unsolved national problems. Those who deny that are usually criticized by the committee. At least one gets such an impression on reading the documents of its recent sessions. How did the committee react to the Soviet Union's reports in the 1970s and early 1980s, when Soviet representatives told experts about the shaping of "a new historic community, the Soviet people," without any complications and conflicts?

Agha Shahi. It's true. Your government claimed then that it had completely solved all national problems and that all ethnic groups were satisfied with their position. This did not correspond to the facts. But, owing to its status, the committee had to be content with the information provided by a state. We had to proceed from the data, often biased, supplied by your country. Committee members asked, of course, whether children could study their mother tongue, and not Russian only, at school and whether representatives of national minorities could hold posts in government bodies at various levels.

N.T. I must admit that from a journalist's point of view this procedure seems doubtful. Why should a state be given the rostrum for self-publicity? Why doesn't the committee have institutions for obtaining independent information, as some other U.N. bodies have? I have in mind, for instance, the appointment of a special reporter.

A. Sh. The convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination does not unfortunately envisage anything of the kind. However, we can use the information available in other U.N. bodies. True, committee members usually have different opinions on this practice. For instance, when we discussed Israel's report many said we should not exceed its bounds. But I insisted that the committee turn its attention to the General Assembly resolution condemning Israel's actions in the occupied territories.

The point is that no U.N. committee is free of political pressure. Experts represent different countries and try to reach a consensus.

N.T. In other words, an influential country, skillfully maneuvring, can present a deliberately biased report and avoid condemnation.

A. SH. Exactly. It is with this aim that many of the reports are compiled and replies drawn up, for instance, the committee asks for statistics about those who speak Russian in the Soviet Union. We are told, in particular, that many nationalities have accepted it as their mother tongue. It is difficult to believe that. What can we do?

N.T. The committee regularly discuses legislative measures taken in one or another country to abolish discrimination. Do you think these measures are effective?

A. SH. They cannot, of course, solve the problem completely, as you could see for yourself. The convention declares as a punishable crime the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority of hated, all acts of violence or incitement to such acts directed against any race or group of people who have another colour of skin or ethnic origin. The organizations encouraging racial discrimination or inciting it have been declared illegal. The signatory countries must being their legislation into line with the convention. However, only a few states have done so.

N.T. The criminal codes of the Russian Federation and other constituent republics have an appropriate article, and it has been specified recently.

A. SH. It all depends on whether law is observed and whether citizens have a real possibility to use it and take the matter into court. At an international seminar on legal problems held in Moscow last December a Soviet participant complained that laws intended to suppress discrimination on a national principle are not applied.

N.T. What action must be taken against chauvinist groups by a state signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination?

A.Sh. The prosecutor-general should study the statements of one or another group from the standpoint of their correspondence with law. If he decides that these statements incite hatred for one or another nationality legal action is taken. A fine is imposed or another, more serious punishment is meted out.

N.T. Nevertheless, as you have said, legislative measures are not always effective. What practices of other countries have been commended by the committee?

A.Sh. The committee showed great interest in the report submitted by Sweden, where a law against ethnic discrimination had been passed in 1986 and government appointed an ombudsman, that is, its representataive on questions of ethnic discrimination. The ombudsman must prevent discrimination at factories and offices and in various spheres of public life. In individual cases he must give consultation or information to those who consider themselves victims of discriminatiom. The law demands that employers should provide the ombudsman with all the necessary information.

The ombudsman also combats discrimination in the housing sphere and in matters of access to entertainment places. He must react to racist and xenophobic statements in the mass media.

Simultaneously with the adoption of this law, Sweden set up a consultative committee on ethnic discimination which concsults the ombudsman on questions of principle, proposes amendments to legislation, and examines separate cases.

N.T. At its last session the committee lashed out at countries where the language qualification or the residential qualification for elections continued to exist.

A.Sh. Fortunately, the residential qualification does not practically exist anywhere today with the exception of the Philippines and Rwanda, where it does not exceed six months. We also criticized the Venezuelan legislation. Its provision on the language qualification for elections contradicts Article 5 of the convention.

N.T. The laws adopted recently in the Baltic republics give access to a wide range of posts only to citizens who speak the language of a given republic. Latvia and Estonia have introduced the residential qualification (from five to ten years) for elections to local Soviets or the republican parliament. How would you comment on these measures as a member of the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination?

A.Sh. The state must equally defend all citizens residing on its territory. If the Soviet Constitution proclaims equal rights for all ethnic groups, such rights must be enjoyed by citizens in all the republics.

N.T. I'm afraid it is a very simple answer to a very difficult question. Many natives of the Baltic republics consider that their rights were violated in the past, that they were forcibly included in the Soviet Union.

A.Sh. This question requires a political solution which, I think, can be brought about by your new parliament. Nevertheless, I shall repeat a very simple principle: all citizens within the jurisdiction of a given state must enjoy equal rights.

N.T. The Baltic republics are unlikely to apply this principle, because calls are being made there for withdrawal from the Soviet Union.

A.Sh. If they secede they will have to respect international laws. And they are clear enough: all people living on the territory of a state shall enjoy equal rights. If someone came to your country and has lived in it for a log time, he is granted permanent residence and his rights are equally defended by the authorities. So if any of the Soviet republics becomes an independent state, its attempts to drive out citizens of other nationalities and deprive them of their rights will contradict international laws.

N.T. Do you know a similar case from more or less recent history?

A.Sh. No, I don't remember an instance when large groups of the population were threatened with disfranchisement. Of course, it often happens that in some country one or another group of people are unable to realize their rights fully and become second-rate citizens. But this is in practice. No state, with the exception of avowedly racist ones, has admitted such discrimination in its legislation.

Any complicated problems must be solved by democratic means without violating the laws worked out by the world community.

United States & Canada

Chernyshev on U.S. Weapons Storage in Norway

LD0703133390 Moscow TASS in English 1313 GMT 7 Mar 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Will the Norwegian coast be turned into a giant American weapon store? This question is now being asked not only in Scandinavia. Bases housing reserves of armaments for the United States' Marines and the NATO Armed Forces have already been set up on Norwegian territory and that country's airfields store military equipment for the U.S. Airforce.

Today, the Norwegian Government expresses readiness to meet the Washington administration's request to build facilities on its territory to stockpile ammunition, fuel, etc for the supply of the American navy.

The concern generated by the U.S. plans is warranted. The United States has visibly intensified the activity of its navy off Norway. Groups of U.S. attack aircraft-carriers visit more and more often the Norwegian Sea. The U.S. Navy command openly speaks about its bid to ensure a permanent presence of American ships in that region, for which it needs naval bases on Norwegian shores.

There is not even the slightest justification for such actions and plans of the Pentagon. Conversely, the point at issue should be moves to lower confrontation and reduce military activity in that region. Actually, the military-political situation in northern Europe has drastically changed.

No Soviet medium- and short-range missiles on operational standby were left in areas adjacent to Nordic Europe. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons excludes the possibility of their reaching north European countries from any point on Soviet territory.

The USSR began destroying some categories of sea-launched nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea. It expressed readiness to reach agreement with all nuclear powers on effective guarantees of nuclear-free status for the Baltic region and supported Finland's initiative for creating a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe.

The European public is beginning to realise that the more meaningful progress is made in lowering military confrontation between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO on the European continent, the deeper urgency a solution to the navies' issue is taking on. As other types of armaments in Europe are being reduced, the destabilising role of these forces will grow.

The strength of naval forces in the East and, especially, in the West clearly exceeds sea lane protection and coastguard needs. Without solving the problem of reducing navies' activity and strength, one can hardly hope that the process to build up trust and move towards non-offensive defence will be effective.

What objectives do those who support the build-up of armaments and an increase in the naval activity in the north of Europe pursue?

Security Panel Head Lapygin Views U.S. Visit

PM0603124990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with V.L. Lapygin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, by APN correspondent V. Pogrebenkov: "We Are Moving Away From Mistrust. Soviet Parliamentarians Have Visited U.S. Military Bases"; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A delegation of Soviet parliamentarians has returned from the United States. The aim of the visit was to study the U.S. Armed Forces. At SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's request, an APN correspondent met with delegation head V.L. Lapygin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Questions Committee, and asked him a few questions.

[Pogrebenkov] Vladimir Lavrentyevich, what was the purpose of your transatlantic trip?

[Lapygin] It can hardly be considered a normal situation when the two superpowers' legislators do not trust one another. Can the reliable security of our two countries and the entire world really be based on the shifting sand of mistrust? So we decided to invite our American colleagues to visit us in accordance with the well-known proverb: Actions speak louder than words. For a week in August, 14 congressmen and more than 30 experts who accompanied them visited a number of important Soviet military-strategic facilities. Ours was a return visit.

[Pogrebenkov] What did the program for this visit include?

[Lapygin] Let me stress first of all that it was very intensive. We calculated that throughout our 13-day tour we visited about 15 facilities, covering a distance of approximately 14,000 km on a special U.S. Air Force aircraft. The program was compiled so that we had a chance to acquaint ourselves with representatives of all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces—ground forces, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. We visited strategically important command centers and the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is engaged in atomic programs, including for military purposes. We had conversations with the military-political leadership of the Armed Forces and discussed at joint working sittings with congressmen questions that are not only of interest but also of mutual concern.

Let me add that the program was not only fulfilled but also overfulfilled. I am referring to the fact that the Americans responded to a request from one of our deputies for which the program made no provision to visit a subunit of the 82d Airborne Assault Division in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and talk with personnel involved in the Panama invasions. His request was met.

[Pogrebenkov] From your viewpoint, how competent an opinion were Soviet parliamentarians able to form of what the U.S. side showed them?

[Lapygin] Learned specialists with sufficient experience in their field work on our committee. We included in the delegation 10 deputies who, in our view, were able to competently evaluate the military-political and military-technical aspects of the Armed Forces. For instance, my committee deputy Colonel V.N. Ochirov is a combat pilot. He himself even piloted a U.S. Apache helicopter. The delegation also included Academician G.V. Novozhilov, who is general designer at the plant which produces the renowned Ilyushin aircraft. Incidentally, Genrikh Vasilyevich spoke to the Americans without the use of an interpreter in very good English.

As for the Navy, Academician I.D. Spasskiy, who is in charge of the Central Naval Equipment Design Bureau, and worker V.A. Opolinskiy, who is a team leader at the shipyard which produces our warships, talked quite competently about the ships we were shown. Not to mention Army General V.M. Shabanov, USSR deputy defense minister for arms, who is well known in America as a major specialist in his field. Moreover the delegation was accompanied by eight experts from the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the USSR Academy of Sciences. Thus those involved in the trip were quite representative.

[Pogrebenkov] How do American arms and combat hardware look in comparison with ours?

[Lapygin] Both I and my colleagues from the committee believe that the United States has advanced hardware and weapons; however, there were no surprises among what we were shown. In some types of arms we are on an equal footing with them; while in some areas we even have the edge over them, if we are talking about some types of conventional arms and heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles. The latter are a strategically important deterrent factor today.

In my opinion, the Navy and its aviation are where we appear weaker. Historically the Americans have given this leading branch of the Armed Forces priority. Today the U.S. Navy is considerably more powerful than reasonable defense sufficiency demands. We believe such aircraft as the E-2C "Hawkeye," which is used for early warning and to guide fighter aircraft to targets, and the F-14 fighter to be quite major equipment. The latter demonstrated its supreme maneuverability during a flight at the Miramar Naval Air Station in California. Although, as one of our deputies remarked, the aircraft was flying light, without arms and a complete issue of fuel. We were shown similar demonstration flights—this time of the U.S. Air Force's F-16 fighter bomber—at Langley Air Base in Virginia.

[Pogrebenkov] What impressions have you gleaned from your knowledge of the social and domestic aspects of U.S. servicemen's life?

[Lapygin] The provisioning of personnel, which is quite well thought-out by our standards, with even some excesses, attracted our attention. We visited barracks, officers and enlisted men's clubs, hostels, recreation rooms, and canteens. Everywhere was clean and comfortable. Soldiers were quite relaxed in conversation. They constantly emphasized that they take pride in their Army, the subunit in which they serve, their chosen specialty, their regular-issue weapons, and combat hardware. Admittedly, on their lips this pride came over like a well-rehearsed television publicity slogan. You get the feeling that the Congress, the Defense Department, and the whole American people show great concern for and take pride in their Armed Forces.

[Pogrebenkov] Do you think that the trip went smoothly?

[Lapygin] If you are talking about the business side of the visit, a curious incident happened at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, where we found ourselves in a lecture on the "Soviet military threat." A major was giving the lecture on Strategic Air Command leadership instructions, illustrating his propaganda passages dating back to "cold war" times with slides from the latest Pentagon issue of "Soviet Military Might." The "program" may have been intended for L. Aspin, chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, who accompanied us; although there is hardly any need to canvass him.

If you are talking about the American people, we were won over by their cordiality, openness, hospitality, and sense of humor. At one training center Soviet parliamentarians were made honorary Marines, after first undergoing a quite impressive two-minute briefing for new recruits from a sergeant. According to established regulations, after two minutes the Marines begin to have their hair cut. Admittedly things did not reach that point.

I also remember my meeting with Maureen O'Connor, mayor of the California city of San Diego, a quite young, energetic, pretty, and intelligent woman. After lunch I treated her to my favorite "Astra" cigarettes. She warned me that an active antismoking campaign is under way in their city, just as throughout America, moreover. After trying our "Astras," she said that she would allow me to smoke in any part of San Diego, obviously to put other people off tobacco.

[Pogrebenkov] What preliminary conclusions can be drawn as regards the results of your trip?

[Lapygin] First of all, we chose the right road—the establishment of personal contacts and direct communication with our American colleagues. It not only enabled us to enrich our experience and gain a better understanding of one another but also to discuss problems of mutual interest together. For instance, an idea emerged after the August visit, and USSR and U.S. parliamentarians are taking concrete steps to ascertain the fate of and free Soviet and U.S. citizens who went missing or were imprisoned during combat operations in Afghanistan and in the DPRK, Vietnam, and Laos, respectively. At the end of this trip we agreed to discuss with our colleagues the problems of unauthorized missile launches and conversion.

Our trip was also productive from the viewpoint of studying and objectively assessing American experience of staffing and maintaining their armed forces. In view of the importance of this trip, we intend to have an open extended session of our committee to discuss the results of the visit, to which we will invite representatives of other USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions, journalists, and everyone who wants to come along.

Shevardnadze, Matlock Discuss Namibia Meeting

LD0703130990 Moscow TASS in English 1259 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock here today to discuss forthcoming meetings between Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

The sides also discussed a possible trip by Shevardnadze and Baker to Namibia to take part in the ceremony to declare Namibia independent, and other issues.

Constraints on USSR, U.S. Foreign Correspondents

PM0203110190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 First Edition pp 1,7

[Own correspondent V. Linnik dispatch under the "Abroad" rubric: "Will Exchanges Be More Intensive?"]

[Excerpts] Washington, 1 Mar—The third Soviet-U.S. intergovernmental information exchange meeting has opened in Washington. USIA is the meeting's U.S. sponsor. The Soviet Union is represented by a large delegation, including senior officials from the CPSU Central Committee, the State Committee for the Press, NOVOSTI, the State Committee for Cinematography, and a number of Soviet newspapers and journals. Debates over joint projects in the sphere of publishing, audiovisual work, and exchanges of journalists and students and discussion of the working conditions of U.S. and Soviet correspondents accredited in the USSR and the United States are on the agenda. [passage omitted].

The working conditions of Soviet journalists accredited in the United States were discussed in a thorough and detailed manner at the meeting. The restrictions to which they are subjected in the United States with regard to their freedom of movement, hotel reservations, and similar "details" are clearly at variance with the overall significant improvement in the climate of Soviet-U.S. relations. Why, say, are Soviet journalists unable to travel more than 40 km beyond their accredited location without State Department authorization when the "free operating area" for U.S. journalists in Moscow totals 100 km? Why are Soviet journalists forced to pay three times more for airline tickets than any other foreign journalists living there, including those representing East European countries' newspapers and television.

The U.S. side loves to cite the principle of "reciprocity." We were indeed the first to introduce so-called closed zones decades ago. But how did Americans react subsequently? They have today "closed" 30 percent of their territory while only one-fifth of our country is closed. Soviet journalists have to rent hotel rooms, buy airline tickets, and lease apartments via so-called foreign mission offices set up in the United States modeled on the Servicing the Diplomatic Corps Administration. However, under our conditions it is extremely complex for Americans to do without the Servicing the Diplomatic Corps Administration in view of the situation with regard to tickets, hotels, and housing. In the United States you have no difficulty in doing all this for yourself. Moreover, if, say, you order a ticket in advance, it costs you less. In that case you can look for a more modest hotel and so on. Under current usages the foreign mission offices do all this for us and even take commissions—albeit small—for their services. As a result hotels are for some reason often extremely costly and tickets three times more expensive than for everyone else. Thus what outwardly looks like "reciprocity" is in fact a mockery of the actual principle of reciprocity.

Establishing reciprocity is an extremely complex task for countries as different from one another as the USSR and the United States. Have there really been cases of the vehicles of U.S. correspondents in Moscow being towed away for parking in an unauthorized place and then a fine of $140 exacted for this? Things like this happen frequently in New York since parking is one of the most acute problems here. These questions seem trivial against the backdrop of global improvements in Soviet-U.S. relations. But it is not for nothing that people there talk about "the poisonous effect of irksome details." The sooner these irritating misunderstandings are resolved, the better it will be for the cause of improving mutual understanding between our countries.

The questions of filling exchange programs between sister cities with specific substance, expanding the printruns of the journals SOVIET LIFE and AMERICA published in the USSR and the United States, and training approximately 1,000 students from both sides at U.S. and Soviet higher educational establishments were also discussed at the meeting. In short, there is plenty to discuss. That is why a useful, benevolent, idea-filled discussion is under way here in the USIA building.

TASS, AP Conclude Cooperation Agreement

PM2302095790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] TASS and AP, the major U.S. news agency, have concluded a new technical cooperation agreement. At a ceremony in New York the document was signed by TASS Director General L.P. Kravchenko and AP President L. Boccardi.

Ivashko Meets With Ukrainians From Canada

90UN0931A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 1

[RATAU Report: "Conversation at the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party"]

[Text] A conversation took place between V.A. Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and V. Garasim, national secretary of the Executive Committee of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, and Z. Nikolishin, national secretary of the Workers' Mutual Assistance Society and president of the Canukra Company, who are visiting the republic at the invitation of the Society for Cultural Contacts With Ukrainians Abroad (the "Ukraine" Society).

The Canadian guests talked about the great interest of the Canadian public in the successful development of perestroyka in the UkSSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] and about preparations by the Ukrainian ethnic group in that country to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the first settlement of Ukrainians in Canada next year.

V. Garasim and Z. Nikolishin expressed their satisfaction with the development of mutual cultural contacts with the "Ukraine" Society which have been maintained for almost three decades.

During the conversation, V.A. Ivashko told the Canadian guests about the course of perestroyka processes in the republic, including those in the sphere of the nationalities policy. It was stressed that the public of the UkSSR is greatly interested in enhancing a dialogue with Ukrainian ethnic groups and their organizations abroad in the context of new political thinking in international relations, and in developing cooperation with the business community of Canada.

N.A. Shulga, head of the Department of Ethnic Relations of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and V.Ya. Brovchenko, chairman of the Board of the "Ukraine" Society, took part in the conversation.

China

'Positive Appraisal' of Trade Talks in Beijing

LD0603155290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1504 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Beijing, 6 Mar (TASS)—The need for further broadening, deepening, and improving of Soviet-Chinese trade and economic cooperation was stressed at a meeting in Zhongnanhai today between K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations and head of a Soviet Government delegation, and Li Peng, prime minister of the PRC State Council.

During a warm and friendly conversation, the dynamic development in recent years of relations between the USSR and the PRC in trade relations and economic cooperation was noted. Both sides gave a positive appraisal of the development of these relations.

The Soviet delegation, which arrived on a visit to China today, had talks with a PRC delegation headed by Zheng Tuobin, minister of foreign economic relations and trade, on a protocol on trade turnover and payments between the USSR and the PRC for 1990. The participants in the talks stated with satisfaction that trade and economic cooperation between the two countries has been developing steadily and dynamically in recent years, which meets with the common interests of the Soviet Union and China.

Compared with 1988, turnover in Soviet-Chinese trade last year amounted to 2.4 billion rubles, an increase of 30 percent. This year, further broadening of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries is expected.

The Soviet delegation will be in China for seven days. Apart from Beijing it will visit the cities of Tianjin, Shanghai, and Xiamen.

Union Leaders Visit Chinese Counterparts

18200492 Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by N. Makurin: "There Is Contact!"]

[Text] The trade union leaders of the Soviet Far East and the Chinese province of Heilongjiang met for the first time in the last 10 years.

The Amur Oblast trade union council delegation visited the PRC at the invitation of the Heihe border district federation of trade unions. The visit resulted in a decision to establish a variety of contacts between branch union committees and worker collectives of the district and oblast.

Chairman of Amur Oblast trade union council Yevgeniy Dmitrievich Shumakov announced planned prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation in the interests of workers on a variety of issues. This means trade, and medicine, and the creation of joint ventures, and organization of vacations for Amur residents at PRC vacation spots.

Land Ownership, Use in PRC Discussed

90UI0412A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
2 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by L. Volkova, candidate of economic sciences, senior scientific associate of the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Who Owns Land in the Rural Areas of China"]

[Text] Pursuant to the PRC Constitution adopted in 1982, virgin lands, steppes, forests, hills, as well as the land of cities, are considered to be state property. The land of villages and suburbs constitutes collective property, except for the lots which, under the law, belong to the state. Areas occupied by residential buildings, farmstead parcels of land, and mountainous terrain also constitute collective property.

Issues of land ownership are very important in the rural areas of China. China has to feed 23 percent of the world's population while it has only seven percent of the world's arable area.

The establishment of a system of contract responsibility with family contracting being the main form of economic operations during the reform in the early 1980's changed the system of land use while leaving the collective ownership of arable land intact. The right to use land was detached from the right of ownership.

The data of a selective survey taken in 1988 may show changes in the structure of land use. In 1978, 99.4 percent of arable land in the regions studied were used jointly by production brigades, whereas in 1987 only 2.4 percent were. At the same time, the share of contracted arable land used by peasant families increased over this period of time from 0.2 percent to 95.7 percent.

The average arable area which a peasant family received in the course of converting to economic operations on the basis of family contracts was very small—between 0.10 and 0.13 hectares per person. In 1982, the duration of contracts was set at between three and five years; in 1984, extending them to 15 years, and in certain cases to 30 and more years, was allowed.

The transfer of land to be used by a peasant family was set forth in a contractual agreement with a production brigade which specified the rights and responsibilities of the two sides. Issues which have arisen in the course of economic operations based on family contracts, primarily difficulties in improving the efficiency of agriculture and increasing production and the insufficient investment of funds in agriculture by the peasants, including capital construction projects in the fields, have caused heightened interest in the issues of land ownership and land use in rural areas. The reform in the rural areas, including the reorganization of their administrative structure, has created a situation where, in resolving issues associated with land, primarily the signing of contracts for land, in 68 percent of the villages (according to the data of selective surveys) was the responsibility of committees and groups of rural residents, and in the other 32 percent of the villages it fell within the jurisdiction of cooperative organizations of the peasants.

A situation has evolved in which no single subject of land ownership exists. The transfer of land management rights from economic to administrative organizations has led to the functionaries of township people's governments and committees of rural residents arbitrarily resolving issues of assigning land to a peasant family under a contract or confiscating it. Cases in which land is used by people not residing in a given village or for non-agricultural purposes have become more frequent. According to data from Chinese sources, in the country as a whole more than 166,700 hectares of arable land were illegally transferred for use between 1982 and 1986.

In Chinese literature, proposals have been made concerning the need for uniformity and codification of the new relations of land ownership and land use. Many variant approaches to solving these problems have been proposed. The following proposals have been made concerning the forms of land ownership: to declare that all arable areas are state property and transfer them for eternal use to the peasants; to maintain collective land ownership in villages and take measures aimed at improving the forms of land use; to transfer land to the peasants as private property. It has also been proposed that various forms of land ownership coexist. For example, some authors believe that it is feasible to transfer farmsteads which occupy about nine percent of the arable area of the country, as well as land under residential structures, to the peasants as their property. The rest of the arable area should be given to the state to be owned, and to the peasants to be used. In the course of this, the land used for the common needs of villages should be transferred to the committees of village residents free of charge, and a large segment of arable land should be distributed among the peasants to be used for a fee.

From all the points of view on land ownership, the proposals based on the preservation of public property, collective or state, on the one hand, and the proposals to transfer the land to the peasants as private property, on the other, are diametrically opposed. The following are the main arguments of those who would convert the land from collective property to the private property of the peasants. First, having received the land as their property, the peasants will make every effort to increase their investment in it in order to ensure an increase in production; in this manner, an improvement in the efficiency of agriculture will be secured. Second, the expansion of the sphere of marketable production under private land ownership, the turning of land into merchandise, and its free sale will facilitate the process of forming larger farms because the peasant families which do not have enough manpower and resources to operate a competitive farm will be forced to sell all or some of the land to more sound farms, thus enhancing its concentration in the possession of the latter. Finally, the transfer of land to the peasants as their property will clarify greatly the relations of ownership, management, and use of land. The proponents of keeping the ownership of land public refute the above arguments in what appears to be a quite well-reasoned manner. They believe that the peasants were indeed apprehensive about the policy changing in the initial two or three years after the transition to family contracts. However, even with the policy being stable, the initial three- to five-year terms of land contracts did not facilitate the interest of the peasant in investing funds in the land. Increasing the terms of contracts for land lots to 15 and subsequently to 30 and more years has resolved this issue to a considerable degree. At present, irrationally low prices for agricultural products, primarily for grains, are the reason why the peasants show little interest in increasing the investment of funds in the land. Besides, the transfer of land to private ownership will establish for a long time the system of small-parcel land use in the rural areas of China. The process of land concentration and formation of larger farms will proceed very slowly; it will increase social tension in rural areas, and may bring about political instability in the country. Many authors believe that the restoration of private land ownership is a retreat from which there is no way out, it is a path leading to a dead end.

At a 1988 symposium on issues of land relations which was convened by the Research Center for Rural Development of the PRC State Council, various versions of land ownership forms were discussed. Here is the conclusion to which the participants in the discussion came: Further improvements in the system of land use under collective land ownership correspond best to the current conditions in the country.

Work along these lines has already been done. The first session of the Seventh National People's Congress (March-April 1988) adopted an amendment to the PRC Constitution which codifies the opportunity to assign the right to use land. On the basis of this amendment, the Permanent Committee of the National People's Congress adopted the "Resolution on Amending the Land Law" in December 1988. A provision banning the leasing of land was omitted from Article 2 of this law. It was set forth that specific procedures for assigning the right to use land and the forms of payment for using it will be determined by the PRC State Council.

Assigning the right to use land and its leasing appear to be the main avenues for reorganizing the system of land contracting and increasing the size of farms in rural areas. Various ways to enlarge the lots of land farmed by the peasants and to increase the size of farms on this basis are being tested in experimental regions for the implementation of reforms. By the end of 1988, there were 19 such regions in various provinces of the country. However, there are a number of serious factors which restrict the process of increasing the size of farms: negligible opportunities for the migration of labor from arable farming and agriculture to other sectors; insufficient development of the system of services and the entire agricultural infrastructure; unsatisfactory supply of many means of production; a relatively low degree of mechanization of agricultural work, as well as the shortage of funds for expanding production among a substantial segment of the peasantry. In the opinion of Chinese specialists, an increase in the size of farms is possible in a relatively small number of rural regions.

Objective factors also determine the position of peasants with regard to leaving the land, on the one hand, or creating larger farms, on the other. As the materials of surveys and public opinion polls of the peasants indicate, most of them express no desire to give up contract parcels. Out of the 8,200 peasant families surveyed in 1987 by the Ministry of Agriculture, only 6.2 percent were willing to transfer their contract lot to other peasants whereas 21.3 percent of the peasants polled would have liked to expand the area farmed. According to the surveys, the share of land transferred by peasants to other peasants amounted to 3.6 percent of the arable area in 1986 and to 3.3 percent in 1987.

The following point of view is increasingly gaining favor in the Chinese scientific literature: The choice of avenues for the organizational renewal of rural areas and the forms of economic operations should be entrusted to the peasants who are capable of taking into account specific conditions in individual areas of the country, which vary widely, better than anyone else.

Chinese Peace Delegation Visits Kamchatka

OW0103084090 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 17 Feb 90

[From the "Hello, China" program]

[Text] The KAMCHATKA PRAVDA reports: In the past, activists in Kamchatka's peace movement could only dream of receiving foreign peace activists. Today, their dream has come true. The first meeting between Kamchatka and foreign peace activists has taken place. A Chinese delegation has arrived in Kamchatka. During a meeting arranged by the Kamchatka chapter of the Soviet Peace Foundation, the need of the Soviet and Chinese peoples to live in peace and friendship as neighbors was stressed.

The KAMCHATKA PRAVDA points out: It is important for the people of the two countries to have contact and exchanges. The exchange between the two countries should not be restricted to the governmental level only. Increased mutual understanding will guarantee the development of a harmonious relationship and the strengthening of peace.

Northeast Asia

Pyongyang Repeats Appeals to U.S., South Korea

SK0703141490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 6 Mar 90

[From the "Asian News" portion of the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Once again the DPRK called on the United States and South Korea to immediately respond to Pyongyang's propsal for holding talks to discuss the issues of discontinuing the "Team Spirit-90" joint military exercise and to realize disarmament in Korea.

In a statement, the DPRK Foreign Ministry stipulated that if the United States really begins withdrawing its troops from South Korea, the DPRK will take measures aimed at building confidence between the North and South militarily, and at realizing disarmament.

To both express opposition to and to protest against "Team Spirit-90," a military exercise being conducted by the United States and South Korea, social sectors of the DPRK began holding mass rallies in cities.

No Tae-u Willing To Hold Talks With DPRK

SK0203064790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] ROK President No Tae-u has stated that his government is willing to hold talks with the DPRK Government on economic cooperation, trade, tourism, and the construction of industrial plants.

New DPRK Ambassador Arrives in Moscow

PM0503122690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 6

[TASS report under general heading "Official Announcements"]

[Text] DPRK Ambassador Son Song-pil arrived in Moscow 1 March.

DPRK Foreign Ministry Delegation in Moscow

PM0203165590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A DPRK Foreign Ministry delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Song Ho-kyong was in Moscow 26 February to 1 March. It was received by I.A. Rogachev.

Concern Over DPRK Nuclear Potential Noted

SK2702123190 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 23 Feb 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Some countries around the Korean peninsula have recently expressed concern over the DPRK's nuclear potential.

This concern is further growing in connection with the fact that Pyongyang, after having joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has not yet signed the safeguards and inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and, by not signing, may try to keep its nuclear activities outside the boundary of international control.

However, it is a well-known fact that very active talks are presently under way between the DPRK and the IAEA over this issue.

Then, why has such a question been raised?

In this regard, our station commentator Ivanov says: According to foreign news reports, the question has been raised reportedly in connection with the fact that a nuclear facility, which has not yet been brought under the IAEA control, is under construction in Yongbyon, northeast of Pyongyang.

U.S., Japanese, ROK, and other foreign mass media contend that the facility is being built in such a way that it can process nuclear fuel, giving them the capability to develop a nuclear weapon.

U.S. President George Bush and ROK President No Tae-u also mentioned this.

As an answer to this, the DPRK Government issued a statement as an explanation. Pyongyang reaffirmed that it is faithful to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the plan to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. It appealed to Washington and Seoul to hold talks in this regard. It urged the declaration of a nuclear-free zone (?on the Korean peninsula) and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the ROK.

During the Moscow talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the Korean question and its nuclear state were specifically (?reviewed).

The Soviet Union, supporting Pyongyang's endeavor to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, noted that the task is presently being finalized to conclude the treaty of control between the DPRK and the IAEA.

The United States as well expressed its hope for an early conclusion of such a treaty between the DPRK and the IAEA, and elucidated how the treaty should be put into practice in the future.

On our country's stand, Ivanov says that its stand is (?clear).

The Soviet Union holds that all treaty member nations faithfully fulfill their given duties.

The Soviet Union also holds that nuclear weapons deployed in foreign countries be unconditionally withdrawn and completely liquidated.

If this happens, some nuclear countries will not need to be concerned about the nuclear potential of non-nuclear nations.

DPRK Scholar Interviewed on USSR Visit

SK2702124590 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 26 Feb 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] A delegation of DPRK scholars recently visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This visit was a continuation of the usual contacts between the science academies of the two countries. The delegation included specialists in history, economy, philosophy, and linguistics. The guests visited Leningrad, Tashkent, Alma Ata, and (Prunse) and met Soviet comrades.

Interviewed by the station reporters, Kim Chol-sik, head of the delegation and vice president of the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences, stated his impression of the visit to the Soviet Union as follows.

[Begin Kim Chol-sik recording] We were deeply impressed by the (?warm welcome accorded) us, the delegation of the DPRK scholars of social sciences, by the USSR Academy of Sciences, scholars and the Soviet people. (?Visiting various places) and [words indistinct], we witnessed considerable successes made in the Soviet Union in social and economic progress. When perestroyka began in the Soviet Union about 5 years ago, we the Korean people and all of us scholars (?wished it success) and actively support it today since it is aimed at correcting wrong things in the past period and making rapid progress. We hope that further progress will be made, [words indistinct].

The purpose of our visit to the Soviet Union is to further promote the cooperation, friendship, and exchange between the academies of sciences of the two countries based on the agreement of scientific exchanges between the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences. [end recording]

The work of the delegation has grown considerably. For instance, a promise was made between the DPRK history scholars and their Soviet counterparts that they will cooperate in the study of the national liberation movement in Korea and other parts of the East. They agreed to hold a symposium in Pyongyang in April this year on the situation on the Korean peninsula and peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region.

The problem of security in Asia and the situation on the Korean peninsula was one of the major topics of conversation. The DPRK scholars, as well as their Soviet counterparts, are participating in the study of a new position for the solution to the political problems. In the course of the conversation on this topic, the Soviet specialists paid considerable attention to the recent proposals made by the DPRK on expanding the relations between the strata of the North and South Korea. According to the conviction of the [word indistinct], (?these proposals, when put into practice,) can significantly contribute to the normalization of the situation on the Korean peninsula.

The members of the Korean delegation also met the Soviet economists and the guiding functionaries of enterprises, and discussed various aspects of the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Korea, such as the establishment of joint venture enterprises. There is no doubt that the delegation's visit will contribute to the future development of the cooperation between the DPRK and the Soviet Union.

Socialist Asian Railway Agreements Signed

LD2802205590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1043 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Chita (Eastern Siberia), 28 Feb (TASS)—A conference of representatives of the transportation and foreign trade ministries of four states—the DPRK, PRC, Mongolian People's Republic, and USSR—ended here today. During the talks, which were held under the aegis of the International Organization of Railways Cooperation (ORC), delegations of the neighboring countries agreed to the volumes of and terms for the transportation of foreign trade freight in 1990.

The agreements signed as a result of the conference will further simplify the ties between the socialist states of the Asian-Pacific region. (Gombyn Och), member of the ORC council, told a TASS correspondent that the positive results of the meeting will also serve to enhance the prestige of our International Organization of Railways Cooperation.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Commentator Views Upcoming Elections in Burma

BK2702131390 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] The emergency session of the People's Assembly of Myanmar [Burma] on 11 September 1988 decided to hold multiparty general elections—the first in 30 years in Myanmar—for the People's Assembly, which will become the country's legislature. The decision was made in response to demands for democracy through massive demonstrations in August and September 1988 in which millions of people participated.

The people called for the termination of the one-party dictatorship and the formation of a government in accordance with the wishes of the majority. However, holding general elections, a decision made by the

National Assembly, was not to be easy following the seizure of all state powers by the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC], composed of military leaders.

After seizing power, the SLORC declared the conditions for nominating candidates and for holding the elections. General Saw Maung reiterated that maximum efforts would me made to ensure that the elections would be free and fair. However, martial law and night curfew was imposed in Myanmar and those who created unrest were arrested.

According to the latest reports from Yangon [Rangoon], 2,233 candidates from 93 political parties and 88 independent candidates will be contesting in the elections. A TASS correspondent reports that one-third of the political parties represent ethnic minorities while five parties represent peasants' interests and three parties represent workers' interests. However, when the final candidature list was posted on 17 February, Yangon residents did not see the names of many personages who played prominent roles during the mass movement which forced the People's Assembly to hold general elections. Among them were Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, general secretary of the National League for Democracy [NLD] Central Executive Committee; U Tin U, chairman the NLD Central Executive Committee; and U Nu, former prime minister of Myanmar.

Western observers are expressing disappointment over these omissions and are wondering whether the forthcoming elections will be free and fair. Myanmar authorities are saying that the foreign medias' attention on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures is not good for their political prestige. Regardless of all this, the approaching general elections will mark a bold step on the path toward democracy in Myanmar. Setting aside the issue of the participation of certain personages in the elections, the holding of elections will provide a training ground for the people of Myanmar who are determined to wage a struggle for democracy in the coming years.

Looking at the elections from another angle, internal factors as well as international acceptance and recognition of the outcome of the elections will be the determining factor. Only when Myanmar receives recognition can it establish normal external economic relations and receive needed assistance. Thus far, Gen. Saw Maung's government has not been successful in convincing many governments to have faith in the upcoming elections.

In conclusion, many changes may take place during the 3-month campaign period prior to the elections, since the military government has publicly announced that there will be freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of organization, and freedom to campaign publicly.

Election Officer Interviewed on Suu Kyi Ban

BK0103064590 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Report of "translated excerpts" of interview with U Kyaw Nyunt, member of the Commission for Multiparty Democratic General Elections of Burma, by unidentified TASS correspondent in Rangoon in a dispatch in the Russian language—read by announcer in Burmese; date not given]

[Text] A correspondent of the Soviet news agency, TASS, in Yangon [Rangoon] met U Kyaw Nyunt, a member of the Commission for Multiparty Democratic General Electiosn of Myanmar [Burma], and asked him a few questions before the three-month election campaigning period began in the country. The following are translated excerpts of the correspondent's dispatch in the Russian language of that interview:

[Correspondent]: Sir, your commission was formed at the ultimate and extraordinary session of the last People's Assembly exactly one week before the military takeover. Although that assembly was a one-party parliament, it decided to hold multiparty elections. Though the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] abolished that parliament as soon as it came to power, it announced that it supported the work and goals of your commission. Could you give me your opinion as to why these two highest organs of state power decided to choose multiparty general elections?

[U Kyaw Nyunt]: The people were so fed up with the 26 years of one-party system that their demands for a change turned into nationwide demonstrations. To be quite frank, that one-party system could do nothing to better the living conditions of the people. Therefore, the Burma Socialist Program Party announced through its People's Assembly in September 1988 that it was making changes for a multiparty democratic system and a commission to hold elections was being set up. Our commission is completely independent and has nothing to do with party politics. Such an organization alone can hold genuinely free elections. As the situation in the country worsened within the first week of our commission's existence, General Saw Maung and his close colleagues had to takeover the duties of restoring law and order in the country. They are also making practical contributions to the holding of multiparty general elections.

[Correspondent]: To recall the events of September 1988, there were two major occurrences—the holding of the extraordinary session of the People's Assembly to make a decision to hold multiparty general elections and the birth of the SLORC. It comes to one's mind that perhaps these two events are closely linked to each other and are part of a well thought out plan. This thinking becomes even stronger if one recalls the speech delivered by U Ne Win at the seventh plenary session of the Burma Socialist Program Party Central Committee on 9 October 1987 when he said that it was necessary to make fundamental changes to the economy. Are there any connections between these incidents?

[U Kyaw Nyunt]: When our great leader spoke of the need to make changes, the effect was so tremendous that the people wanted these changes to take place overnight. But, as we, and so do the Soviet people understand, things do not work out that way. This is evident not only from our experience alone but from the experiences of, say China, the Soviet Union, and the other countries. The new leader that emerges following the elections will be also make it to the history books, one way or the other. In other words, the leader will be judged by how well he can be able to tell the people to be patient and forgiving, and how well he can call on the people to work strenuously hand in hand with the government to resolve urgent problems and within the framework of the law. This is important. Personally, I cannot deny outright that the events of 1988 did not take place as part of one national salvation plan. I believe that perhaps fate had something to do with our present line.

Listeners, our TASS correspondent then asked about the relations between the SLORC and the Elections Commission, and U Kyaw Nyunt replies: Our commission had made suggestions that the SLORC maintain law and order. We only look toward one goal; that is, to hold honest and free elections, and we perform like a single close-knit organization. Some political parties, which want events to appear the way they want them to be, allege that the SLORC is interfering in our work and that our commission is at loggerheads with the SLORC. This is not true. Members of the SLORC are human beings like us, and the SLORC would definitely give up power after the elections. This must be believed. The Defense Services will return to the barracks.

Continuing, U Kyaw Nyunt told our TASS correspondent that he cannot discount the possibility that the newly elected People's Assembly representatives may ask the SLORC to continue undertaking the daily administrative work while the state constitution is being drafted.

Regarding the question of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's candidacy, U Kyaw Nyunt says: The decision by the Yangon Division Elections Subcommission not to let Daw Aung San Suu Kyi take part in the elections was final, and there was no need for the Elections Commission to take the decision further.

U Kyaw Nyunt also rejects the belief that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's candidacy was barred because she had disagreements with the military government. He says: She was barred from the elections because of the suspicion that she contributed to the spreading of foreign influence over Myanmar.

No special investigations were however conducted into the allegations made against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's candidacy.

U Kyaw Nyunt explains: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's candidacy was in breach of the laid down rules. In other words, her action and facts about her personal life were not up to the demands required of People's Assembly candidates.

Politician Calls for End to Campaign Restrictions

BK0303112890 Moscow in Burmese to Burma
1430 GMT 2 Mar 90

[From the "Asian Affairs" news program]

[Text] A well-known political figure, Thakin Chit Maung [chairman of the Democratic Front for National Reconstruction], has called on Myanmar [Burmese] military authorities to hold talks with political parties and to lift restrictions on election campaigns as soon as possible.

Thakin Chit Maung is the only politician among popular politicians who has not been arrested. During his meeting with journalists in the capital, Yangon [Rangoon], Thakin Chit Maung said that law and order must be maintained in order to ensure smooth parliamentary general elections, scheduled for 27 May.

According to a news dispatch, over 2,000 candidates from 93 political parties are running in the elections.

Democratic Front Press Conference Reported

BK0303145390 Moscow in Burmese to Burma
1030 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Aleksandr Vladimirov commentary entitled: "Current Responsibilities in Myanmar"]

[Text] The three-month long election campaign in Myanmar [Burma] has begun. The current government has pledged to lead the Myanmar people toward a multiparty democratic system. Observers on Burma are asking: How free and open will the election campaign be? Will the political parties be able to carry out the necessary organizational work for their respective parties? Will there be a guarantee of equal rights for candidates regardless of the parties they represent?

Reports coming from news agencies based in Bangkok are full of news on oppression and torture of opposition leaders and people by the military government. The general tone of the reports on Myanmar is pessimistic and they are predicting that the elections to be held by the military government will neither be free nor fair. However, the political leaders contesting to obtain seats in the new People's Assembly do not view the situation as such. For instance, Thakin Chit Maung believes that compared to the 1960 elections, the forthcoming elections are likely to be more free. The veteran politician pointed out that the Defense Services was clearly in favor of a faction of the AFPFL [Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League] in the previous general elections.

The TASS correspondent sent a dispatch from Yangon [Rangoon] saying that Thakin Chit Maung, who is leading the Democratic Front for National Reconstruction [DFNR], had held a press conference for leaders of the front and foreign correspondents at the front's headquarters. Speaking at the press conference, Thakin Chit Maung pointed out three responsibilities for the present, namely, the guarantee for free and fair elections; the endeavor for unity and solidarity of genuine democratic forces; and the preparation and drafting of a new constitution.

The final responsibility of drafting a new constitution is to be entrusted to the constituent assembly to be convened by a national unity government. In his speech, the DFNR leader said the time has come for all political parties to put aside the differences among parties and to work toward common national interests. He expressed his opposition to boycotting the elections scheduled for May.

At the same time, Thakin Chit Maung pointed out the inconsistencies of the military government. Assessing the orders issued by General Saw Maung, chairman of the State Law and Order Restoration Council, to permit pre-election campaigning, the DFNR chairman pointed out that the current actions of the government are contrary to its pledge to organize and hold free elections after its task for establishing law and order was completed. By permitting pre-election campaigning the military authorities are acknowledging that the situation is ready for elections. Thakin Chit Maung asked at the Yangon press conference why the government then laid down numerous restrictions and prohibitions for political activity if they have been able to establish law and order. The chairman of the democratic front appealed to the military government to substantially reduce the prohibitions in order to avoid bloodshed. He proposed that candidates should now be speaking on radio and television.

The DFNR has started its election campaign by calling the press conference in Yangon. The peasants organizations under its banner have also started their campaign. The commentator concludes by saying it remains to be seen whether other registered democratic parties will join the DFNR or whether the military government, which does not allow political leaders to criticize it, will respond to Thakin Chit Maung's appeal.

General Aung San Birth Anniversary Reported

BK1402142590 Moscow in Burmese to Burma
1430 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Station observer Aleksandr Vladimirov commentary: "Something To Ponder About"]

[Text] Today is the birthday of [late] General [Gen] Aung San. Many outstanding leaders, of course, have emerged throughout the Myanmar [Burmese] history, and they will always be remembered by the people. However, I do not believe there is anyone among these people as popular as Gen. Aung San. His pictures can be seen along the roads and on buildings and structures in Myanmar. When I was in Myanmar, I noticed many of my friends had pictures of Gen. Aung San in military uniform hung prominently in their homes.

When discussing about why Gen. Aung San was famous, it has to be pointed out that he was not just a national figurehead. He is popular because I believe the Myanmar people deeply long for those glorious years when they were fighting for the country's independence and for a brighter future when their lofty goals—some of which have already been realized—will be attained one day.

It is true that Gen. Aung San's life and the history of the struggle for national liberation by the Myanmar people are one and the same. Since the student days, he was actively involved in the mass movements against colonialism, and as everyone knows, the Yangon [Rangoon] University for many years was the cradle of such movements. The general was a leader of the student boycott and also the chairman of the All Burma Students Union. His work was so well known and prestigious that he became the leader of the then most progressive and popular Do-Bama Organization. In the later years, Gen. Aung San became the head of the patriotic army of the Myanma people who fought the fascist Japanese.

Gen. Aung San also contributed to the unity of the national races in the country. His ideas on racial equality, national unity, and democracy have greatly influenced the Myanmar people, and political leaders who wish to win the support of the Myanma people have to refer to these ideas even today.

The Burma Socialist Program Party, which once promised to take the Myanma people to a prosperous and progressive society, also said that it was continuing the work of Gen. Aung San. But the general's dreams of bringing a good life to the ordinary people still remain what they are today—dreams.

At the last banquet held at the Myanmar Embassy in Moscow, we could not help but notice the pictures of Gen. Aung San and Gen. Ne Win being hung side by side above the hall at the embassy. The throngs of students who demonstrated in Myanmar against the Burma Socialist Program Party had pictures of Gen. Aung San in their hands.

If the tragic event of 1947 [assassination of Gen. Aung San and several other leaders] did not take place, the general would perhaps be a gray-haired veteran statesman still playing a leading role on the political stage in Myanmar. As we all know, even U Nu [former prime minister], who was a right-hand man of the general since the student days, has not given up politics today.

If only the general were alive, who would he be standing side by side with today? This is something we should ponder and consider about. The general's star still plays the most vital role in the astronomical charts of Myanmar politics today. I believe the popularity of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi [daughter of Gen. Aung San] is due to her father's prestige. She, who had no political experience whatsoever, has now become a top political leader within a year or two.

When the present military leaders were asked about her future, they in turn asked why show the interest in her alone when there are many leaders who have taken the political stage today. The answer to that question has been provided by the very fact that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been placed under house arrest by the government of Gen. Saw Maung with the excuse that she attracts throngs of people whenever she gives a speech. Whatever the reason may be, it is not right to ignore the wishes and feelings of the people, because the people constitute the true strength.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi relies on such a strength and has been striving to build a prosperous and fully democratic nation for the Myanmar people to reside in.

Malaysian-Soviet Economic Relations Viewed

PM2802170590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by special correspondent A. Ostalskiy and TASS correspondent M. Tsyganov: "Country Which Has Been Lucky; or Why Everything Goes Right for Malaysia"]

[Excerpt] Kuala Lumpur-Moscow—[passage omitted] Malaysia's kindly interest in our country and the processes taking place in it is obvious. It was not only professional politicians in the country who told us that the whole world, including Malaysia, is vitally interested in the success of perestroyka. Whereas before it was believed that ruling circles here were suspicious of everything emanating from the USSR, now they display sincere distress when projected cultural or information exchanges are thwarted or documents are not signed on time or, for instance, photographic exhibitions are late. "I simply cannot believe my eyes when I see all this," we were told by a senior diplomat at the Soviet Embassy, who also knew the old times.

We asked Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar to comment on these changes. Here is what he said: "Malaysia is satisfied with its present relations with the USSR but to proceed further we need a more positive response from the Soviet side. Malaysia is seeking to develop not only political, but also economic relations with the USSR. We know that you have a vast market and, although there are many problems on the path of the development of trade relations between our countries, we are hoping to activate our cooperation. An important role here can be played by the direct economic relations established by our country with two Soviet republics—Uzbekistan and Estonia. They have already produced certain fruit and we hope that these ties will also encompass other fields. In our view, the Soviet Union should display more activeness in deepening cooperation with Malaysia. Our country has already begun to play a marked role in the international arena and its influence is continuing to grow. Of course, we should like to see signs of recognition of this from the USSR."

What does the Malaysian minister have in mind when he speaks diplomatically of "the need for a more positive response and greater activity" on the part of the USSR? The point is that 2 and ½ years ago now the Malaysian prime minister paid an official visit to the Soviet Union, yet there has still been no return visit. Now N.I. Ryzhkov has gone to Australia, Thailand, and Singapore, but has not gone to Malaysia. This naturally offends the Malaysians. But they can nonetheless understand how busy the Soviet premier is. But what about facts like, for instance, the thwarting of the signing of the latest cultural program? Why, do you think? Because, we were told at the USSR Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, no rooms could be found in a good hotel for the Malaysian delegation. It is easier for us than for the Malaysians to believe that it is all only a matter of lack of order and management, but our partners see contempt here.

The Malaysian minister is undoubtedly right that great opportunities—and for mutual benefit—also exist in the expansion of economic cooperation. But how do we use these opportunities?

Not very effectively, the Soviet trade mission admits. We continue to buy in Malaysia those same old "colonial" goods—palm oil, tin, and rubber. Perhaps we cannot do without them, but surely we could use the favorable, preferential opportunities to buy, for instance, the cheap Malaysian consumer goods or to set up the production in our country, with Malaysian aid, of personal computers, cassettes, domestic electronic equipment, air conditioners, and so forth? It is not that no such attempts have been made at all, but so far there have been few of them. Mainly because we cannot offer Malaysia anything in exchange except enthusiasm: We have no hard currency, it is also difficult to find goods which could interest potential partners in the world of local business. Many representatives of our enterprises and cooperatives which have received foreign economic autonomy are so far still acting thoughtlessly, merely dabbling, even reminiscent (as one trade mission staffer put it) in their maneuvers "of traffickers rather than businessmen."

Malaysia, we were told by representatives of the trade mission, is literally crammed with saiga horns, Siberian deer's antlers, and ginseng from the USSR, as a result of which prices for what are in principle priceless goods already in such short supply in our country have fallen to a ridiculous level. Yet cooperatives and enterprises are constantly offering new consignments, counting on obtaining something in exchange.

Business is also bad with our traditional deliveries. The local newspapers refuse our paper: It is now of such quality and of such a color that it is virtually impossible to use. "Belarus" tractors are in demand, but they are used mainly as bulldozers and means of transport in the jungles. Spare parts for them are in chronically short supply. So much so that several vehicles have to be dismantled to ensure the operation of others. "How much can be used for dumping—at low prices?" a trade mission staffer asked us with anguish.

Nor was the attempt to sell Malaysia tomato puree without an international certificate of quality a success. It emerged that Greece subsequently also rejected this puree. Nor has anything come so far of the sale to Malaysia of melons and grapes from Uzbekistan—after all, it turns out that there are strict punishments here for the presence in fruit of even small doses of pesticides, nitrites, and nitrates.

On the other hand there is a steady rise in the number of Soviet citizens sent on trips to Malaysia "to develop economic relations." In 1988 there were 15 of them, while last year there were 60. [passage omitted]

Near East & South Asia

Further Reportage on Attempted Coup in Afghanistan

Situation Updated

PM0803104790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Mar 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Article by APN correspondent A. Pravov specially for PRAVDA: "After the Strike on Kabul"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] For a long time there were no communications with the Afghan capital. As soon as communications were resumed, the APN correspondent in Kabul filed this report at our request:

Kabul, 7 Mar—In Pushtunistan Square in the very center of Kabul alongside one of the posts guarding the entrance to the Presidential Palace, there is a huge crater. Huge split fragments of asphalt have piled up on each other. In all the neighboring buildings the windows are broken. There are large holes in the walls of the Ministry of Justice. The Finance Ministry has been hit and left a gapping hole in the wall. You can see bookshelves through the hole.

The destruction is a sign of the massive bombing, or—as local servicemen put it, a low-level bombing [bomboshturmovoy] strike—which rebel aircraft launched against the palace district 6 March.

...It all started at 1320 hours local time. At the time I was at the Soviet Science and Culture Center. There was suddenly a major explosion which rattled the windows. It was clearly different from the explosion made by a shell, to which people in the city have almost become accustomed. It was followed by a second explosion, a third... The guards around the center, reinforced by a detachment of troops which arrived, took up combat positions around the center. Several soldiers clambered onto the roof of the guard post and set up a machine gun. Meanwhile the bombing continued. A black plume of smoke and dust slowly reared up over the sealed-off Presidential Palace area. Tanks appeared in the street. They rushed in the direction of the Defense Ministry.

Local radio fell silent. The first report was carried at approximately 1500. The announcer reported that there had been an attempted coup in the capital headed by Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanay. He is now the ex-defense minister. It was reported that he had been replaced on President Najibullah's personal instructions by Colonel General M.A. Watanjar, formerly minister of the interior. The president appealed to the capital to remain calm. It was also reported that Tanay had gone underground.

It cannot be said that the news of the former defense minister's attempt to seize power in the country came as a complete surprise to journalists working in Kabul. In private conversations Afghan politicians and public figures who firmly support President Najibullah and his national reconciliation policy have long talked about General Tanay's ambitions and his desire to make ultimatums with everyone.

And now the general has staged a coup attempt. He ordered aircraft aloft from a military airfield in Bagram and sent them to bomb Kabul. One of the pilots who flew a fighter from Bagram spoke in a radio broadcast. According to him, the putschists forced the pilots to fly to the capital by threatening reprisals against their families.

Talking about the former defense minister, Kabul Radio called him an enemy agent with ties to the opposition leadership in Peshawar—specifically Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's "Islamic Party of Afghanistan." This report was backed up by a report on Voice of America, whose correspondent claimed that Hekmatyar had ordered his groupings active in the Kabul area to support the rebels' actions in every possible way.

Meanwhile, military units loyal to the president stubbornly laid siege to two palaces at the end of Dar ol Aman Street, where the Defense Ministry and its main political directorate are housed. It was there that the putschists attempted to dig in.

All the details of this battle were clearly visible. Until late at night the darkness was broken by bursts of automatic fire. Shells curved away in the direction of the palace. There was the dull rumble of howitzers...

Journalists were only able to get close to the palaces at the center of the battle near noon the next day.

As Senior Captain 'Abdul Fatah Shahin told us, his unit had ended its combat actions some 90 minutes previously. Admittedly, even without these explanations it was clear that the soldiers had just come out of a hard fight. The young guys tried to wipe the sweat mixed with soot from their faces with sleeves reeking of gunpowder.

"We made every effort," the senior captain unambiguously assessed the coup attempt, "to rebuff this extremist coup..."

In his second radio broadcast President Najibullah reported that the Defense Ministry building, in which the putschists had dug in, had been liberated. The 52d Communications Regiment had ended its resistance, as a result of which the so-called "revolutionary headquarters" had been wholly deprived of a communications system.

The situation in Kabul is gradually returning to normal. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has called on more than 4,000 party members to stand guard in the city. People dressed in civilian clothes and carrying assault rifles can now be seen all around the city. They check the few vehicles in the streets and search many of them. In general they do the same work as military patrols.

Many party members are guarding the Presidential Palace. I noticed a young woman approaching a group of armed civilians standing alongside some soldiers. Slightly lifting her veil, she talked about something to them for a long time.

"She's looking for her son," Captain Soltan 'Aziz, an employee at the Ministry of the Interior, told me. "She says that yesterday he was on guard here. He's called Wahid. She asked whether anyone had seen him or knew where he is now. A great deal of blood was spilled yesterday..."

Although the tension in the city is starting to diminish there are still tanks and infantry fighting vehicles at junctions.

But life is reasserting itself. In the Shakhrinau shopping district, I saw storekeepers opening their small stores. Fruit and vegetable traders are bringing their carts out onto the sidewalk. And taxis have now appeared. Life is getting back to normal.

Stores, Offices Opening

LD0803125790 Moscow TASS in English 1239 GMT 8 March 90

[Text] Kabul March 8 TASS—The situation is coming back to normal in Kabul. Downtown streets are patrolled by tanks and infantry armoured carriers, and the curfew is in force in the city.

Bazars are open, and state-owned enterprises and government offices resumed their operations.

Law and order in Kabul are guarded by paramilitary detachments of party activists which were formed by the city committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

Repair teams are clearing the debris of houses destroyed by bombing raids, and roads damaged by bombs and shells are being paved anew.

Situation Returning to 'Normal'

LD0703130690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1213 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Kabul, 7 Mar (TASS)—The government is in control of the situation in the Afghan capital, which is gradually returning to normal. There are no sounds of shooting in the city, though there are as yet few people about on the streets. The city committee of the People's Democratic Paty of Afghanistan has organized more than 4,000 party members to keep order in Kabul.

The 52d Communications Regiment has ceased its opposition to troops loyal to the government. As a result, the so-called "revolutionary headquarters" has been completely deprived of its communications system. Kabul Radio has reported that captured coup members will be shown on television today. However, according to reports coming in, the Air Force Base at Baghram is still in the hands of coup members. According to the testimony of a pilot who flew from there in a fighter aircraft, they are forcing pilots to fly on bombing missions to Kabul by threatening them with reprisals against their families.

A relatively stable situation is being maintained in all Afghan provinces and their administrative centers. The defenders of Jalalabad and Khowst are confidently repulsing the attacks of formations of the irreconcilable opposition.

Minister Reports Government in Control

LD0703231690 Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] The deputy foreign minister of Afghanistan, Abdul Baqi Samandari, has told a Kabul news conference that the Afghan Government fully controls the situation in the country. He said that the attempted coup was aborted owing to the vigilance and courage of the Afghan Army. The strongholds of the rebels, the building of the Defense Ministry in Kabul and the air base in Bagram, were taken over by the troops loyal to the government after a fierce battle. The rebels maintained close ties with the leader of the extremist opposition wing, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, in Pakistan, and with Pakistani military intelligence. In his radio appearance on Wednesday President Najibullah said that the coup leader, former Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanay, had fled to Pakistan taking with him a small fortune in United States dollars.

Stance Toward Rebels Noted

LD0703231190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2124 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Report on Afghanistan, presented by Yuriy Rostov]

[Excerpts] [Rostov] Like yesterday some of the most important reports today have been coming from Kabul. I remind you that there was an attempted military coup there. Early this morning the government confirmed that the rebels had been beaten. At 1400 Moscow time [1100 GMT] our Kabul correspondent was in contact. He sent a report which was in the Vremya program and a fragment of which we now repeat. [passage omitted]

[Rostov] We did not manage to make contact with our correspondent this evening. Foreign agencies, however, report that rebel aircraft bombed Kabul on Wednesday too. There is no news of damage. The foreign agencies cite information from diplomatic sources and UN circles. At present it is difficult to say whose dispatches—those of our correspondent or those of the foreign journalists—are more reliable. Tanay, former minister of defense and the organizer of the revolt, has still not been detained. His differences with President Najibullah increased after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The minister of defense, judging by everything, was in favor of a harsher stance toward the rebels.

Development of Events

LD0703203790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] As has already been reported, a coup attempt has been put down in Kabul. Our special correspondent Vladimir Pasko reports details from the Afghan capital.

[Pasko] Events developed in the following manner. On Tuesday shortly after midday, the sounds of bombs and rockets exploding were heard from the direction of the Presidential Palace, which is situated in the center of the city. After this, tanks and guns located in various parts of the city began firing on the building of the Ministry of Defense which is on the outskirts. About two hours later the radio transmitted a presidential decree on the appointment of Watanjar, the minister of internal affairs, as acting minister of defense, and a little later a declaration by the Higher Defense Council in which the coup attempt and the flight by Tanay, the previous minister of defense, were reported. After this an appeal was made by the new leader of the military department to the servicemen involved in the revolt to lay down their arms. Information was received on support for the current republican regime by power bodies from a number of provinces, including such major ones as Qandahar, Nangarhar, Herat, Balkh, Baglan, and the Khowst area as well. At about 2200 hours, President Najibullah spoke on television. He declared that the treacherous attack, headed by Tanay, had been put down, some of the leaders had been arrested, some had given themselves up and were continuing to give themselves up.

The firing in Kabul started to abate at 0100 in the morning and by the following midday had completely stopped. The building of the Ministry of Defense has been practically burned down by the fire. The radio and television services continue to work normally. The government is in control of the situation. But, I think it is too early to place a period after this, and it is not only a matter of the location of the former defense minister not being known. The saddest thing in this matter was, in my view, the fact that Tanay was the leader of one of two factions in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA]. If not only Tanay's personal ambitions are behind the coup attempt, then the events of the past 24 hours mean that the disagreements between the factions have crossed the boundary of those permissible. And this complicates the path toward the restoration of peace in Afghanistan.

In President Najibullah's radio address which was heard today, it is reported that the city council of the PDPA has raised more than 4,000 party people to protect order in the city.

I, together with Aleksandr Shkirando, technical assistant (Yevgeniy Shmatrikov), TASS and APN correspondents, and accompanied by officials from the security service of Afghanistan, travelled through a number of regions of Kabul. The destruction makes a strong impression: a meter-and-a-half bomb crater, the asphalt upturned by the explosions, fallen trees, many squares and streets entirely covered with broken glass. There is not a single unbroken window in the radio and television building, from which I am conveying this material; many frames have been completely ripped out by the force of the explosions. It is said that in the region of the Presidential Palace, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Radio and Television, rebels dropped more than 30 bombs. This was one of the most dramatic days in the Republic's history. To this I would add that there are no casualties among the Soviet people working here.

[Announcer] Let us add to this correspondent's report that, according to the latest data, the military air base in Bagram remains as before in the hands of the rebels. The previous minister of defense, Shahnawaz Tanay, who headed the rebels, remains at liberty. One of the leaders of the irreconcilables declared at a press conference in Islamabad that he, as before, was ready to support opponents of the Najibullah government if they repeat the coup attempt.

TASS Reports on Details

LD0703185990 Moscow TASS in English 1826 GMT 7 Mar 90

["Afghanistan: Situation Under Government Control"—TASS headline; by TASS corespondents Andrey Semenov and Yuriy Tyssovsky]

[Text] Kabul March 7 TASS—The streets are strewn with rubble and debris around the presidential residence in Kabul.

On Tuesday, fighter bombers from the air base in Bagram, 70 kilometers north of the capital, made 18 combat flights to Kabul to strafe the city with more than 30 cluster bombs in an attempt to destroy the presidential palace, the television centre, National Guard headquarters and some state security departments in the rebellion led by former Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanay, government sources said.

The extensive palace compound was not damaged, but two bombs rocked the television centre, shattering all windows and splintering window frames.

Ten state officials were killed. One bomb fell in the Pushtunistan Square next to the buildings of the state bank, post, telegraph and telephone offices. Residential buildings around the square were also seriously damaged.

An air-to-surface missile hit the building of the Afsotr Afghan-Soviet joint stock society a few minutes after it was vacated by the office workers at closing-time.

Fazl Hadi, security forces chief in this district, told TASS that the building was very seriously damaged and it was lucky that no one was killed.

Eye-witnesses reported that anti-aircraft defence forces shot down one of the attacking aircraft, which hit the ground in the residential area populated by the city's poor. No information on the death toll is currently available, but there is evidence that the number is great.

In the morning, a security unit escorted a group of journalists along the empty Dar-ul-Amman Avenue to the Defence Ministry building where fierce battles raged on Tuesday. Artillery and automatic gun fire were heard there on Wednesday morning, too.

Journalists were not permitted to approach the buildng as government forces continued suppressing resistance forces around it. A security officer, Senior Captain 'Abdul Fatah Shahin commanding a detachment guarding the approaches to the ministry, told TASS that despite intensive combat activity in the area, none of his men was killed and some ten soldiers, who suffered minor injuries, returned to duty after medical aid.

Journalists toured the city for a couple of hours and saw the streets come alive in the afternoon, although troops were stationed at every crossing to carefully examine papers. All shops and offices were closed. Repair teams were working in the streets and squares to restore electricity supplies and telephone lines.

The Bagram Air Base is still being held by the rebels.

Najibullah Visits Garrison

LD0703205490 Moscow TASS in English 1952 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Kabul March 7 TASS—On Wednesday afternoon President Najibullah told the nation about the situation in the country. He noted, among other things, that the Defence Ministry building is fully controlled by the forces loyal to the government. Battles continue at the Bagram Air Base.

On the same day, Najibullah visited units of the Kabul garrison to thank the men for the courage they displayed in putting down the putsch.

The situation in Kabul remained quiet at night. No gun fire can be heard. The curfew has been reduced.

A statement of the national Democratic Party Central Committee Secretariat was read on television today. It stressed that Shahnawaz Tanay betrayed not only his country but also the party. Occupying a high post, he for a long time engaged in activities aimed at splitting the party and eventually sank to betrayal. Fleeing Kabul after the abortive coup, he left behind his party card and his general's uniform. The statement said that Tanay will henceforth have no relation to the National Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

Television showed Muhammad Hakik, an active member of Hikmatyar's underground organisation recently exposed in Kabul. He said that Tanay was an immediate leader, along with representatives of the Islamic Party, of this clandestine organisation aiming to overthrow the government and seize the power in the country.

Messages for Najibullah from state and public organisations, and units of the Armed Forces continue flowing in pledging allegiance to the government and the idea of national reconciliation.

Najibullah Gives TV Address

LD0703114790 Moscow TASS in English 1135 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Kabul March 7 TASS—President Najibullah has addressed the Afghan people on national television.

"A bloody war has continued for ten years in Afghanistan," he said. "External enemies and their supporters within the country are trying to torpedo the policy of national reconciliation, to extend the bloodshed in Afghanistan. These plots, together with external aggression against the republic, are intended to destabilise the situation in the country. The Afghan leadership is taking every necessary measure to combat such sorties."

"An underground network of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's organisation was discovered recently," the president noted. "It included people who betrayed the interests of peace in pursuit of selfish personal ends. On March 6 traitors to our country and henchmen of external enemies were led by former defense minister Shahnawaz Tanay. Taking the cue from the Pakistani military intelligence and acting jointly with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, they attacked several state and civilian objectives in Kabul."

"Tanay's attempted coup was put down due to the timely and resolute actions of Afghan Armed Forces deployed in the capital. All units and contingents of the Afghan Armed Forces have been ordered to deliver Tanay, dead or alive, to the Army headquarters. All fellow countrymen are asked to help catch him."

Najibullah urged the Armed Forces to stamp out any remnants of the plot. He said the Defense Ministry building was occupied by government troops and all plotters radio relay communication systems were cut off. The president also called on the garrison of Bagram Air Force Base and the 40th division to understand that Tuesday's actions were treasonable and to help arrest Tanay.

On behalf of the Armed Forces, the People's Democratic Party and its political allies, Najibullah urged the people of Kabul to keep calm.

A presidential decree was issued on the same day urging the people who were deceived and drawn in Hekmatiyar-Tanay's plot to break with the traitors and help the Armed Forces liquidate the internal enemies. The president announced a time limit within which these people can join forces with the government troops—until 04.00 a.m. on March 7. Their safety and immunity is guaranteed.

Kabul Radio transmitted today a report from the city defense council saying that the plot was thwarted and the situation in the capital was normal.

Pakistani Delegation Visits Leningrad, Moscow

PM0603122690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] A parliamentary delegation from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which is on an official visit to our country, has finished a two-day stay in Leningrad.

On its return to Moscow 28 February the delegation was received by R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities.

The sides expressed their desire to develop Soviet-Pakistani parliamentary links and cooperation in various spheres.

Participating in the talk were USSR People's Deputies Yu.N. Belenkov, Yu.V. Golik, A.T. Kuzovlev, A.A. Mokanu, N.M. Mgaloblishvili, A.A. Plotnieks, B.N. Ochirov, and V.V. Finogenov.

Report on Visit

PM0603191590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

["Joint Announcement on Visit to Soviet Union by Parliamentary Delegation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] At the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet a delegation of the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan headed by Malik Mairaj Khalid, speaker of the National Assembly, visited the Soviet Union on an official visit 25 February through 4 March 1990.

In addition to Moscow, the Pakistani parliamentarians visited the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic and Leningrad. They laid wreaths at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall, and the Piskarevskoye Memorial Cemetery in Leningrad.

The delegation of the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was received by A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Meetings and talks were held with R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, leaders of a number of USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chamber commissions, and USSR people's deputies, and at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The parliamentarians also visited the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

During the meetings and talks the members of the delegation were briefed in detail on the current stage of perestroyka in the USSR, the content and progress of the political and economic reforms which are being implemented, the development of the processes of democratization and glasnost, the role of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the implementation of the tasks of the radical renewal of all aspects of the Soviet society's life, and the structure and activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, its committees, and the standing commissions of its chambers.

The Pakistani delegation welcomed the Soviet people's achievements in the implementation of perestroyka and the democratization and renewal of Soviet society through political and economic reforms, and also the progress achieved in ensuring fundamental human rights. Best wishes were expressed for success in translating the aspirations of the Soviet people into reality.

The delegation briefed the leadership of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the role of the Pakistani parliament and its efforts to strengthen the democratic federal parliamentary system established in Pakistan after the November 1988 party elections.

The attention of the Pakistani delegation was drawn to the consistent policy of the USSR aimed at ensuring peace, security, and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and throughout the world. And also to the further advancement of the concept of new political thinking in international practice.

Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states irrespective of differences in ideology, religion, socioeconomic systems, or political structures. They rated highly the sincere efforts at an international level aimed at the elimination of regional conflicts and tension and in the interests of solving the urgent task of strengthening peace throughout the world and ensuring mankind's survival. The Soviet and Pakistani parliamentarians are opposed to the use of force to settle controversies and favor their settlement by political means, through negotiations.

The sides expressed profound concern in connection with the continuing bloodshed in Afghanistan. It was emphasized that this problem must be resolved by peaceful political means, by promoting the inter-Afghan dialogue with a view to forming a broad-based government expressing the will of the entire Afghan people. The members of the Pakistani delegation expressed their hope for an early settlement which would ensure an honorable and safe return home of the 3 million Afghan refugees currently living in Pakistan.

The USSR people's deputies rated highly Pakistan's efforts to date to secure the release of Soviet servicemen and expressed the hope that these efforts will be stepped up further. The Pakistani parliamentarians gave assurances of their readiness to contribute to the swiftest solution of this humanitarian problem.

The sides declared their desire to develop Soviet-Pakistani relations and cooperation in various spheres on the basis of the principles of equality, justice, mutual respect, and a balance of interests.

The Pakistani delegation expressed gratitude for Soviet assistance to Pakistan in the construction and expansion of the metallurgical plant in Karachi, and also assistance in the implementation of other projects furthering the development of the Pakistani economy.

The talks' participants agreed that real potential exists for more fruitful contacts in the interest of the development of relations of mutual understanding and good-neighborliness. They expressed confidence that parliamentary exchanges between the two countries will stimulate exchanges also in other spheres such as art and culture, the women's and youth movements, and also contacts between writers, journalists, and other public organizations which will result in a further deepening of trust and cooperation between the peoples and governments of Pakistan and the USSR.

The Pakistani delegation extended an invitation to the USSR Supreme Soviet to send a delegation to Pakistan at a convenient time. The invitation was gratefully accepted.

Probable Supply of Sophisticated Weapons to Syria

JN0703212890 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 6 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] London, AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM—Military experts and strategists have said that the USSR continues to supply Syria with sophisticated weapons despite previous Soviet statements on a reduction in Soviet military aid to Syria. They added that Syria's growing arsenal of Soviet missiles, some of which can carry sophisticated warheads, poses a grave danger to Israel. They indicated that Israel views Syria as a major problem, not only because it has borders with Israel but also because it has surface-to-surface missiles. The experts said that Syria has medium-range Scud missiles capable of carrying sophisticated warheads and short-range SS-21 missiles that can score more accurate hits. They pointed out that Syria can do what other armies cannot; that is, inflict heavy losses on Israel. The experts estimated that Syria has 18 SS-21 missile batteries. They said that the USSR supplied 24 Sukhoi Su-24 fighter planes to Libya, Iraq, and probably Syria. They added that Israel, with U.S. aid, has begun to manufacture the missile "Hats", the missile interceptor "Arrow", which is part of the U.S. Star Wars program to help confront Arab missiles. The experts went on to say that the lack of financial appropriations would jeopardize the future of this project. They added that the Israeli project would be frozen if the United States were to suspend its aid.

Kuwaiti Oil Specialist Envisages Joint Projects

LD0303230490 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Kuwait, which is actively developing, includes one of the most important sectors of the economy, namely the petroluem exploration industry. Faysal al-Katmawi, director of the Kuwaiti Petroleum Exploration Company, recently visited the Soviet Union and our correspondent Nikolay Gernikov held an interview with him:

[Begin recording] [passage omitted][Gernikov] You are currently about to embark on petroleum exploration projects in the Soviet Union. During your stay, and that of your delegation, in Moscow, you have held talks at the USSR Ministry of Geology. Could you tell our listeners about these talks?

[al-Katmawi] These talks were two-fold; the first part concerned exploration in the Soviet Union. It is possible that we will start a joint project with specialist corporations in the Soviet Union to explore in the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. With that in mind I visited the region two days ago and stayed there three days [as heard]. We conducted geological studies and visited the areas we may work in in the future. The second part of my visit concerns initiating talks on a joint project with Soviet companies in South Yemen. Talks are still continuing on this. [passage omitted] [end recording]

East Europe

Shevardnadze Discusses German Unity in Interview

LD0703222590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1548 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Interview with E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, by unidentified correspondent for the Berlin magazine NEUE BERLINER ILLUSTRIERTE (GDR) in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Mar (TASS)—Question: Mikhail Gorbachev stressed recently in his interview to PRAVDA that the Germans have the right to independently determine the timeframe and form in which the unification of the two German states should be implemented. At the same time he pointed out that this problem concerns not only the Germans but also all the neighboring European states whose voice must be heard. Isn't there an inherent contradiction here?

Shevardnadze: There are no contradictions here. This is the dialectic of the problem of constructing a united Germany, the importance of which, by force of well-known historical conditions, goes far beyond the framework of the fates and interests of just the Germans, themselves.

Let us, for instance, take an aspect such as the mechanism for unification. Some people in Bonn, for this purpose, are counting on the employment of Article 23 of the FRG Basic Law, which provides for its entry into force "in other parts of Germany upon their accession."

The real state of affairs behind such a method is evident. If the GDR is declared a "land" or its territory is restored to the former German lands, it would immediately vanish as a sovereign state, and with it its obligations and rights as a subject of international law. Unification would thereby proceed along an extremely dangerous path and would be implemented on a purely nationalist basis and not on a democratic, equal, and civilized basis. This would have disturbing consequences, too, for the future policy of a united Germany. Who, under these circumstances, can guarantee that there will not be attempts to employ Article 23 vis- a-vis "other parts of Germany," which have not been this way for a long time and which are located, as is well known, beyond the boundaries of the GDR and the FRG? Is it not for this reason that Chancellor Kohl has been so stubbornly avoiding an unequivocal answer to the question of borders?

It must be said that from a purely juridical viewpoint, too, the attempt to bring the Article 23 mechanism into operation does not stand up to criticism. It is well known that the FRG Basic Law is a document of a provisional and "transitional" nature. Article 146 points out that it "its validity ceases on the day a constitution adopted by a free expression of the German people's will enters into force." This, as we can see, rules out the unification of Germany by some sort of GDR accession to the FRG. What is more, it also presupposes the existence of an equal accord between two German states. Such a development would result in a new subject of international law—the legal successor of the GDR and the FRG—that is able to aspire to a proper place in the world community.

Plans for the GDR's accession "as lands" are thus illegal. They ignore the sovereignty of the GDR and its constitution, and pose a direct threat to the security of the neighbors of the two German states.

We support the concept of the GDR Government and of H. Modrow on a stage-by-stage movement toward a German federation, and we rule out a simple annexation, a GDR-FRG anschluss.

And one more point. It is fundamentally important that a solution to such basic issues as the building of German unity should be the result of the genuine self-determination of all Germans, and not some sort of "blitz-game," played off hastily by certain over- ambitious politicians.

One has come to hear from Bonn that the reason behind the haste in unification is the imminence of the GDR's economic disintegration, the mass migration of people to the West, and the increasing disorganization of state structures. Therefore, they are saying, the FRG must "grab the GDR in mid-flight." But isn't the FRG actively promoting the destabilization in the GDR by adopting delaying tactics in the matter of rendering true aid, by preserving financial and other enticements for settlers from the GDR, and by using the republic as a proving ground for its own election campaign? I would like to recall that in the practice of international law, self-determination is understood to be the ability and the right to make one's own political choice freely and without pressure from outside. Otherwise there is a risk that the choice will not be the correct one, and the right will remain, in essence, unrealized.

Question: During the conference in Ottawa, where you represented the USSR, despite the fact that the main theme was "open skies," important statements were made on the German question, in particular on the mechanism for discussing it. Could you tell us about the results of this accord, which is designated by the formula "two-plus-four"?

Shevardnadze: The formula agreed in Ottawa meets the main criterion. There should be no resolution of the German question by the victorious powers or anyone else behind the backs of the German people. But on the other hand, this question, which directly touches on the fundamental interests of the countries which resisted German aggression, and all European peoples, can not be resolved without their participation. All of them are interested in having a Germany at the center of Europe which threatens no one in military terms, and is open to cooperation with both the East and West.

The "two-plus-four" mechanism was set up to discuss the external aspects of building German unity, including questions on the security of neighboring states. In our view, the "two-plus-four" formula signifies the joint search—involving the two German states, and also the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, and France who bear responsibility for Germany—for ways to resolve the whole complex of issues mentioned. Correspondingly, there can be no question of the "six" simply rubber-stamping everything that may be adopted as a result of a preliminary agreement between two, three, or four participants of this group. We agree with those who express the idea that the operation of the new mechanism should be based on the principles of consensus. Only in this way is it possible to ensure that due account is taken of the fundamental interests of all sides.

What is meant by the external aspects of the German problem? Above all, it means ensuring security in all its component parts—recognition of borders, excluding the military threat from German soil, demilitarization, guarantees against the rebirth of nazism, solving the questions of Germany's place in the military-political alliances, quadripartite responsibility, foreign troops on its territory, and settling the financial and material claims against Germany arising from the war, and so on. All these questions must be clarified in contacts within the framework of the "six."

Since it it evident that the vital interests of other countries too are affected here, it is perfectly logical that they too must have their own voice and place in the negotiating process. Thus, as is known, Poland has posed the question in this way, and we have adopted an attitude of complete understanding toward this.

Question: How can the military-strategic balance be preserved if the two German states unite? How would you define the military status of a unified Germany—a status that, from your point of view, would be in accord with the interests of your country and of the other European states? Could you, in general, envisage a Germany formed from the unification of the FRG and the GDR as a member of NATO, even with a reduced military presence, as some West German politicians are proposing?

Shevardnadze: Those are precisely the questions that the "six" will discuss and later, probably, in a broader international context as well.

I will say frankly that the hasty statements of some Western politicians that a united Germany will without fail be a member of NATO seem to me to be tactless, to say the least. It seems tactless if only because not one of them has asked what opinion citizens of the GDR hold—a country which is a member of another organization, the Warsaw Pact, an organization which continues to play an important role in ensuring the security of the countries of Eastern Europe and in maintaining the military-strategic stability on the continent.

I am ready to confirm that the forecast of a united Germany's membership in NATO is not in accordance with our ideas about our own national interests or a reliable structure for a peaceful "Common European Home."

It is essential to seek a solution which is appropriate to the complicated nature and the importance of this problem, and (?such) a solution can hardly be reduced to arithmetical operations with plus or minus signs.

Question: Are many citizens in your country afraid—and this would be understandable in view of historical experience—that a united Germany could become a new source of threat in Europe? What guarantees is the USSR requesting to exclude the appearance of such a source of threat?

Shevardnadze: Such fears do indeed exist, and not only among the citizens of the Soviet Union, but of other countries, too, which were singed by the flames of World War II. The leadership of our country would not have fulfilled its duty before the people if it had not taken account of this just alarm in the most serious way.

It is precisely this which explains the high political and economic charge of the questions on Germany's military-political status, on the recognition of borders, and on the demilitarization of Germany.

I will make it clear that by demilitarization we mean, of course, not the complete disarmament of the new European colossus, but the creation of conditions whereby aggression from German territory would be impossible. I think that the present dynamic nature of European developments and the successful progress of the talks on reducing conventional armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals make such a task perfectly realistic.

Without forgetting the bitter lessons of the war, it is important to see that there are no grounds of us to have unfriendly feelings toward the German people. New generations of Germans who value international security, prosperity, and cooperation among peoples have grown up in the last 45 years in both the GDR and the FRG. A preponderant anti-war potential has developed there; there is a great inclination toward creative joint work with other countries in many advanced areas of the economy, science, and culture; and there is a growing awareness of the special responsibility of the Germans for peaceful development in Europe. Chancellor H. Kohl's statement that only peace must emanate from German soil is indicative in this regard. We take those words with all seriousness and are counting firmly on them to continue in the future to guide all those who must define the political line in the united Germany.

Question: In the opinion of the USSR, and not only the USSR, the unification of the two German states and the process under which Europe as a whole comes together must proceed in synchrony. How do you imagine that synchrony?

Shevardnadze: The essence of the notion of "synchronization" is that the German question muct be tackled within the general European process and proceed in the same direction as the whole of Europe—toward strengthening security and the development of cooperation.

The "accelerated" course of history in German affairs forces us to urgently form a system of all-European spaces—legal, humanitarian, and economic spaces. Proposals on new forms of ensuring security, such as the creation of a center for averting the danger of war, have become even more topical. The creation of a committee of ministers of foreign affairs, and the founding of permanently-working bodies of the secretariat type, would promote the further "consolidation" of general European political contacts.

On this score European politicians, in particular H.-D. Genscher, are expressing quite a few ideas which are worthy of attention.

The idea therefore is not to hinder in some way the building of German unity, but to make it one of the supports of a wider European community.

Question: Present day international politics are moving and are now developing—especially with regard to the German question—at a great speed. Would it not be correct, at this time of rapid changes, to recall that numerous initiatives concerning the resolution of the German question came, specifically, from the USSR and the GDR, back in the 1950s? Does this also not belong to the category of historical justice?

Shevardnadze: I agree with you. It should not be forgotten who stood up after the war for the partition of Germany, under the slogan, "Rather half of Germany whole, than the whole of it half," and who, on the contrary, sought to deal with it as a unified whole; who created a bizonal and trizonal set-up and broke the Western zones of occupation off from the Eastern one, and who resisted that; finally, who, after the formation of two German states, drew the FRG into NATO, thus deepening the division, and who proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany on the principles of Potsdam. In his answers to a PRAVDA correspondent's questions, M.S. Gorbachev recalled the most important initiatives to overcome the division of Germany put forward by the Soviet Union and the GDR in the 1950s. A fairly impressive list resulted.

Question: Can the final status of a united Germany be defined in the final analysis only by a peace treaty? Does the responsibility of the four powers not remain in force up to then?

Shevardnadze: With the aim of settling complex questions which arise in the international community in connection with the unification of Germany, a comprehensive multifaceted document will be necessary. This document should have sufficient international legal force and contain guarantees for the strict observance of its clauses by all sides. I think that only a peace treaty could meet these demands in full measure.

In a peace treaty, obviously, there should also be a resolution of the question of the rights and responsibility of the four powers which, naturally, remain in force until that time.

Moscow TV Interviews GDR's Modrow in Berlin

LD0703215790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Interview with GDR Premier Hans Modrow by correspondent V. Mustovoy on the "Vremya" newscast, following the end of the GDR People's Chamber Session in Berlin on 7 March; Modrow and Mostovoy speak in German with superimposed Russian translations—recorded]

[Text] [Mostovoy] This was the final meeting of deputies of the 10th convocation before the election on 18 March, as a result of which 400 members of the country's new parliament will be elected. The central point on today's agenda was a government statement delivered by Hans Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers. The head of government devoted the main attention in his speech to matters of the unification of the two German states and, in connection with this, of course, the results of the GDR Government delegation's visit to Moscow, which ended yesterday. This subject was also the main one in an interview given by Hans Modrow for Soviet Television.

[Modrow] Today's government statement stressed that, in the unanimous opinion of all the parties belonging to the government of national responsibility, the visit to the Soviet Union is of great importance for the present situation in my country and, in my view, for the whole European process. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed repeatedly in his remarks that the Soviet Union is for the unification of the two German states within the overall European process. Our positions here coincide fully. An important contribution towards resolving these matters must be made by the international conference under the four-plus-two formula, preparations for which are now proceeding very actively. Our positions also coincide fully on the point that it is utterly necessary now to move from general discussions on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to direct, practical preparations for such a forum, so that the European process as a whole might also be able to develop in parallel. This is being awaited in Europe today by people, not only in the two German states, but also in neighboring countries and throughout the continent, since everybody believes that it is very important.

[Mostovoy] What, in your view, is the timetable for this process?

[Modrow] It is very hard to assess this situation, since—incidentally, this was stressed at the People's Chamber session today—the preparations for the elections in the GDR are now proceeding under significant pressure connected with speeches by West German politicians, who are, on the one hand, clearly reflecting the difference in the positions of the FRG parties, the Social Democrats, the CDU [Christian Democratic Union], and others, and many GDR citizens do not always understand the background there. It does more to inject confusion into the pre-election situation than to promote the holding of truly free elections on 18 March.

Modrow Lists Key Aspects of Moscow Talks

PM0803105990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Results of Visit"]

[Text] Berlin, 7 Mar—H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, has briefed the country's parliament on the results of the talks held in the USSR by the government delegation which he headed.

After returning from Moscow I would like to state once again that it is a question of German unification, not an annexation of the GDR. This view is wholly shared in the USSR, and not only there.

H. Modrow highlighted the five most important aspects of the Moscow talks. First, the role of a future united German state in military-political structures was discussed. The Soviet position on this issue is well known—it rules out German membership of NATO. Second, the border question was examined in detail. The Soviet Union also attaches great importance to the unambiguous recognition of the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border by the GDR, FRG, and a future German state. The GDR is prepared to conclude a joint treaty with the FRG and Poland which would reaffirm the inviolability of their borders. Subsequently this document would be presented for ratification by a future united German parliament. Third, German unification should have a favorable impact on the peaceful order in Europe and promote the disarmament process. This places a special responsibility on the GDR and the FRG. Fourth, the sides exchanged opinions on questions concerning the obligations of the four victorious powers. The unanimous view was expressed that German-German talks should be coordinated with preparations for a conference of the Six. And, fifth and finally, great attention was devoted to the prospects for economic cooperation.

The GDR Government believes that it is necessary to maintain the ownership relations that have historically emerged in the GDR in the postwar period. The USSR wholly supports this opinion, H. Modrow noted.

Hungary's Horn Remarks on NATO Cause 'Confusion'

PM2702153790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov report: "Contradictory Responses"]

[Text] Budapest, 23 Feb—A few days ago Gyula Horn, member of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] Presidium and Hungarian foreign minister, stated during a discussion with representatives of other parties: "It is necessary to create close contacts with NATO and I certainly do not rule out the possibility that Hungary may become a member of the North Atlantic alliance's political organizations."

The statement did not make clear what political organizations he has in mind. And all commentators equated them with fully fledged membership of NATO. The words of the leader of the Hungarian foreign policy department have aroused much comment in the world. Within NATO circles they were greeted coolly and with bewilderment. A number of newspapers view this unexpected statement as a pre-election maneuver and an attempt to win votes from radical forces in Hungary.

Hungarian newspapers today published a comment by Rezso Nyers, chairman of the MSZP. Regarding [Horn's] comments, he stated that Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact now is unrealistic. Gyula Horn's comment that the possibility of Hungary joining NATO cannot be ruled out has caused definite confusion.

"Gyula Horn made this suggestion at a scientific session as a political proposition, not an actual fact, and he was not speaking on the party's behalf," the MSZP chairman said.

Horn Clarifies NATO Remarks

PM2802112790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Hungary and NATO"]

[Text] The newspaper NEPSZABADSAG has published an interview with G. Horn, member of the Hungarian Socialist Party Presidium and Hungarian foreign minister, in connection with his recent statement on Hungary's possible membership in NATO's political organizations.

In it the minister points out, in particular, that some people have tried to exploit his statement for their own political ends.

It is interesting that in the political debate in Budapest representatives both of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and of the Alliance of Free Democrats made a positive assessment of my views on Hungary's possible membership of NATO's political organizations, Horn emphasized. So it is hard to understand the subsequent statements in this connection by representatives of various parties. I wish only to point out that my statement imposes no obligations on the Hungarian Government or the country.

Pact Membership 'Not in Question'

PM0603103990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Hungary: G. Horn's Statement"]

[Text] Significant changes have now begun within the Warsaw Pact, Hungarian Foreign Minister G. Horn noted in an interview with NEPSZABADSAG. They essentially boil down to the fact that decisions are now adopted democratically. This facilitates the incorporation of the member states and the organization itself in all-European processes.

The fact that the Warsaw Pact is in increasingly frequent and close contact with NATO is a great step forward. The situation in Europe today is developing in such a way that political questions are moving to the fore within these alliances.

Hungary's membership of the Warsaw Pact is not in question. Naturally if the process of rapprochement in Europe continues, this membership will change in substance. At the same time Hungary is not thinking of any steps that would entail artificial tension within the Warsaw Pact or would call into question Hungarian-Soviet relations.

Hungary Moves for Direct Presidential Elections

PM0503164390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov dispatch: "Hungarians Want Direct Elections"]

[Text] Budapest, 2 Mar—An argument flared up in Hungary a few months ago: How should the president of the republic be elected? By direct universal vote or indirectly—only by the new parliament? It has now been confirmed at a session of the Hungarian National Assembly (309 votes for, with 10 against, and nine abstentions) that the presidential elections will be secret, direct, and universal.

The presidential term of office is four years. The new body of parliamentarians for whom the Hungarians are to vote 25 March will determine the specific date of the election.

Commenting on these changes to the Constitution, Matyas Szuros, interim president of the republic, said:

"I welcome this decision. It reflects society's demands."

MSZMP Leader Defends Socialist System

PM0503124990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "In the Interests of Democratization": "Budapest"]

[Text] Neither society nor the socialist system failed in the past decades. It was the path of development which the country took that was wrong.

This was stated at an election rally held in the city of Tatabanya by G. Thurmer, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP].

The MSZMP, which was reborn 2 months ago, the speaker observed, has analyzed its past mistakes and drawn the relevant lessons from this. It is now a workers' party not just in name. All its objectives and activity are geared toward working people's interests.

MSZMP members and those who sympathize with them are stating that the 25 March elections will determine the answer to the question of which path Hungarian society will develop along in the future. The MSZMP advocates the creation in the country of an economy based on mixed forms of ownership in which collective ownership will predominate. The party advocates the retention of free education as one of the most important of its achievements in the last 45 years, the MSZMP leader stressed.

Razumovskiy Meets With Hungary's Kovacs 6 Mar

PM0703165190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Exchange of Opinions"]

[Text] G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met 6 March with Ye. Kovacs [initial as transliterated], member of the Hungarian Socialist Party Presidium. Opinions were exchanged on topical issues in the two parties' activity and the prospects for cooperation between them. S. Gyorke, Hungarian ambassador to the USSR, took part in the talks.

Ye. Kovacs also had talks at the CPSU International and Ideological Departments.

Hungarian Free Democrats Describe Program

PM0703111590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch: "'We Support a Change of System.' A Report from the Electoral Center of the Alliance of Free Democrats—One of the Influential Parties in Hungary Today"]

[Text] Budapest—Not far from the Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences there is a two-story building which of late is reminiscent of an agitated beehive—this is where the electoral center of the Alliance of Free Democrats [AFD] has been housed. The first story has been set aside for work with voters: there are heaps of propaganda materials and posters, including the very popular one which shows people concertedly turning a house upside down... from the roof to the foundations. There is quite a cumbersome copying machine here. Visitors drop in frequently, while party agitators go off to the city to put up posters.

The AFD is quite a young party, officially registered only in 1988 although as AFD members themselves note, it existed as an "informal" party back in the 1970's when the Czechoslovak Charter-77, which created a sensation at that time, was signed. In the past few years, the AFD has united many people who were opposed to the regime of the time. They included my first interlocutor—Laszlo Rajk Jr., member of the party executive committee. His father Laszlo Rajk Sr., an eminent activist in the Hungarian Communist Party who served underground with the party, and who held the posts of minister of the interior and foreign minister after the war, fell victim to one of the trials staged on the orders of the then "leader" M. Rakosi. When Rajk Sr. lost his life, his son was only three months old...

"I have always been opposed to the regime and the party that condemned my father to death," L. Rajk Jr. said in a conversation with me.

"Yes, but since that time, both the regime and the party have changed..."

"Perhaps, but don't forget that when my father was executed, the minister of internal affairs was Janos Kadar." (Rajk's case was, from beginning to end, dealt with by the state security service which was not subordinate to the minister of internal affairs but directly to Rakosi, and which was directly linked with Beria's and Abakumov's department in Moscow—editor's note).

"In general," my interlocutor said, moving on from his personal drama, "the AFD believes that it was the communist party and the regime it created—which lasted for over 40 years in Hungary—that are to blame for the critical situation in the country today and must bear responsibility for it. All we have is an ineffective economy, which has been maintained in recent years only thanks to foreign loans, which have reached a total of over $20 billion and what good is that!

"Therefore we believe that in order to get out of the present crisis, we must not reform a system which, in our opinion, defies reform, but we must change it. The AFD advocates a change of system.

"In the economic sphere, the AFD, which has at its disposal good specialists and a detailed program, is a firm supporter of a transfer to the market economy, denationalization of state enterprises, and privatization. The AFD, and the three other parties that belong to the so-called small coalition (the Social-Democrats, the Smallholders, and Young Democrats) believe that no more than five percent, or 10 percent at the very most, of enterprises of state-wide importance, such as nuclear electric power stations and railroads, should remain in the hands of the Hungarian state, like in West European countries. All other inefficient state enterprises should find themselves a proprietor, who would make them function efficiently: cooperatives, joint stock and insurance companies, and banks at home and abroad, as well as private individuals could be such proprietors."

"Will it not turn out, in time, that the enterprises will simply pass into the hands of richer foreigners? There are already isolated examples..."

"First, there are still not very many people willing to invest their capital, which we need very much, in Hungary's economy," came the reply. "Second, in our opinion, the process of privatization and denationalization must take place under state supervision, and as soon as a critical level of foreign ownership, so to speak, is reached in our country, its further growth can be restricted by legislation. Which is what happens in the FRG and in Austria."

It must be said that despite all the likenesses in the coalition parties' programs, there are considerable differences between them too. As they state, this does not undermine the viability of the small coalition which could create a four-party government after the elections, on condition, of course, that the members of the coalition gain over 50 percent of the votes in total.

"As regards the political program, then here we do not have so many differences with other parties that are not part of the small coalition: We are opposed to any dictatorship, not just communist dictatorship but also the kind that existed in Hungary between the two world wars," Imre Mecs, my second interlocutor from the AFD leadership, said. He is a 57-year-old engineer and father of five, who had been sentenced to death—subsequently commuted to 15 years' imprisonment—for participating in the events of 1956. He was released during the amnesty in the mid-1960's. I. Mecs is one of the founders of the opposition movement among the intelligentsia and in summer of last year he led an AFD delegation at nationwide "roundtable" talks.

"In principle," I. Mecs said, "our ideal is contemporary liberal democracy, based on a multiparty system, where the majority rules by parliamentary means and the minority is reliably protected by law."

During the two-hour discussion the conversation with the AFD leaders touched on many subjects and problems. The definition of their party as purely intellectual is outdated, in the opinion of my interlocutors. The growth in party ranks says this most eloquently of all—it has almost doubled in the past few months, and 40 percent of the 14,000 AFD members are workers. Judging by polls, the party's influence extends to 20 percent of voters.

I asked the question: "Is it true that the party receives large subsidies from abroad?" "At first that was true," my interlocutors said, not denying it. "We received assistance from sympathetic foreign parties and social funds, which is not illegal. The AFD now mainly uses resources allocated from the state budget for the election campaign.

"We are interested in good relations with the Soviet Union, and with all the peoples and republics of the USSR and we intend to develop these relations in every way, on the basis of equality, and noninterference in one another's affairs. Naturally, we are interested in the future of tens of thousands of Transcarpathian Hungarians," I. Mecs said in conclusion. "It seems that in time economic problems between our countries will disappear and the USSR will be an important trade partner as before."

"It is important for relations between our two countries to be finally cleansed of the accretions of the past. The Soviet Union recently admitted that sending its troops into Prague in 1968 was a mistake. We believe that a similar step could be taken with respect to the Hungarian events of 1956, and this, in our view, would be received very favorably by Hungarian society. Furthermore, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory—and talks on this are already in full swing—would not weaken the Soviet Union's security at all, it would seem."

B.I. Stukalin, USSR ambassador to Hungary, recently visited the free democrats' headquarters at their invitation.

Article Examines Hungarian Preelection Scene

PM2802112990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch: "Hungary: A Code of Honor for the Elections"]

[Text] Budapest—Today one can sense literally everywhere that the general elections in Hungary, with just over one month to go, are drawing nearer. Once again, just as it happened during preparations for the November referendum, a "poster war" has been launched in Budapest's streets, while radio and television are literally choked with election campaign programs by the country's political parties, more than 40 of which have been registered so far.

It must be noted that the election campaign preparations demanded considerable efforts to ensure equal opportunities for all parties. Many of them were given buildings and premises to locate their election centers, most of which had formerly housed MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] district committees. All registered parties now receive subsidies from the state budget in proportion to the number of their members, including funds to be used for their election campaigns, and the National Assembly's January session voted the appropriation of an additional 100 billion forints for this purpose. Therefore, as the parties admit, their election campaign is not encountering any particular financial difficulties, especially bearing in mind that many of them supplement their funds of subsidies and membership dues with private donations from abroad which, incidentally, are not banned by the law on parties.

The problems which have arisen as regards coverage of the election campaign by the mass media, hitherto under control by a single party or the state, are a different matter. These problems can be felt to this day, despite the fact that all parties have been allocated equal television time both for paid advertisements (at the cost of 120,000 forints per minute) and for free five-minute clips describing the party's goals and tasks. Television's preelection ups and downs were reflected in the recent resignations by the directors of Central Television and both its channels, and the departure from office by Minister of State I. Poszgay, member of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] leadership and in charge of mass media activity in the government.

For the first time in many years, these elections in Hungary will be held on a multiparty basis, which will create a qualitatively new situation both for voters and for the parties themselves, which are coming up against acute competition and the most natural struggle for votes. Moreover, as the first month of the election campaign showed, this struggle often spills beyond the parliamentary framework.

It was evidently no accident that an election code of ethics was rather urgently worked out and published a few days ago. The code specifically proclaims the impermissibility of any pressure by one party on another's election campaign, any creation of obstacles in the holding of election meetings and events, or attempts to discredit the prestige of other parties' candidate parliamentary deputies. The good timing of this code was proved by what happened in Leninvaros to MSZMP General Secretary K. Grosz who arrived there for a party election meeting. Representatives of an opposition party behaved improperly toward him.

The election campaign is not lacking surprises like, for example, the statement by G. Horn, Hungary's foreign minister and MSZP candidate parliamentary deputy, about Hungary's possible membership in NATO's political organizations. G. Horn admitted in an interview with the Hungarian Television news program that he received numerous telephone calls and telegrams demanding additional explanations of the position expressed by him. The minister declared in this context that the changing international situation, including in Central and East Europe, is putting on the agenda the question of creating a consultative system between the two alliances, which would require closer political relations. In its turn, according to the minister, this means that Hungary, just like any other Warsaw Pact country, could in the future—while remaining a member of its organization—simultaneously belong to some of NATO's political consultative organizations.

There are quite a few oddities, too. For example, the famous porn star Ilona Staller, better known in Italy as La Cicciolina, has announced her intention to run for election to the Hungarian parliament. Hungarian by origin, I. Staller is not satisfied by being a member of just the Italian parliament and now, having retained dual citizenship, has decided to try her luck in her homeland as an independent candidate parliamentary deputy. As regards her election program, La Cicciolina offers the Hungarian voters exactly what she offered the Italians—free love, the opening of a school to teach sex techniques to Hungarian men, free dissemination of pornography, and so on. But I am afraid that the last point I mentioned is old hat for Hungary...

The election campaign in the country is now on the homestretch—the registration of deputies and parties wishing to participate in the election will close 24 February. According to the latest opinion polls, if elections were held today, the majority of votes would be gained by opposition parties—21 percent by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, 18 percent by the Union of Free Democrats, and 16 percent by the Party of Independent Smallholders. The MSZP stands at 11 percent for the time being. But the election campaign flywheel is only just picking up speed...

Katushev, Hungary's Beck Discuss Trade Ties

LD0303235390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1806 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 March (TASS)—Konstantin Katushev, USSR minister for foreign economic relations, and Tamas Beck, Hungarian minister of trade, discussed the state of and prospects for development of foreign economic ties between the USSR and the Republic of Hungary. They exchanged opinions on fundamental issues relating to the implementation of the agreements reached at the 45th sitting of the CEMA session on further improving the mechanism of economic cooperation between countries, transfer of economic relations to world prices, and payments in freely convertible currency.

Agreements were reached on adopting measures aimed at settling mutual indebtedness and signing a protocol on goods exchange between the USSR and the Republic of Hungary in 1990 in the very near future.

MSZP Urges Talks on Export-Buying Currency

PM0103101590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Ending Export Is No Solution"]

[Text] Budapest, 23 Feb—The government's decision to end exports to countries paying in rubles has placed a whole series of Hungarian small, medium, and large enterprises in a highly complex position. Tens of thousands of people may lose their jobs. The Hungarian side may also lose the Soviet market for goods which will not be in demand elsewhere. That statement was made by the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP].

The MSZP proposes that the government begin talks with interested CEMA members, primarily the Soviet Union, as soon as possible to resolve on the basis of mutual interest the difficult situation which has arisen in this sphere. Bearing in mind that the Hungarian economy cannot sustain a significant ruble surplus, it is necessary to elaborate an agreement which would open the way to transferring Soviet-Hungarian trade to payments in convertible currency and would help to balance the large ruble surplus existing at present.

Before the adoption of such an agreement the MSZP proposes that the government change the system of export permits so that economic organizations would have greater prospects and confidence in their export potential, the statement notes.

Impediments to Soviet-Hungarian Trade Noted

90UI0383A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent V. Gerasimov datelined Budapest, 16 February: "A Knot of Problems"]

[Text] **The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the Republic of Hungary will be 42 years old on 18 February. In 1967, it was extended. At present, referring to the anniversary, it is impossible to ignore mounting difficulties which impede the further development of Hungarian-Soviet economic ties.**

On "appointment days," the Hungarian Ministry of Trade is besieged by the commercial directors of enterprises from the morning on. "Supply go-getters" come here for licenses: They have to extract permits to export goods to the Soviet Union. The situation which has emerged is altogether unprecedented.

Deputy Minister Piroshka Apro complains: "On top of this, we have to take a lot of phone calls! Everybody demands explanations, special approaches, and that their situation be taken into account. What can we do? Due to imbalances in ruble-based imports we have to resort to such draconian measures of control. However, it cannot be said that an embargo or a ban on the export of goods to the Soviet Union has been imposed. In January alone, 668 permits for R473 million were issued. We immediately issue permits for barter transactions in which imports from the Soviet Union are precisely defined."

As I found out, such permits are issued for one quarter. A total of 1,700 Hungarian enterprises are monitored: At present, a license has to be secured even to export goods specified in inter-governmental agreements. I visited the BHG combine of communications equipment, the MOM instrument-making and optical combine, and a number of machine-building plants. They said everywhere that the need for Hungarian products in the Soviet Union is tremendous. Deliveries could be stepped up. At present, they have to reduce exports; moreover, there may be no orders at all. The enterprises have to be completely restructured, shops should be closed, and workers should be laid off. They even mention this statistic: 100,000 people may join the ranks of the unemployed.

"Raba" has suspended various capital-investment projects. Ruble-based exports used to account for 40 percent of the output of this major plant (rear axles, engines for Ikarusz buses, and agricultural machinery). The plant failed to sign a transaction this quarter which could have brought 1.5 billion forints in profits because they were unable to proceed. By now, all plants and shops of the Ikarusz are idle. Ten thousand people in all are without jobs. Is it for a month or two? For now, they are going to be paid 80 percent of their wages "for idle time."

However, the complaints of Piroshka Apro are also understandable. She gave me the following number: R952 million. This is the debt of the Soviet Union. The imbalance is growing. Quite recently, on 1 January, the surplus in the balance of payments in favor of Hungary amounted to R782 million rubles. This surplus is intolerably heavy for the country to shoulder.

Radical measures amount to "the gates" alternately opening and closing the way for the export of Hungarian goods. Previously, the ruble exchange rate was reduced by five percent, advance deliveries were banned, taxes on ruble-based exports were imposed, and subsidies on them were reduced and in some cases entirely eliminated. An exchange was organized for "above-the-quota" rubles. That is to say, the Ministry of Finance no longer guarantees an official forint equivalent of these rubles.

In the Ministry of Trade, they reminded me about the recent past when prices for raw materials and oil were increasing rather than declining. Hungary managed to increase its exports to the Soviet Union. Between 1976 and 1986, additional goods worth R8 billion were supplied due to the price changes. I also had to listen to the following justified rebuke addressed to us. For years, the same products without modifications were ordered in Hungary because market mechanisms did not function while quota-based trade was rigorously regimented. Soviet foreign-trade organizations followed the beaten path: Get more and get it cheaper, it is good enough. The capacity of some enterprises was boosted with only Soviet needs in view—say, tugs for Siberian rivers, or electronic devices for railroads. At present, it is primarily deliveries of machine building products that the Soviet side itself is curtailing in order to reduce Hungary's accumulated ruble surplus.

It appears that the tangle of problems in Hungarian-Soviet relations consists of threads which abound in knots and snags, of multi-colored thick and thin yarn and, perhaps, on occasion of pieces of absolutely alien origin. The mythical transferable ruble isolated from the money of the world, confusing and contradictory prices, rigid planning (Western companies switch to turning out new products in half a year whereas in our country everything hinges on five-year plans), the very mechanism of settlements—all of this continues to lead us toward "knotty" trade and confusion rather than integration which is now out of the question. Is this not a paradox: If we ignore the transferable rubles and convert Soviet deliveries to Hungary to dollars at international prices it will turn out that Hungary will be "in debt" right away to the tune of $1.5 to 1.8 billion a year. Besides, why do the employees of the Hungarian Ministry of Trade somehow fail to tell the public about the profits which Soviet imports generate for Hungary?

Andrash Gabor, chairman of the Hungarian Economic Chamber and chairman of the Tungsram Joint-Stock Company, spoke sharply about the licensing of ruble-based exports: "Instead of freeing up entrepreneurial activities, limitations have been installed. They are more numerous now than under the confounded old mechanism which we fought. The view is still common in Hungarian public opinion that the great neighbor to the east exploits our motherland at a time when the state budget takes in about 60 billion forints annually due to our trade with the Soviet Union. It is necessary to evaluate exports and imports on the basis of a unified approach, to publicize data on the profits, as well as on how the government spends the money taken in."

The Hungarian Economic Chamber has also developed a proposal to use the 20 billion forints which are annually withheld from enterprises in taxes on ruble-based exports to improve production structures.

As we sort out the tangle we indeed encounter new "threads." At present, the country's solvency depends entirely and completely on international financial organizations. They are the ones to develop Hungary's economic policy now. Along with the demand to restrict the budget deficit, they have made several more suggestions, one of which affects Hungarian-Soviet relations: to ensure balance in ruble-based settlements by the end of this year. This is why the government's economic program provides for reducing ruble-based exports by 20 percent. Therefore, a further decline in the volume of bilateral cooperation this year is envisaged and is, by all signs, unavoidable.

When one visits enterprises he senses the tremendous inclination and desire to work for ruble-based exports, improve the quality of products, create joint enterprises, look for forms of cooperation, and study the Soviet market. We may recall the contracts which have worked out. For example, the "alumina-aluminum" program has saved 15 billion forints for Hungary and has generated meaningful hard- currency exports. Soviet deliveries on contracts are the basis for the growth of the chemical industry and plastics and the profits they generate. At present, it is impossible to imagine the Hungarian power industry without the Paks Nuclear Power Station which is acknowledged to be one of the best and most reliable. Last fall, after winning a bid, Soviet assembly workers tore down an old blast furnace and built a new one within 99 days rather than the 180 days the Hungarian designers had expected.

A transition to settling in freely convertible currencies is to come in 1991. It is up to the specialists to decide how to implement it best. However, it is, perhaps, beyond any doubt that settlements in freely convertible currencies at world-market prices and a market-oriented approach provide the only opportunity to overcome the critical condition of Hungarian-Soviet cooperation, eliminating the Soviet shortfall in the balance of payments, and cutting the knot of mounting problems.

Bessmertnykh Confers With Hungarian Ambassador

PM2802105190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 23 February USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh received S. Gyorke, Hungarian ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request. Questions relating to the developing situation in Europe and also other international problems were discussed.

Frolov, Hungarian Envoy Meet at PRAVDA Office

PM0603160790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Unattributed report: "Meeting in Editorial Office"]

[Text] I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, has had a meeting at the PRAVDA editorial office with S. Gyorke, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Hungarian Republic to the USSR, at the latter's request.

KGB Official in Moscow Discusses Cooperation

AU2602152690 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

["D.P." report: "There Are No KGB Officers in the Hungarian Interior Ministry"]

[Text] At present, there are no KGB advisers in the Hungarian Interior Ministry, Vladimir Lutsenko, deputy head of the Constitutional Defense Directorate of the KGB, announced in Moscow. However, as members of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and Hungary cooperate in defense and state security matters.

This cooperation is based on the principle of full sovereignty and is regulated by adequate agreements, Lutsenko said, and described reports on this subject published in the Hungarian dailies in January 1990 as "distorted."

In practice, this cooperation is carried out by specially authorized Soviet KGB and Hungarian Interior Ministry officers in Budapest and Moscow, respectively. They have no advisory functions. According to a KGB news conference held in Moscow on 22 February, the two organizations cooperate in the security of state borders and in the fight against international terrorism, smugglers, and drug traffic, as well as against organized crime. According to the TASS report on the news conference, Lutsenko noted that the Soviet justice bodies have contacts not only with the Warsaw Pact members but also with developing and capitalist countries.

The part of the TASS report dealing with the Hungarian-Soviet relations mentions the fact that the observations made by Lutsenko refer to the present. The KGB officer did not deal with the recent or distant past.

Hungarian Armed Forces Reform Mooted

PM2702162790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Hungary: Draft Reform of Army"]

[Text] Budapest, 26 Feb—The Hungarian Defense Ministry leadership has submitted a draft reform of the army for examination by the country's National Assembly. If it is approved, Major General F. Szombathely, Hungarian deputy defense minister, said at a news conference here, then on 15 March the Hungarian People's Army will be renamed the Hungarian Honvedseg ("Defenders of the Fatherland"). That was the name of the Hungarian Army in the 19th and 20th centuries.

It is planned to redraft the rules of routine garrison duty and the drill regulations of the armed forces.

After touching on the question of the possibility of Hungary's future participation in the political organizations of NATO, Maj. Gen. Szombathely noted that the disruption of the military-strategic balance in Europe cannot be seen as a sensible political step.

Bulgarian Party Holds Meeting at Sofia Stadium

PM0503122490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Kapralov report: "Hope Must Be Defended"]

[Text] Sofia—Traditionally 1 March is celebrated in Bulgaria as the festival of spring, the festival of hope. People give each other "Marchings"—simple decorations woven from two twisted threads—red and white. On that day the Higher Party Council and the community council of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] of Sofia invited citizens and party comrades to the capital's Vasil Levski Stadium. A noteworthy detail: The organizers paid in full for the lease of the stadium.

A speech was delivered to those present (and there were as many of them as there were at the rally of the Union of Democratic Forces in 9 September Square, which was held a few days earlier) by A. Lilov, chairman of the BCP Higher Party Council Presidium. He explained why the Higher Party Council decided to hold not a rally, but a meeting: "We want political reason and wisdom to prevail at our meeting, not the political passions and exaltation of the square."

And indeed, no one was shouting "Down with!" at this meeting of many thousands of people. The slogans were like this: "For a high level of political culture in dialogue and in action!" Yet it is well known that at the rally of the Union of Democratic Forces, it was slogans with the subtext "Down with the BCP!" that predominated.

Lathe operator R. Benov said on this point: "Today some of our opponents would like to see the Communist Party on its knees. But the BCP can only bend its knees before the sacrifices with which it has strewn its age-old path!"

A. Lilov's speech was heard with particular attentiveness. "The country faces a choice," he said, "not only the free elections to the National Assembly, but a historic choice: By what path will the radical democratization of society proceed? Will it be a peaceful path, without violence, chaos, or bloodshed, or will it be the path of kindling hatred and internecine strife, of aggressive clashes with unpredictable consequences? Which path will we choose—the Romanian or the Hungarian, the bloody or the civilized, pogroms or reforms—that is the first, truly epochal question facing every party and every Bulgarian citizen today. No one can avoid answering it."

Certain opposition hawks, A. Lilov went on, sometimes call us a "mafia" and a "gang," burn our newspaper, and desecrate the party's sacred sites. But it is not so easy to intimidate us. We have a clear program, and we know how to defend it.

The stadium greeted with a tumultuous ovation and shouts of approval the appeal for a peaceful transition to democracy that was adopted at the end of the meeting. Mass meetings were also held in other cities in the country: Sliven, Tolbukhin, Yambol, Plovdiv.

BCP on Democratization, Elections, Name-Change

PM2702105990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Bulgaria: BCP Supreme Party Council Sitting"]

[Text] Sofia, 24 Feb—Important questions relating to the renewal of Bulgarian society were considered at a session of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Supreme Party Council here. A. Lilov, chairman of the BCP Supreme Party Council, delivered a report on the present situation and some of the BCP's main political tasks.

Characterizing the political situation in the country, he stated that the process of democratization initiated 10 November last year is continuing. It is notable for its supreme dynamics, the formation of new political parties and movements, and the development of political pluralism. Some of the population still have a critical attitude toward the BCP, brought about by their condemnation of the deformations permitted by T. Zhivkov's regime of personal power and their dissatisfaction over the insufficiently rapid pace of real change in the country.

The BCP's leading organ approved a number of initiatives substantiated in the report and designed to effect real changes within the BCP and democratize the political system and all Bulgarian society. Thus the Supreme Party Council proposed enhancing the status of the national "roundtable" by transforming it into a permanent political forum for the discussion of highly important questions relating to the country's political and socioeconomic life and an active factor for the democratization of society.

The session adopted a document concerning the upcoming elections. Accommodating the opposition's desire for the prolongation of the preparatory period prior to the parliamentary elections, the BCP proposed holding them in June rather than in May as previously planned. The idea of inviting representatives of other countries' parliaments for the voting was put forward with a view to ruling out any chance of speculation as to the democratic nature of the elections.

The Supreme Party Council proposed adopting appropriate legislation to suspend the operation of party and other political organizations in places of work and instruction. It is intended that all parties and political organizations be based on the territorial principle. The Supreme Party Council also decided to hold a partywide referendum on the question of changing the BCP's name.

Anticommunist Rally Held; BCP Urges 'Dialogue'

PM0103141590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Kapralov: "Resistance"]

[Text] Sofia—"The first day of Lent in Sofia was reminiscent of St Bartholmew's Night," RABOTNICHESKO DELO writes. In Holy Sunday Church Bulgarian Patriarch Maksim urged love, compassion, charity, repentence, and forgiveness... But the 200,000-strong crowd on 9 September Square was listening to different "sermons." "Murderers! Down with the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]!" "Back to Feudalism with the BCP!" and "Victory for the UDF [Union of Democratic Forces]!" were inscribed on the placards.

The rally was organized by the UDF. Opening it, the rally moderator said that the UDF was launching a nationwide protest "against the Communist Party leadership's destructive policy."

RABOTNICHESKO DELO—the organ of the BCP—did not bury information about the event on the square on some obscure inside page but led with the story under the headline "Hawks Show Their Claws." It quotes statements by some speakers which are blatantly anticommunist in nature. "Hypocrisy is an immutable attribute of the Communist Party. We know we are strong and it is doomed to fail," the Democratic Party chairman stated. "We are convinced that the terrorist organization that calls itself the Communist Party is to blame for the political, economic, and moral catastrophe to which Bulgaria has been brought!"

The UDF's ultimatum to the BCP at the rally did not encounter any resistance, although I do think that at least as many people could have been assembled in the square under party banners. The party's response does not reside in a demonstration of strength but in a search for ways of dialogue and the achievement of unity and concord for the sake of nationwide rather than narrow party objectives. The BCP Supreme Council's package of political initiatives published Sunday is evidence of this. One section of it concerns the status of the national roundtable discussions. It has not yet produced any appreciable results. The UDF has adopted a pretty rigid stance, insisting that decisions made during the roundtable discussions have priority over the decisions of parliament and state organs. Indeed this idea was contained in the speech delivered at the rally by UDF leader Zh. Zhelev. He categorically stated that the amendments and additions to the constitution (particularly the law on political parties) should not be submitted to a session of the People's Assembly until they have been adopted at the roundtable.

The BCP Supreme Council is urging participants in the roundtable discussions to refrain from using violent methods or advocating any form of coercion and to prevent the outbreak of disorder and chaos in the country in order that the transition to a democratic political system may proceed in a bloodless, civilized manner. The creation of reliable political and legal safeguards for the holding of free elections will mark an important step towards this, in the Supreme Party Council's opinion. The elections were initially scheduled for May. The Supreme Party Council is now proposing that they be switched to June. The deferment of the elections is, incidentally, also in line with the demands of the opposition (although the UDF has, it is true, insisted on the end of the year), which needs time to gather its strength.

To preclude the possibility of the democratic elections being exploited the Supreme Party Council is proposing that two representatives be invited to the elections from the parliaments of the USSR, the United States, the FRG, France, Britain, Canada, Finland, and Austria and also the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and the European parliament.

The Supreme Party Council has also adopted a decision to hold a referendum in March on the party's name. It will be conducted by secret ballot in all the party's basic organizations.

Bulgarian Opposition Shows 'Undemocratic Trends'

PM0703162790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Opposition Demonstrations"]

[Text] Sofia, 6 Mar—The Bulgarian public has noted with alarm the increase in dangerous clearly undemocratic trends which have manifested themselves in the course of events organized by the opposition.

It was from this viewpoint that readers of RABOTNICHESKO DELO drew attention to a procession in the Bulgarian capital organized by the Federation of Independent Student Societies. Its organizers took the convoy along a route banned to demonstrators by the capital's People's Council.

Attacks on the Communist Party and socialism have become an invariable feature of the opposition's mass demonstrations. The rally held in Sofia by the Union of Democratic Forces as part of the celebrations of the day Bulgaria was liberated from the Ottoman yoke was no exception. In their speeches addressed to several tens of thousands of people, the speakers not only disregarded Bulgaria's achievements during the socialist years but also tried to ascribe the mistakes committed by T. Zhivkov's regime to the entire Communist Party and equate the postwar period in Bulgarian history with the times of Ottoman supremacy.

Continuing Zhivkov Investigation Reported

PM0103092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Kapralov dispatch: "Bulgaria: Investigation Continues"]

[Text] Sofia—The Bulgarian National Assembly will begin work 5 March. But various parliamentary commissions are already working hard now to prepare important new draft laws, in particular on settling collective labor disputes, on the status of Bulgarian Television, and on political parties. The activity of the commission considering solutions to certain urgent questions connected with deformations and breaches of the laws are also the center of Bulgarian public attention.

The parliament's press center reported on the latest session of this commission 21 February. The commission assessed its activity in a self-critical manner, noting that the exposure of people guilty of gross violations of the law under the totalitarian regime is proceeding slowly. The commission proposed giving T. Zhivkov an opportunity to be defended by an attorney at the investigation stage.

I do not want attorneys now, the accused T. Zhivkov said in response to this proposal.

Meanwhile the investigation has to clear up a series of new facts concerning T. Zhivkov's culpability for the design and construction of a number of state facilities and population centers, the conclusion of economic agreements with other states, and the reorganization of the country's economic system, which inflicted serious damage on the national economy. Financial audits and checks will be carried out at publishing houses and economic and foreign trade organizations and an examination conducted to value villas, apartments, possessions, and various collections. The number of witnesses is expected to run into several hundreds. No answer has as yet been received to queries from the chief prosecutor sent to five Western European powers regarding deposits of foreign currency and valuables by the families of T. Zhivkov, M. Balev, and I. Slavkov.

T. Zhivkov's state of health, BTA reports, presents no difficulties during the investigation. He is under constant medical supervision.

It is also reported that, given sufficient evidence, M. Balev (former member of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Central Committee Politburo, who has been expelled from the party) and I. Slavkov (former husband of T. Zhivkov's late daughter and chairman of the Bulgarian Olympic Committee) have been taken into custody. They are currently to be found at the main investigation administration.

Bulgarian National Agrarian Union Holds Congress

PM0103161090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Kapralov report: "Two Extraordinary Congresses"]

[Text] Sofia—The congress of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union has neded in Sofia, and with it the organization itself ceased to exist. In its place, a new one was formed—Bulgarian Democratic Youth.

The program declaration of Bulgarian Democratic Youth states that it is an "autonomous social organization" expressing and upholding young people's interests. It "breaks resolutely with the totalitarianism of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union." Its aim is to uphold young people's right to self-expression and their protection in society, operating by political means in accordance with the country's laws.

Unlike the Communist Youth Union, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, whose extraordinary congress opens on Tuesday, is apparently under no threat of a split or renaming. Since 10 November the agrarian party, having escaped the rigorous patronage and control of the Bulgarian Communist Party, has been turning into a real political force. The number of members has increased by 20,000, reaching 130,000.

The congress will discuss the new statutes and election platform of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, which advocates socioeconomic and legal guarantees of various types of ownership, putting private ownership first and cooperative ownership second. Willing to collaborate with other parties, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union advocates a transition to a democratic society, using civilized means to achieve its goals. Its potential partner is the "Nikola Petkov" Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, named after a prominent party figure who was executed in 1947, when hundreds of his comrades were also repressed.

The "Nikola Petkov" Bulgarian National Agrarian Union belongs to the Union of Democratic Forces, and its representatives at "roundtable" sessions sit on the opposite side to the leaders of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. Will the representatives of these two peasant parties be able to form a single platform for the coming elections? It is too soon as yet to answer this question in the affirmative. It will depend largely on the readiness to make mutual concessions and compromises. The latest such attempt failed the other day when a meeting in the Sofia Opera House ended in mutual complaints and reproaches.

At a meeting of leaders of the country's sociopolitical forces with Bulgarian State Council Chairman Petur Mladenov on Monday, it was decided unanimously to declare 3 March a national holiday. The day of liberation from the Turkish yoke will be celebrated as Bulgaria's freedom, independence, and unity day.

"Let us make the holiday a day of national consensus, of triumph of the people's virtue and ideals," the Fatherland Front National Council's appeal says. "Let us express gratitude and respect to the fraternal Russian people and the other European peoples with whose help freedom was born. Let 3 March be a great day of love for the Fatherland!"

Extraordinary Congress Ends

PM0503125390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondent A. Kapralov: "At The Crossroads"]

[Text] Sofia—The extraordinary congress of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] has ended in Sofia.

The history of this peasant party is highly dramatic. The long-time leader of the BZNS, P. Tanchev, tried to copy Todor Zhivkov in every way. And now, after four decades of "painfully and agonizingly programless and humiliating existence," the union has adopted and proclaimed its own program.

Its main stated aim is to create a society that is highly developed spiritually and materially, in which equality and freedom of expression will be guaranteed for all citizens. Acting as a national, democratic party, the BZNS will cooperate with other public forces and establish a coalition with them, given complete openness and glasnost.

It is perfectly natural that the farmers' party should pay special attention to problems of the priority development of agriculture. The social progress and material prosperity of the people are impossible without the revival of the Bulgarian countryside, in which all types of ownership should exist on an equal basis: private, cooperative, communal, state.

But in order to transform the Bulgarian countryside it is necessary to carry out a reform which will restore the land to its former peasant owners or their heirs. Those wishing to work on the land and establish private plots must be fully entitled to leave collective farms.

The congress approved the BZNS statutes and elected a union chairman from six candidates. He is Viktor Vulkov, formerly a BZNS secretary.

One very important issue that was tackled at the congress was the question of uniting the two wings of the agrarian party—the BZNS and the newly emerged "Nikola Petkov" BZNS, named in honor of the farmers' leader executed in 1947 on a charge of plotting against people's power and now rehabilitated.

The Nikola Petkovites are refusing to leave the opposition Union of Democratic Forces, and the BZNS leaders, in turn, are reluctant to join it, while, at the same time, refusing to participate in a government headed by communists.

As party Chairman V. Vulkov said at a press conference, "the question of unification is so delicate that to interpret it too freely can only do harm."

Further on Union Congress

PM0503124590 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 4 Mar 90 p 3

[Own correspondent Yu. Savin dispatch: "Bulgaria: From Congress to Conference?"]

[Text] Sofia, 3 Mar—The extraordinary 36th Congress of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, which has ended here, marks a major step toward the establishment of this party as an independent organization and a real political force in the country. The Union's new statutes have been approved. After a heated debate which lasted two days the BZNS program has been adopted. It should be noted that for more than 40 years the party functioned without a program document.

The Agrarian Union has declared itself a nationwide political organization favoring the establishment of a democratic parliamentary state with a developed economy and agriculture and a rich spiritual life for its nation. The party favors the election of the head of state by means of direct nationwide elections, the separation of legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, the establishment of a multiparty system, and harmonious relations between society and nature.

The congress noted the need for a radical democratization of economic life on the basis of market economy principles and the provision of socioeconomic and legal guarantees of equal rights for all forms of ownership. The conviction was expressed that social progress, the material and spiritual welfare of the people, and a strong and independent state are impossible without a rebirth of the countryside, .

The congress elected a Union Board which is three-fourths new. The BZNS chairman is 53-years-old Viktor Vulkov.

In place of the old Standing Committee, the Union Board in turn elected an internal leadership consisting of four people who, judging by today's editorial article in the newspaper ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME, will "manage current organizational tasks effectively until the historic day."

This formulation alludes to the theme which became dominant as early as the evening of the first day of the congress proceedings. It is the issue of the unity of the agrarian movement, or rather the unification of the current BZNS with the BZNS named for Nikola Petkov—a political organization disbanded in 1947 whose reinstatement was proclaimed at the end of last year.

The two parties' contact groups have reached agreement on the convocation of a national constitutent conference of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union 24 March. Delegations greeted this announcement 28 February with tumultuous applause and chants of "Unity!" Why does the headline to this report end with a question mark? It is because the very next day utterances from the leadership of the BZNS named for Nikola Petkov called into question the agreement which had been reached. How will events develop now? Time will tell. In any event the BZNS congress approved the powers of its contact group to conduct further negotiations on problems of unification.

Bulgarian Unions Face 'Disintegration'

90UI0386A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 3

[Special correspondent V. Khrustalev report: "Last Congress, First Congress"]

[Text] Sofia, 19 February—The constituent congress of the Confederation of Independent Syndicates of Bulgaria (CISB), which had started out on Saturday as the 11th, Special, Congress of Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions (IBT), has ended in Sofia.

As K. Petkov, chairman of the IBT Provisional Executive Committee, said in his report at the congress, Bulgaria's unions "face a fatal dilemma: Either they restructure themselves, conducting profound internal reform to become a part of the radical changes or they will disintegrate as an organization."

In actual fact, the disintegration has already begun. The seepage not only of individual members but of whole organizations has assumed disturbing proportions. A number of organizations have dissolved themselves and ceased to pay their dues. Interest in the "Podkrepa" parallel labor federation pursuing, after the example of the Polish Solidarity, not only syndicalist but also political aims has grown.

Under these conditions how can a disastrous split for the workers' movement be prevented? A concrete answer was given to this question in both the report and the delegates' speeches. Only a confederative union free of the pressure of the administrative and command system could unite the multiplicity of independent organizations on the basis of a common platform.

Following heated debate, such a platform was adopted. The confederation advocates a policy which puts the interests of the country and the people above narrow-party interests and opportunist political goals, a multiparty political system and the depoliticization of relations at enterprises and in establishments.

The organizational structure of the CISB, the congress said, must be open and flexible, and the apparatus, minimal, for which it was resolved to reduce the current apparatus by two-thirds.

K. Petkov was elected chairman of the Confederation of Independent Syndicates of Bulgaria.

Bulgarians' Political Awareness Increases

PM0503144390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by special correspondents L. Zhmyrev and A. Krushinskiy under the rubric "Bulgaria Today": "Love and Passion—Politics..."]

[Excerpts] Sofia-Moscow—There is probably no other people than the Bulgarians in whose customs there is such an expressive dividing line between winter and spring. From the first days of February an innumerable quantity of "martenitsas"—brooches, miniature toys invariably combining the colors red and white (symbols of health, happiness, and hope)—appear in stores, in newspaper kiosks, and on street hawkers' trays. On the eve of 1 March mailmen stoop beneath the weight of bags containing congratulatory postcards.

The traditions of another sign of spring run very deep here, although not to such an extent: During the first days of March newspapers and magazines abound in photographs of Shipka and Pleven, in portraits of Russian generals, and in verses and essays on the subject of 3 March—the anniversary of Bulgaria's liberation from the Ottoman yoke. This year, the 112th anniversary, is special. In accordance with a decision that has just been adopted, it henceforth acquires the status of the country's national holiday instead of 9 September, which used to be celebrated as Freedom Day. This is one more link in the long chain of the changes that have occurred in Bulgaria over the past two or three months. Changes whose common denominator is frequently defined as "depoliticization."

At first sight this is a fair definition. Thus, the Bulgarian Confederation of Independent Syndicalists (formed instead of the Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions) has declared its intention to adhere to "active political neutrality." The Dimitrov Communist Youth League has ceased to exist, and a new organization has been set up in its place—Bulgarian Democratic Youth. Political organs in the Army are being disbanded.

An analogy with the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary suggests itself—particularly as an extraordinary party congress was recently held here, just as there, and its decisions also revised the attitude toward democratic centralism and the multiparty system and expressed adherence to the principles of democratic socialism. However, while rightly noting the similarity of the processes taking place in East European countries, we sometimes forget that everywhere has its own specific nature. [passage omitted]

The situation in the party is not so optimistic throughout Bulgaria as a whole. There have, alas, been losses. However, in his report at the recent republic party aktiv meeting Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Higher Party Council, said, and not without reason, that, as distinct from other East European Communist parties, the BCP found at its congress an original way to preserve itself and to preserve its political role in the restructuring of society. He called for an end to political passiveness and for active work in two interrelated areas: the discussion and realization of the congress decisions and the preparations for parliamentary elections.

There is no way you can call the start of this spring "comfortable" for Bulgarian Communists. We recently witnessed a small but very aggressive demonstration: Some 200-300 people, mainly young people, marched along a central street in Sofia, chanting "BCP mafia! Both then and now!" A little later DEMOKRATIYA, the organ of opposition forces, predicted "inevitable political unemployment for 1 million Bulgarian Communists."

However, relapses into "black propaganda" are commonplace in modern Bulgaria. The failure to form a coalition government was a more serious unpleasantness for the BCP leadership: Not only representatives of the Union of Democratic Forces but even the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, which hitherto had invariably cooperated with the Communist Party, refused the portfolios offered them. This is the result of disagreements in the "roundtable" stemming, in the opinion of certain observers, from not quite legitimate analogies with the situation in a number of East European countries: You get the feeling that the opposition would like almost the same concessions from the BCP as other Communist parties have had to make.

And so a one-party government has had to be formed. Under conditions of the unbalanced economy and the worsening situation on the domestic market, time is working against the BCP. A further deterioration in life (and it is difficult to halt this process) could deprive the BCP of many votes in the upcoming elections. And yet the party has assumed the burden of responsibility by proclaiming the primacy of national interests over narrow party interests. The BCP is seeking not to lose the political initiative, as its leadership has graphically demonstrated, having just proposed a package of bold restructuring ideas (including the national holiday's move to 3 March). What outwardly seems a retreat is being viewed by many people as a new wave of Communist activeness.

At any rate, the term "depoliticization" is not very fitting for an assessment of all these events. When previously have the Bulgarians taken such an interest in politics in their history? This is now their love and passion here, an all-consuming enthusiasm. Even when exchanging "martenitsas," many people speak not of happiness and health but, again, about politics! About ensuring that the transition to humane, democratic socialism is made without upheavals.

New Bulgarian Party Editor Interviewed

90UI0402A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Feb 90 Second p 5

[Interview with Stefan Prodev, chief editor of Bulgaria's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, conducted by correspondent L. Zhmyrev: "In the First Person"]

[Text] Sofia—In his essay "Words Unspoken," which was published some time ago, S. Prodev, a commentator who is well known in Bulgaria, spoke about himself with a certain irony: "I have celebrated my 60th birthday and have spent 40 years in a saddle from which I have on 13 occasions jumped from editorial office to editorial office...." He had just prior to this returned to the "saddle" of chief editor of the newspaper NARODNA KULTURA, whence he had previously been removed by T. Zhivkov's ideological machinery.

But when he wrote this essay, he had no idea, evidently, that ahead lay one further "jump," the 14th: at the 14th, special, BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Congress Stefan Prodev was elected chief editor of the newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO (in accordance with the new party rules, this office is now elective). And whereas, furthermore, there were for R. Radev, former chief editor of this paper, little more than 400 votes cast, for Prodev, 2,315. Incidentally, several days earlier in the same hall of the People's Palace of Culture there had been a congress of the Bulgarian Journalists Union, of which he, Prodev, was elected chairman also.

Today we publish an interview with the new leader of the fraternal newspaper conducted by L. Zhmyrev, PRAVDA correspondent in Bulgaria.

[Zhmyrev] Two years ago you wrote in PRAVDA a commentator's observations entitled "Why Am I an Optimist?" The events which followed shortly after in your life harshly confounded this proposition, it would seem—you were kicked off the newspaper NARODNA KULTURA. But now, what, are you an optimist under the conditions of the perestroyka which has unfolded in your country?

[Prodev] I would now also reply in the words of that publication, memorable for me, in PRAVDA: the time has come to recognize not only our mistakes but also our real strength. And this, our strength, lies in reason, which demands a struggle against dogmatic forms of thinking and action, against anti-democratism. There is nothing stronger than this!

[Zhmyrev] But in the last 2 years there have once again been many relapses into dogmatism and serious mistakes. The Bulgarian press, I recall, on instructions "from the top," actively supported the campaign on the national-ethnic question....

[Prodev] Oh, no, by no means all our journalists and writers lied and played the hypocrite when the T. Zhikov camarilla was perpetrating monstrous violence against Bulgaria's Muslims, taking away their names, ancestral memory and right to their language, dress, religion and customs. I admit that at that time many people adopted the ostrich position: "This is nothing to do with me, it is out of my hands, I am performing a 'party assignment'." But there were also those who in Zhivkov's time even dissociated themselves from his nationalism. Some protested as best they could, others quit their jobs, yet others did everything within their power not to inflame hatred toward the Bulgarian Turks.

[Zhmyrev] Perestroyka, democracy, glasnost, pluralism. What do they mean for the individual? What is the place therein of the writer and the news media?

[Prodev] The attitude toward perestroyka is in the full sense of the word the touchstone for each actively living conscience. One cannot consider oneself a modern man without having adopted an entirely certain position in perestroyka. Any attempt to practice guile and adopt a wait-and-see position entails degradation.

All these interweavings made up of individual misgivings, interests and selfishness are erecting before perestroyka a whole mountain of problems. And its success depends on the conquest of this mountain. In this sense the fate of perestroyka is difficult. Like any major social phenomenon, now also the truth is being forged as the result of quite serious confrontations. I repeat, no one can remain aloof.

The role of journalism in the struggle for perestroyka is exceptionally great. The man of letters invades reality by means of his characters, and the readers do not usually identify him with heroes and events. The commentator, on the other hand, writes in the first person—he is always face to face with problems and cannot hide behind them and transfer his words and thoughts to someone else....

I was just 20 years old when I started out as a cub reporter. One of my first mentors, Botyu Sultanov, I recall, would din it into me constantly that journalism is difficult and... "dirty" work. Alas, considerable numbers of the journalists of my generation lived as if in a dream. Everyone was waiting for something which would change our press. Many grew weary. And is there anything more paradoxical than a tired journalist? There are many such now—tired of unrealized dreams, the lack of trust and fear of punishment. Past years considerably dulled our pens, but gave us something also. Now, although tired, we do not succumb to lies and agree less easily to compromise and sell off our feelings.

Why hide it, there are even now people who believe that journalism is "dirty" work. As far as I am concerned, I believe that we who remain can still, despite our tiredness, take several steps forward. Can and must.

[Zhmyrev] What, in your view, can the individual give his society in an era of a break with the old ideas?

[Prodev] Much, I believe, depends on the capacity for self-cleansing. I refer to my own example. Immediately after 10 November, when the T. Zhivkov dictatorship fell, I wrote two articles. One of them, entitled "The Portrait," was carried by TRUD. This article was about the fact that just the day before just one portrait adorned all the offices of our state. Hoisted at the mausoleum, it was as if it wished not only to enslave us but also depersonalize us and turn us into his lookalikes. I went on to write about the fact that many of his subjects now felt, probably, robbed and devastated—because no one was now ordering them about. I understand their calamity, but cannot console them. "Dear Motherland! How long you have waited for your true hour, the hour of triumph over an obsession which usurped your brightest aspirations?"

In the other article, which was entitled "Idea for an Exhibition" (it was published in RABOTNICHEKO DELO), I developed the idea that for future generations it would be no bad thing to preserve the attributes of the cult—a kind of exhibition of documents, monuments, books, posters, this entire giant phantasmagoria of glorification of one man. Why? So that others might learn from this. So that it not be repeated.

[Zhmyrev] There is much argument currently about the future paths of development of our society, about the fate of socialism....

[Prodev] Only recently socialism was enmeshed in dogmatic teachings which have already been repudiated. We were long persuaded that socialism had reached maturity, and attempts were made to prove that our life was continually moving in direct line of ascent. Now we not only know but neither are we afraid to say that our system also has its calamities, that the way ahead is marked by difficult retreats and that we cannot live by slogans and dreams alone. Now the universal upsurge of social forces, called with every justification perestroyka, shows the whole moral and political groundlessness of this lie. Perestroyka is a necessary sobering-up, as it were, following a long state of ideological intoxication. And, thanks to this, forces whose existence we did not even suspect have been set in motion.

[Zhmyrev] Did the results of the 14th BCP Congress, to which you were a delegate, confirm your sense of optimism?

[Prodev] Yes, they did. During the congress I constantly had the feeling that society was beginning to agonizingly "scramble out" of the anti-times of stagnation. No fanfares, no pioneer neckties marching to a drumbeat, no empty talk of "guests," no semi-comatose presidium and other attributes of a well-rehearsed performance. On the contrary, the present congress resembled more a mass meeting. Never before in the history of our Communist Party had there been such a non-official, explosive forum.

The congress showed that a restoration of Zhivkovism is virtually inconceivable. We are living under new social conditions, where total ideology is giving way to various opposition forces. There are objectively in the party various ideological currents and platforms. Representatives of the Alternative Socialist Association and the platforms of the "Bulgarian Way to Europe," "The BCP—Democratic Forum" and other ideological formations gained a rostrum. The orthodox are leveling charges of "revisionism" and "treachery" and attempting to impede the process. This is natural and should not frighten us. The old practice of social hypocrisy and political lies and shameless pressure and chiefism were emphatically rejected.

In the main documents adopted by the congress—the "Manifesto" and the updated rules—the party made a serious attempt to leave the former ossified forms and become a renewed Marxist party, a party of democratic socialism. This is something more than everyday perestroyka. It is a second birth, perhaps.

[Zhmyrev] The following question was heard in a speech at the BCP Central Committee December Plenum in connection with the debunking of the Zhivkov cult: "Why does the socialist system give birth to dictators, why does it tolerate them for so long?"

[Prodev] Such is a tragic deviation. Dictators are by no means an inevitable concomitant of socialism. Take the character of Lenin. This was a genuine Marxist who preferred public disputation to the individual verdict. Lenin hated glorification, clamorous devotion and the elevation of an individual over collective intellect, the party and society. It was not fortuitous that he wrote in one of his letters that it was a mistake identifying him, Lenin, with the Central Committee.

Lenin's strength was precisely the fact that he did not identify himself with this collective organ or the other of the party and power. Just the opposite. He distanced himself and drew a line between himself and them. But what happened after Lenin? The longer this social dictator and tyrannosaurus or the other ruled, the uglier his cult became. However, can this be linked with Lenin?

In accordance with some unwritten law, the last years of Lenin's life were for us some kind of taboo. Why? We are afraid to destroy our "integral" idea of the leader and the man. But we are simply afraid of touching not him, the live person, but a statue. In its last months and days his life acquired something of a Shakespearean quality.

To the astonishment of the doctors, the disease which had destroyed his body was not strong enough to affect his mind. Lenin's thought, still alive, active and restless, although far from the Kremlin, continued to control Russia. It was there, in Gorki, that he wrote his testament to the Central Committee and his last articles on reorganization in the party and the state, on the new economic policy and restructuring in the countryside and on the international division of labor. This testament of Lenin's is now a call to us for perestroyka!

Heroes, leaders, dictators.... Monuments and portraits.... Now, in the era of the break with the old thinking and the riddance of stereotypes, one reflects agonizingly on how to preserve our socialist ideal, our "I believe," our optimism. Looking at the bronze, marble and plaster Lenin, one says to oneself: no, this is not he! Statues are cold and dead, but he was an invigorating storm!

West Europe

FRG Envoy Conveys Coalition Agreement to USSR

LD0703132290 Hamburg DPA in German 1246 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl has conveyed to the Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev the Bonn coalition's agreement on guaranteeing the Polish western border. It has been confirmed in Bonn today that ambassador Klaus Blech handed over the text to Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin in Moscow. [passage omitted]

Differences Within FRG on Unification Noted

LD0703215890 Moscow TASS in English 2140 GMT 7 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn March 8 TASS—West German President Richard von Weizsaecker opposes the opinion predominating in the Bonn governmental coalition that German unification is possible only through the joining of the German Democratic Republic to West Germany on the basis of Article 23 of the West German Constitution. As is known, this would actually mean that the German Democratic Republic would be engulfed by West Germany and that political, legal and economic systems of West Germany would automatically be spread on the other German state.

In an interview to a number of newspapers, summarised by the Bonn GENERAL-ANZEIGER, Von Weizsaecker said that the question of the ways and forms of the unification of the two German states should be decided above all by the German Democratic Republic.

The newspaper writes that the president has opposed the opinion of Chancellor Helmut Kohl who believes that the GDR's joining West Germany on the basis of Article 23 of West Germany's Constitution was the ideal road to German unity.

Von Weizsaecker opposed artificial speeding up of unification and of bringing "one-sided economic pressure" on the German Democratic Republic.

The president believes that the debate on this theme artificially whipped up in West Germany is premature. He said the GDR will bring into a united Germany its own values and its history. Eastern and Western Germans cannot be united by hard currency alone, he said.

Meanwhile West German revanchist circles rallying around "Bund der Vertriebenen" are not to be satisfied with Germany's reunification in the present frontiers. They demand the restoration of the German reich within the 1937 frontiers. These claims have again been advanced by leader of "Bund der Vertriebenen", Herbert Czaja.

Speaking in Bonn on Wednesday he called in question the final nature of the post-war frontiers, asserting that they have not been sealed by a treaty. He fully ignored the treaties that West Germany concluded with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the treaties that consolidate the inviolability of these frontiers.

Head of Silesian Germans Association Herbert Hupka also declared against the ultimate recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. He issued here a statement in which he declared against "the satisfaction of Poland's maximalist demands" which is how he describes the lawful right of Poles to live within guaranteed frontiers.

Kohl's Motives on Peace Treaty Examined

PM0703163590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[S. Guk article: "Is the FRG Against the Peace Treaty?"]

[Text] Chancellor H. Kohl rejected the idea of a peace treaty being signed between a united Germany and those countries which were victorious in World War II. Such a treaty should put an end once and for all to the protracted discussions in the FRG as to whether the Third Reich within the 1937 borders will continue to exist or not. Or more to put it more succinctly: It would mean the

Germans' voluntary renunciation of territorial claims (even if purely theoretical) against their neighbors.

The head of the Bonn cabinet explained his position simply: In the event of a peace treaty being signed, the countries that were victims of Nazi aggression, primarily Poland, can make claims for the payment of reparations running into billions. A future Germany does not intend to pay anything to anybody.

The question of postwar reparations seem to have been decided long ago: In 1953 Poland voluntarily renounced them (as far as is known other countries too are not making any claims). Nonetheless, H. Kohl suddenly demanded reaffirmation from Warsaw—only on these conditions is he ready to guarantee the immutability of the Polish border along the Oder-Neisse line. And Bonn makes one more demand: That the rights of the German minority living in Poland be guaranteed. He received such guarantees in November 1989 during his visit to Warsaw. Today the chancellor is demanding new guarantees. Why?

Elections to the Bundestag are planned for the end of the year in the FRG. A rival has appeared to the bloc of conservative CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] parties, which will have to be taken into account—the ultra-right party of "republicans." In the postwar years a bloc of right-wing voters has taken shape in the country, primarily from the Landsmannschaften and the unions of "exiles." Millions of voters are behind them. The chancellor does not want to lose these votes: The elections may be lost to the main contender—the SPD [the Social Democratic Party of Germany]. He is afraid to officially recognize today the immutability of the postwar borders—so as not to anger the right wing of the voters who may desert to the "republicans." These people will not miss their chance (the CDU allegedly is doing a deal with national interests—selling off German territories, in violation of the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, by which the Third Reich continues to exist within the 1937 borders). In this case the troubles with the related CSU, which is further to the right than the CDU, also cannot be avoided.

H. Kohl clearly does not want to run this risk on the eve of the elections. The sharp disagreements which arose on this basis with the Free Democratic Party—the partner in the ruling coalition—seem to him to be the lesser evil. And how about reaction in the world at large?

Not only Warsaw but also London, Washington, Paris, Moscow, and Prague believe that the question of the postwar borders is not a topic for discussion. The final renunciation of any territorial claims was enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act which Bonn also signed. There are the 1970 treaties between the FRG and Poland, and between the FRG and the USSR, where the borders question was closed once and for all. Then why worry? It is very simple: All these documents are valid only for the FRG, and not for a future united Germany.

Another question: Will the Germans manage on their own one day to alter the European borders despite the wishes of the rest of the world? The proposal, in my view, is just as fantastic as the chancellor's present publicly expressed fears that someone will be able to force a united Germany to pay reparations even if it does not want to do so. All the same some nuances remain in this whole affair.

The chancellor is making his statement about reluctance to sign the peace treaty without asking the opinion of the other partner—the GDR. After all, the position of that country is diametrically opposed. So what; should its will be disregarded?

Quite recently H. Kohl repeatedly and ceremoniously gave assurances to the entire world that there would be no separate unification behind its neighbors' backs and contrary to their interests—it would only occur within the framework of the all-European process. But none of the CSCE participants sanction the unification, unless the borders question is resolved once and for all; without any reservations or conditions which leave formal-legal "loopholes" for the future—for laying claims to any territories of the former Reich.

FRG Chancellor H. Kohl sooner or later will have to make a final choice—between the votes of the supporters of the "eastern Landsmannschaften" in the FRG, and the rest of the world.

Supreme Soviet Session

Session Discusses Defense Industry Conversion

LD0703120190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Over to the All-Union Radio correspondent's office in the Kremlin. Aleksandr Ruvinskiy is at the microphone:

[Ruvinskiy] As our listeners evidently know, today the committees and commissions are working at the Supreme Soviet. The state program for conversion is being examined at the sitting of the Committee for Defense and State Security. Many deputies who are not members of the committee are also taking part in the debate. Comrade Smyslov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, made a report in which he analyzed the current state of conversion in the defense industry and examined the prospects for conversion up to 1995. The end goal—or rather one of the goals—is to achieve by 1995 a one-third reduction in expenditures on defense as a proportion of national income.

Conversion not only embraces the defense field, but also involves a considerable number of civilian enterprises that work for defense. Dozens of plants are switching to exclusive production of civilian output. Forty billion rubles will be needed additionally in the immediate future, according to the estimates of experts, to achieve these tasks. This is money for the technical re-equipment of production processes and for the creation of new capacities. Well, it is also necessary to train a large number of workers for new professions. They will retain for a time the wage level they have attained to date. Other measures for social protection are also envisaged.

Ten priority civilian profiles for the defense industry have been determined. Here are some of them: The production of foodstuffs and consumer goods, and of equipment for light industry and the food industry and trade; and the production of computer technology, communications systems, medical equipment, and civil aircraft, and shipbuilding and much else. The Ministry of Atomic Power has a large amount of work to do in the autonomous towns, which come under it, to create a civilian infrastructure there.

Unfortunately, the main speaker was unable to give exhaustive replies to the deputies' questions on this matter, and there were many questions. The issue of nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk will also be examined today at the sitting of the committee. That sitting will take place jointly with the Committee for Ecology.

Supreme Soviet Views Halting Semipalatinsk Tests

LD0803023190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1820 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 Mar (TASS)—TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin.

At a joint sitting the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees for Defense and State Security and for Ecology today discussed the question of the cessation of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk testing range in Kazakhstan.

Speaking at the sitting, the representative of the Defense Ministry Colonel-General Vladimir Gerasimov stated that the military is ready to complete tests by the year 1993 after carrying out another 17 explosions. After this, all nuclear tests must be concentrated at the Novaya Zemlya (an island in the Northern Arctic Ocean) testing range. Vladimir Gerasimov stressed that the Soviet Union is ready to cease nuclear tests immediately as soon as this is done by the United States.

He recalled that during the soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, which continued for 1.5 years (from August 1985), the U.S. side carried out 25 explosions, many of which were intended for the development of fundamentally new kinds of weapons. The new moratorium on which many people's deputies insist would signify unilateral disarmament, according to Vladimir Gerasimov.

While agreeing with the need to properly maintain the country's defensive capability, the deputies from Kazakhstan nevertheless demanded the immediate cessation of nuclear tests, which were first held at the Semipalatinsk facility in 1949. Right up to 1963, explosions were conducted in the atmosphere, which led, according to the deputies, to the radioactive irradiation of a considerable number of local people. Other problems appeared with the switch to underground nuclear tests: Seismic activity and the release of radioactive inert gases to the surface. This sparked off the mass campaign of the public in Kazakhstan for an end to the tests.

"The socio-psychological atmosphere in Semipalatinsk Oblast is extremely tense," declared Yuriy Shcherbak (Ukraine), a member of the parliamentary committee for ecology, who headed the deputies' commission that visited the test site in January this year.

The transfer of testing to Novaya Zemlya is also giving rise to protests from the population of adjacent territories. Last autumn, during the discussion in parliament of urgent measures for ecologically improving the country, deputies from the northern oblasts objected to this categorically.

Parliamentary committees will continue the discussion that started today after the conclusion of the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which opens on 12 March.

More on Nuclear Testing Delegation

LD0703223190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1715 GMT on 7 March broadcasts at 11-minute video report by correspondent D. Kiselev at a joint sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees on Defense and ecology at the Kremlin on 7 March.

Kiselev says that the deputies and experts have gathered to discuss the government program to transfer nuclear tests from the Semipalatinsk site to Novaya Zemlya. The program, over the next three years, provides for testing a further 27 nuclear devices at Semipalatinsk and then continuing all work in Novaya Zemlya.

In an interview, Ye.V. Chaykovskiy, chairman of the Semipalatinsk-21 city soviet executive committee, spoke of the proposals that his city soviet has been putting forward as an alternative to the government's proposals. He says it is necessary to transform the test site into a center of science and culture for the republic. There should also be an accelerated socioeconomic program to develop the regions adjoining the test site. Unless these proposals are met and if nuclear testing is resumed at the test site, Chaykovskiy said he would ask the local soviet to halt tests at the Semipalatinsk-21 test site.

The video report shows actual footage of the joint committee sitting in progress chaired by Academician Velikhov.

Kiselev says: "Let us hasten to the sitting, which Academician Velikhov opened by acquainting those assembled with the history of the problem of halting nuclear tests. Then Colonel General Gerasimov, head of a directorate of the Ministry of Defense, spoke in support of the government program."

Col. Gen. Gerasimov is shown speaking at the sitting: "The fatherland's existing nuclear arsenal does not at the present time fully accord with the new functions of weaponry. First and foremost there is insufficient viability in particular complexes of nuclear armaments vis-a-vis the mounting efficacy of the enemy's conventional and nuclear offensive weapons, and there is insufficient accuracy in the vehicles delivering the nuclear warheads of enhanced power which leads to unacceptable consequences in their use. It is stemming from the above complex situation that the concept for the development of nuclear munitions should include the creation of nuclear munitions that could ensure the modernization of nuclear weapons and parity even with a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive forces.

"I would above all like to say that perfecting nuclear weapons in line with the concept that has been expounded on cannot now be ensured by those nuclear warheads that have already been created, because warheads of a new quality are required, and it is practically impossible to create new warheads without tests. Why is it impossible to create them? Because the yield of a nuclear warhead, the particular features in the formation of the strike factor, the reliability and stability of the nuclear blast from the viewpoint of the strike factor, and the safety of nuclear explosions can only be determined by nuclear tests.

"I think that Novaya Zemlya is complicated by the fact that it requires a great outlay, and a timespan of three years will indeed be required to prepare the situation there."

Correspondent Kiselev then interviews People's Deputy A.I. Vyucheyskiy (from Nenets Autonomous District) who explains what a move to nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya would mean for his people. He says that infant mortality is about twice the national average and life expectancy among the adult population is 43, and a check of the radiation level 190km from the site revealed it to be 10-30 MR although at Semipalatinsk it is about 17. He would like to end all tests and declare a moratorium. He refers to Gorbachev's Murmansk speech about the Arctic being the "weather kitchen" of the world.

Back at the rostrum in the session V.A. Mikhaylov, deputy minister of atomic power engineering and the atomic industry, says: "Banning nuclear tests is the first step toward a nuclear-free world. I am able to report to you that I have not, among scientists engaged in this problem, met any who wish to have tests or nuclear weapons. We, perhaps more than anyone, understand perfectly the terror and the danger of these weapons, and we are ready today, as they say, to raise both hands in favor of banning tests and in favor of banning nuclear weapons, but—and I say this once again—on a bilateral basis, first and foremost with the U.S. side." The debates are continuing.

Defense, International Affairs Committees Meet

LD0703103290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Video report by Correspondent D. Kiselev, identified by caption, from the joint session of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Issues and the Committee for International Affairs; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Kiselev] The theatre starts with the hanging up of one's coat. But is this only true of the theatre? The Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Issues held a joint session today with the Committee for International Affairs. The situation at the Vienna talks on cuts in conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe and the talks in Geneva on nuclear and space armaments was reported. One must think that our parliamentarians heard a great deal that was new from our ambassadors. You see, deputies are infrequent guests. The parliamentarians of the west keep their diplomats and generals under a good deal greater control for the moment. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is at last ceasing to be departmental, and parliament is starting to take part in that. What does this mean?

[N.V. Neland, secretary of the Committee for International Affairs, identified by caption] This means a very great deal. This means a very great deal for foreign policy and for domestic policy. For today's session, for example, was unique in many respects. For the first time, there were two committees together and for the first time we are dealing with a very big problem, the problem of how to restrain the arms race and not to restrain it, but to disarm. Hence the gain in foreign policy and the enormous gain in the future with respect to our expenditure on armaments.

[Kiselev] Are we witnesses to the setting up of a new mechanism for making political decisions in our country which is for us a guarantee against new Afghanistans, Czechoslovakias, Egypts, and so forth?

[Neyland] Naturally we are, but to say that it guarantees us against that, well, naturally I hope it does.

[Kiselev] The work of your parliamentary committees, I have no doubt, is interfering in the best possible way, is interfering in a way that is welcome to us voters, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the new parliaments of Eastern European countries are obviously hampering you; if the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has ceased to be dictated by a department, then East European policy has ceased to be dictated by the Soviet Union. What comment do you have to make about that?

[S.A. Tsyplyayev, secretary of the committee for Defense and State Security Issues] You know, at the present time, one of the most valuable qualities is becoming the ability to come to an agreement. I think that that is a normal obstacle in this process. In particular, as has already been said, we are also learning for the first time to come to an agreement with the Committee for International Affairs in solving a problem that is at the junction of our interests.

[Kiselev] Working in a new key presupposes more active contacts with the parliamentarians of the East European countries, with the parliamentarians of the allied countries of the Warsaw Pact. Is that a reality or is that something in the future?

[Tsyplyayev] At the present time, we are beginning to make contacts with the parliaments. We do have, our committee has just travelled to and made contacts with U.S. congressmen and I think that the next step is undoubtedly meetings with a number of parliaments regarding the interests of our committees, and with our allies. It is an absolute must that we must agree upon our interests and our views in working out common positions with respect to these problems.

[Kiselev] We shall hope that in resolving the following issues the first contacts will, moreover, be with the parliamentarians of our allies.

[Neyland] Yes, one only has to wait for the results of the elections, because our allies will now have a series of elections. [video shows scenes at meeting and interview with Neyman and Tsyplyayev]

Armenian Deputies Abstain From Transcaucasus Vote

NC0703161790 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Karo Atayan report from USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] [Atayan] Yesterday morning the joint session of the two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet was supposed to endorse the draft resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia and on measures to normalize the region. However, the vote had to be postponed until the afternoon because of (?the lack of a quorum). After the first recess, the deputies spontaneously gathered in the congress hall and began to debate the draft resolution. During the second meeting under Lukyanov the deputies were (?unable) to vote on the draft because our deputies' speeches were attempting to prove in every way possible that that draft resolution was a spineless and unrealistic document that in no way contributes to the efforts to normalize the situation.

Before the evening session when draft resolution was to be voted upon, I interviewed some of the Armenian deputies.

[Arutyunyan] Though this session is a closed one, I can say unreservedly that none of our deputies agree with that draft resolution [passage indistinct]. The presidium submitted an alternative which was also unacceptable, particularly Point 8 [passage indistinct]. This is because the Armenian and Azerbaijani deputies have already met a few times, to no avail. We held firm to our basic position and made no concessions. Therefore, it is not possible to draw up a draft resolution in a coffee-shop style meeting between the deputies of the two sides [passage indistinct].

[Samvel Galstyan] [passage indistinct] Under coercion, they want to endorse a resolution today that is unacceptable for the people of Karabakh and Armenia. For that reason, the Armenian deputies declared that their delegation will not participate in the discussion of this document. During today's session all our deputies expressed their anger against Comrade Lukyanov personally for refusing to listen and understand us. Instead he is trying to make us understand that ostensibly ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis are extending hands of friendship to each other while the deputies and republican leaderships are hampering this effort. I am amazed that a high-level leader of the country thinks this way, in an attempt to equate the two sides.

I am a deputy from Artashat, a border region. When the border was open for months people freely brought in arms under the guise of friendship (?for people on both sides of the border). In the meantime my friends and relatives are imprisoned in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and I have not seen them for a long time. All the same, this is a bitter struggle, but justice will triumph.

[Armenak Kirakosyan] I would add that the draft resolution presented to us in no way emanates from the views expressed by the deputies. I am amazed that some of the views expressed, such as the proposal to subject the oblast to the center or raise its status to one of republic, found no place in this draft resolution [passage indistinct]. We accept no such resolution. The reason for the

Armenian deputies' reaction is that the draft resolution is reminiscent of the stagnation period [passage indistinct].

[Atayan] When this document was presented to the evening session by Anatoliy Luk'yanov, all the communication lines in the press center and the lobby were disconnected and the reporters were asked to leave the congress hall. Our deputies handed a letter of protest to the presidium informing the session that no Armenian deputy would participate in the voting on the draft resolution. We heard late at night that the Supreme Soviet session endorsed the resolution, except for the last point, Point 8, by a majority vote.

Political & Social

CPSU Central Committee Greets Soviet Women 7 Mar

LD0703233490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1455 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Message from the CPSU Central Committee to an audience of a gala concert held at the Bolshoy Theater in Moscow on 7 March, the eve of International Women's Day; read out by an unidentified male speaker—live]

[Text] Dear women! The CPSU Central Committee cordially congratulates you on International Women's Day, March—our shared, bright, spring holiday. Your concern for the family and children and the prosperity of this country and the whole planet is tireless. The female, maternal heart is one of the unshakeable moral buttresses of the life of our society, both in stern days of trials and in days of peaceful labor. In the complicated period of the fundamental reconstruction of our society, women are participating actively and fruitfully in all processes of renewal. Thank you for that.

At the same time, a significant proportion of the many difficulties which the country is now experiencing are being laid on your shoulders and augmenting your everyday cares. The Central Committee of the party understands this, sees the real situation and assures you that it will do everything to ensure that queues and shortages of goods, shared manual labor and the lack of everyday facilities will disappear more quickly [laughter in hall], and that the Soviet woman's full potential will be revealed more fully and be used in all spheres of the life of society.

Woman has been given an invaluable gift, the gift of peace-making, by nature itself. The leading role has always belonged to her, when it has been necesary to cool heated heads and mollify hardened hearts. The CPSU Central Committee counts on your assistance in overcoming inter-ethnic conflicts and maintaining dialogue and civic accord in the country.

Undoubtedly, Soviet women have also made a contribution towards ensuring that, on our planet as a whole, confrontation is gradually giving way to dialogue, trust and cooperation. Women's centuries-old inclination towards charity and their humanity and charm can justly be counted among the psychological factors which are helping to relax international tension, to make the disarmament process irreversible and to strengthen the new, genuinely humane thinking in the world.

Dear women! With all our heart we wish you, your families, and all your nearest and dearest health, prosperity and happiness. [applause]

Gorbachev Attends Women's Day Concert

LD0703212390 Moscow TASS in English 1949 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—A meeting to mark the international women's day was held at the Bolshoy Theatre here today. Women's labour and their role in the country's social life were praised.

The meeting was attended by Mikhail Gorbachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov and other party leaders and statesmen.

The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's message of greetings to the Soviet women was read out.

"The work on a state programme to improve the position of women is in full swing at the USSR Supreme Soviet and the government," Zoya Pukhova, chairman of the Soviet Women's Committee and USSR Supreme Soviet member, said in her speech.

Officials Attending Concert Listed

LD0703234890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Excerpt] There was a festive gathering devoted to International Women's Day, 8 March, in the Bolshoy Theatre of the Soviet Union today. Taking part in it were: Comrades Gorbachev, Vorotnikov, Zaykov, Kryuchkov, Medvedev, Ryzhkov, Yakovlev, Biryukova, Lukyanov, Pugo, Razumovskiy, Baklanov, Girenko Manayenkov, Stroyev, Usmanov, and Frolov. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze on Political Stability, German Unity

LD0703203790 Moscow TASS in English 1931 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who is also Soviet Communist Party Politburo member, has described the Soviet Union as one of the pillars of the modern world's stability.

In an interview with the popular OGONYOK weekly, Shevardnadze said that instablity in the Soviet Union was fraught with destabilisation of the entire world situation.

Clever people in the West, the minister noted, understand that the failure of perestroyka would unleash the reign of anarchy in the country and that would lead to a complete disintegration of the state. Or else—which is more feasible—a dictator will usurp power.

Shevardnadze said that these variants are not ruled out in East European countries or the unified Germany. In order to preclude this, he said, It is necessary to speed up the process of reaching an agreement on security in Europe. But to do this, he said, the Soviet Union needs internal stablity.

Shevardnadze said that the way out consisted in strengthening democratic institutes in the Soviet Union and creating a strong administrative and executive powers capable of defending democracy and perestroyka.

The need for such power, he noted further, is also prompted by outbursts of temper and the irreconcilability in inter-ethnic relations. The Soviet Union needs a president endowed with considerable powers but leaning for support on democratic institutes.

Speaking about developments in Eastern Europe, the minister stressed that the interests of the Soviet Union were best met by a situation, in which it neighboured on free, democratic and prosperous states, open both to the West and to the East, and not the situation in which a sanitary cordon of dubious and shaky regimes is artificially created around the country. The Soviet Union's interests are best met by the democratic nature of social and political transformations in those countries, not by the preservation in them of power structures relying on their own and foreign bayonets for survival.

Shevardnadze then focused on the issue of German unification. He recalled that this century's two most scourging wars were begun from German territory and stressed the need to do everything possible to prevent the presently obvious signs of German national chauvinism from becoming a thing of flesh and blood so as to preclude the united Germany from posing a threat to the world now or at some point in the future.

The Foreign Minister said that the Soviet approach regarded the right of Germans to self-determination as indisputable, the striving of a split nation for unification as a natural process, and, at the same time, the right of other European nations, which have suffered much from German Militarism, to secure their future just as natural and indisputable.

Shevardnadze expressed confidence that the way out can be found with the help of the recently established 2 plus 4 mechanism, envisaging the responsibility of the four great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France—for the solution of the German issue.

He also said that the Soviet Government intends to publish soon its principled views on problems of German unification.

In discussing the internal situation in the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze said that the thing in question now was the creation of a new union, a treaty-based community of republics and peoples, whose national sovereignty can be ensured by really-existing political, legal and economic institutes.

The present international situation is such that even the most powerful states cannot afford the "luxury" of standing apart. Any disunity is fraught with destabilisation, equally pernicious both for individual countries and the world as a whole, he said.

The minister also expressed hope for a better economic situation in the Soviet Union in the perspective. The mechanism now being created by the Supreme Soviet, will make it possible to find solutions and normalise the economy, he said.

CPSU Unity Needed To Combat Nationalism

PM2802165590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences R. Abdulatipov under the rubric "We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform": "Pledge of Renewal"]

[Text] Quite recently we seemed to be continually encountering in the press and actually uttering fine words from platforms about internationalism, unity, and cohesion within the party and among the people. Owing to frequent sometimes unthinking use, these customary and on the whole correct words gradually lost their original deap-seated meaning and became a propaganda shell. We began to talk about internationalism increasingly infrequently—either from fear of stereotypes and "lofty style" or out of reluctance to win a reputation as conservatives and conformists. Something extraordinary did indeed have to occur for us to be acutely conscious once again of the vital need for close-knit unity within our party ranks.

There was a clap of thunder at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress: A split occurred. The congress proclaimed an independent Lithuanian Communist Party, which intends to build its relations with the CPSU as it does with any other foreign party.

But the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum said that Communists and Soviet people with a sincere interest in both the national revival of our peoples and in the preservation of unity within the party and the Soviet Union have long been prey to serious disquiet: The 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress took a step designed to ensure an organizational and political break with the CPSU. The plenum resolutely condemned these actions since, the adopted resolution says, they undermine CPSU unity and inflict great damage on the processes of renewing the Soviet federation and on society as a whole. However the doors to dialogue are not closed.

Were there changes in public consciousness and in Lithuanian Communists' world outlook after the plenum? Hardly anyone today would bring themselves to answer this question unequivocally. I would like to believe and hope that common sense and concern for the people's welfare and not for satisfying the political ambitions of various leaders longing for power will take the upper hand. There is time for reflection.

The responsibility of the historic moment which the country and the party are experiencing is also facing us Communists, if you like, with a historic choice. What can I, you, each one of us do? I am sure that we must not make our choice to suit current conditions or to suit our own ambitious narrow national aspirations, which take cover behind the terminology of perestroyka but which are in reality eroding its socialist potential.

I have visited almost all the "hot" regions recently. I have taken part in public debates and official events and had frank heart-to-heart discussions. This enables me to share some of my observations.

It is quite obvious that many people have been carried away by the flood of rallies, and there are also those who are under the thumb of nationalists and populists. People have been overwhelmed by a flood of criticism of the past and by what appear at first glance to be extremely attractive demagogic arguments. People are increasingly playing on the most sacred feelings—national pride and patriotism—for the sake of new political ploys. National feelings are exacerbated today both by past deformations and mistrust and by current unruly nationalist forces. People display a pathological reaction to everything that wounds their national dignity. Under these complex conditions the poison of national egoism and separatism is presented as healing balm. I observed this both in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus. The publications produced by a number of people's fronts describe nationalism as a highly humane idea of universal love and concord within the nation like love for one's parents and children.

However the "infection of nationalism" is by no means as harmless as it sometimes appears and we do not seem to have fully considered all its dangers. After all the most varied forces have at all times exploited national interests for their own political ends. Some people are already coming to power on this platform today, making extensive use of the "national card" in their political sport, in the struggle for power. But the blood of innocent people, women, and children is shed amid this sport. No slogans, not even supernational slogans, can justify what is happening today in Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is time for us all to ponder this.

Let us read the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress. Section 7, entitled "Toward the Party's Renewal," begins with an extremely frank phrase: "At this sharp turning point the party will be able to retain its vanguard positions and to pursue the cause which it has launched and which enjoys the people's support provided its radically restructures itself." Further on it speaks about renouncing the authoritarian regime and supercentralization and the need to abandon the claims to infallibility and political monopolism. No one criticizes the party more harshly than it does itself. The pledge of renewal lies in "reforming the party, in its profound restructuring." But renewing the party goes against the grain with some people. Some people have reached the point where they only present the entire Soviet period in a black light, in the light of the repressions and deportations. Such views have even infiltrated the party documents of some republic communist parties.

On visiting a number of republics, I saw for myself that some Communists and even leaders go considerably further in their anti-Soviet and separatist sentiments than the moderate wing of these movements. They have obviously sensed the real transformation of national movements into parallel political structures and the fact that they have joined the struggle for power. People have shown a desire to change trains in motion. Some people have even done so. It is clear as day that it is not sudden love for their nation but transient considerations that are motivating many of them. For instance, you only have to look at Sajudis' ATGILIMAS [spelling as published] (Rebirth), which publishes extremely negative opinions about internationalism and, friendship among the peoples and propagandizes nationalist and separatist ideas. I cannot share the viewpoint held by Communist R.A. Ozolas, who edits this newspaper, when he presents separatism and national egoism as a philosophy of national revival. Can the people really be revived by humiliating and flouting the rights and freedoms of those living cheek by jowl with them? But Comrade Ozolas claims that if people of other nationalities want to live in Lithuania, they must realize that the Lithuanian people are the leaders. While the others must obviously be considered second-rate.

The most alarming thing is that representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia are the repositories of these ideas. People believe them, they heed their words. What great responsibility every member of the intelligentsia must take for their words and deeds! Let us ask ourselves: What do we bring the world—goodness, light, ideas of internationalism and unity or poisoned seeds of arrant nationalism?

Let me return once again to the CPSU Central Committee plenum material. The plenum assessed events, once again reminding us that we cannot, we do not have the right to overstep the internationalism that cements the foundations of the party if we want to preserve the party as a union of like-minded people. Communists have been given a historical responsibility for the fate of perestroyka. Today we remember unkindly those who enshrined our union 50 years ago and we are revising historical documents. But who will answer in 50 years for the policy and consequences of breaking up the USSR, which various fronts, including some Communists, are carrying out in some regions under perestroyka slogans?

The animosity, alienation, and mistrust which permeate interethnic relations have tragic consequences. People who are sincerely concerned by the state of affairs in the country and the fate of their people and the fraternal peoples ask the following question: "What has happened to us?" Why have some people in Georgia begun to persecute all non-Georgians and why is this not being resolutely rebuffed? Why is the struggle for their language, culture, and history in Moldavia, Estonia, and Latvia becoming a struggle against people of different nationalities, their well-being, and tranquillity? Why are the new "spokesmen for national interets" even raising the fabricated problems of autonomous national formations today in those areas where people have lived together for centuries on one territory?

Sluggishness, inertia, the inability to anticipate events, and lack of proper politics stand in our way. Today is a crucial moment in perestroyka, the situation is complex and we must act since procrastination is akin to death. After all if the republics' party committees split for national reasons, who will predict what kind of state with what kind of political system will end up alongside us or involved in our economic system?

My arguments may sound conservative to some people amid the flood of bombastic utterances about freedom and democracy made from rostrums and in the press by people's front leaders and even by some people's deputies. I assure you that ideas of freedom, democracy, humanism, and national revival are equally close and dear to me. I am after all a representative of a small people and my people have the same problems in reviving their history, culture, language, and socioeconomic life and our hopes are focused on perestroyka. But it is time to pick up the pieces. Otherwise our multiethnic home will collapse because of the conflicts, dissension, and bloody clashes. No people will win from this. The Union and the union and autonomous republics can certainly of course be divided up. But a single heart and soul, and a single family cannot be divided up...

All the same time there is a reliable means of preserving and consolidating the union of nations. Namely, as noted in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Congress, the resolute rejection of the Stalinist, essentially unitarian state model and complete and consistent implementation of the federal principle. This involves implementing Lenin's nationalities policy and the principles of democracy and humanism, filling our federation with new substance, and strengthening the internationalism and unity in party ranks. This policy has a future if we overcome the serious shortcomings by common efforts.

And there are a considerable number of them. While demanding, for instance, freedom, sovereignty, and independence from union bodies, ministries and departments, many representatives of union republics do not want one whit to reduce their dominion over national formations within their republics. Georgian comrades are rightly striving to attain independence and sovereignty for the republic at all levels but some of them refuse to hear of the rights of the Abkhaz ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast to independently determine their peoples' future. The leaders of the Moldavian national movement are implacable in defending of their own sovereign rights but posture when it is question of autonomy for the Gagauz.

And why, I ask, do all union bodies and ministries (and also the communists working in them) not learn to respect peoples' national autonomy when some rights and powers are transferred to the localities? Many people at central level still believe themselves the sole defenders of general state and federative interests although that is not in fact the case. At one time V.I. Lenin gave the following response when asked what role Communists at central level should play with regard to Communists in the national republics: "Not teachers and nursemaids, but helpmates." But some people still want to act as teachers and nursemaids. We still have to graduate to assistants.

Let us also acknowledge the following unbecoming fact that many of us party officials lack culture and competence on questions of nationalities policy and interethnic relations. There is even the opinion that everyone who talks about reviving the national principle and preserving national originality is automatically a chauvinist or a nationalist.

Lastly, one of the most essential shortcomings to which the CPSU Central Committee plenum also drew attention is the lack of party principledness, consistency, and political will in implementing the party's adopted platform. Communists' strength has always resided in the fact that during the most difficult periods in our history many of them remained internationalists and patriots, even at the risk of their own lives. Today as we move toward our congress, the party is once again entering the line of fire and in this struggle we Communists are dependent on the mighty consolidating force—internationalism, unity, and cohesion in our ranks. There is no other option today.

CPSU Stance on Nationalities Issues Viewed

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[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Mikhaylov, first deputy chief of CPSU Central Committee National Relations Department, under the rubric "We Discuss the Draft CPSU Central Committee Platform": "On the Basis of National Accord"]

[Text] And so, the decision has been made: We are aspiring to humane, democratic socialism. Its essence boils down, in the main, to the idea of freedom and the strengthening of guarantees which rule out the infringement of the rights of the citizens of the Land of the Soviets, on the grounds of nationality, among other reasons.

The heated debate at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum confirmed yet again that the road toward humane, truly democratic socialism is the road of legislatively ensuring for every nation equal rights for national self-determination, filling the sovereignty of union republics with real content, expanding the rights of autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs, and developing regional and local autonomy and self-management.

Those who have closely followed the logic of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee during the perestroyka period, were able to see for themselves that the February Plenum has, as it were, brought together the key ideas of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and a number of subsequent party Central Committee plenums. Section V of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform—this was stated unequivocally—is a direct continuation of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum which defined the strategy of the party's nationalities policy in current conditions. It is necessary to note that this circumstance, specifically, explains to a large degree the rejection of a number of the provisions of the draft platform by those who, at all levels, are trying to prove that the party allegedly has no outline plan [kontseptsiya] for perestroyka.

The dialectical position of the CPSU in questions of national relations, which is based on the realities of life, is in conflict with both the pretentious pose of those who occupy an overtly imperial position and therefore uphold the unitary form of state structure, and also their opponents at the other end of the scale who include separatists and motley groups and movements. Their originally noble aspirations to revive national cultures and the national character of peoples are frequently taking on nationalistic hues, and engendering a total rejection of the post-October experience of state building in the USSR and disillusionment with the ideals of socialism.

Truth, as always, is concrete. Common sense combined with a sober assessment of past miscalculations, mistakes, and even criminal actions in this sphere, which have been unconditionally condemned by the party, are raising the country to a new level of interethnic relations based on the integrity of the Land of the Soviets as a federation of a superior type—a commonwealth of free and equal republics which voluntarily delegate to the Union part of their rights for the sake of the attainment of common aims. However, this process may be doomed to failure if we do not succeed in achieving the main thing—overcoming the voluntarism in the nationalities policy, dismantling the Stalinist model of the nationalities policy, whose main "congenital defect," apart from outright crimes, was the attempt to resolve the nationalities question "from above," by means of crude administration by injunction from the center.

The scientific "dismantling" of the theoretical precepts of this policy is just as essential. Let us recall a number of its main postulates. Clearly, we must begin by acknowledging that the erroneous conclusion that the nationalities question had been resolved in the USSR was accepted as the official viewpoint for many years. This emasculated theoretical thought and diverted it into the channel of false notions about the processes of internationalization.

The view that as a result of proletarian and class solidarity national differences and ethnic sentiments and manifestations will allegedly lose in importance and inevitably wither away in the longer term, which will lead to a merging of nations, also played its negative role.

Furthermore, under the yoke of the Stalinist interpretation of the phenomenon of nation, rigidly tied up with characteristics that were defined once and for all, a subjectivist distortion of the history of many peoples became possible, which offended their national dignity, while problems of national development were reduced merely to socioeconomic growth. Consequently, the obvious fact that national forms of societal life function according to their own laws and should in their own way influence union-wide policy in the sphere of the economy, social and cultural development, and national state building, was not taken into account, and sometimes ignored altogether. Today we are forced to admit that substantial differences exist in the level of the socioeconomic development of national-state formations in the USSR. For instance, the Mari ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] occupies very nearly 50th place in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] as regards per capita nonproduction fixed capital, while as regards the provision of housing, it occupies the 56th place in the RSFSR. How can one put up with such a situation?

At the same time workers, peasants, and specialists believe that investing the autonomous republic with economic autonomy may unleash the intiative and creative potential of the working people. It will help to develop more fully the traditional sectors of industry and agriculture and the cottage industries and resolve the problem of self-sufficiency.

Similar examples could also be cited for other formations, union republics, and individual regions. It is by no means an accident that increasingly loud calls are being heard of late from various peoples demanding greater independence and an enhanced political status for various national-state formations. Territorial claims have also emerged. And although, under the guise of a striving for self-determination, there are nationalist ambitions and a striving for political aloofness behind certain of these demands, which are being encouraged by those who are interested in destabilizing the socialist society, these demands must, nonetheless, not be ignored.

Alongside the question of the need to elaborate a law and a mechanism for the implementation of the right of nations to self-determination, including the right of union republics to secede from the USSR, the question of a mechanism and of conditions for admission to the federation was raised at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum. This is not a simple problem. Two circumstances have to be borne in mind here.

First, the question of self-determination is considerably broader that the right of secession. It is a universal principle for resolving the nationalities question which applies not only to union republics but also small peoples and ethnic groups. Second, the question of the right of union republics to secede must not be confused with the inexpediency of such a step. The CPSU believes that any contradictions which may arise are soluble within the framework of the Union. The main—you could say strategic—task is to create conditions everywhere for free, full-fledged social development under which any separatist aspirations would be perceived as an anachronism, as a venture essentially directed against the people, a task of dispersing the illusions of those who believe that self-isolation (both spiritual and economic) is a road to swift prosperity.

The CPSU aims at all-around development of the national economy in conditions of an intergrated, unionwide socialist market based on unified strategic planning. This is a course which is in keeping with the objective trends of social development in current conditions. These conditions are such today that the growth of national self-awareness can, in unfavorable situations, feed centrifugal tendencies, while socioeconomic development dictates the strengthening of integration ties. The former view is based on the illusion that it is possible to gain more from national separateness, relying on one's own resouces.

As for the second factor, it is generally known what a momentum integration processes have now gathered. The striving of countries and peoples for cooperation and interaction is growing appreciably both on a regional and a global scale. All this is based on mankind's common interests, reinforced by the demands of the scientific and technological revolution, the exacerbation of global problems, and the need—increasingly felt—for deepening the international division of labor in the interests of enhancing economic efficiency.

The course of historical development has convincingly demonstrated the need to return to Lenin's teaching on the two tendencies in the nationalities question. It has proved correct not just in respect of capitalism. Alongside internationalization, the striving for national development and self-determination of peoples based on the growth of national self-awareness has not only not waned, but increased in accordance with world processes and internal natural laws. In conditions of democratization, after artificial suppression over a long time, the second trend is developing particularly intensively, often assuming an explosive nature. This applies essentially to all peoples, including the Russian people, who are also facing full-blown problems of national rebirth.

Consequently, the time has come to take both trends fully into account, proceeding from the premise that the correlation between their priority is not constant. At the current stage it is extremely important to take maximum account of the interests of national development and to amend the entire socioeconomic, national-state, and cultural policy accordingly.

The number one question today therefore is to achieve a diversity of federal relations which would take account of economic, political, cultural, spiritual, moral, and sociopsychological aspects. It must be a question of a reinterpretation of the nature of mutual relations between republics, and, inside each of them, between autonomous formations.

There is every reason to expect that the creation of fundamentaly new economic and political bases of the life and activities of peoples, and the creation of a common socialist market will expand and strengthen the social and national base of perestroyka. Integration processes will advance with greater vigor. The trend toward a rapprochement of nations, with simultaneous efforts to ensure their prosperity, will begin to operate with new force, but this time in accordance with objective laws. Internationalism, inspired with new life, will be perceived as a real need and not as something imposed from outside.

Thus the logic of party decisions on the nationalities question indicates that we are moving toward a new model of our federation—a union of truly equal peoples, based on voluntary association, freedom of national self-determination, and the principles of internationalism.

It is generally known that voluntary association as the basis of the union was enshrined in the first USSR Constitution which was in the nature of a treaty. The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform notes the need for the further development of the treaty principle of the USSR. The achievement of a consensus on any question that is not clear-cut must become the norm of relations between republics. This could, in time, eliminate the current differences in respect of proposals that republics should decide the procedure for the application of union laws on their territory. It cannot be ruled out that gradually it might be possible to legislatively establish the principle which would strengthen the state sovereignty of republics, ensuring supremacy of union laws in federal relations, and supremacy of republican laws within republics.

Naturally, these are constitutional problems. After all, we are on the threshold of the adoption of a new USSR Constitution. In these conditions taking full account of the interests of national-state and national-territorial formations, and also ethnic groups in the constitutions of union and autonomous republics, and the establishment of order in legal regulations concerning interethnic relations inside union republics and multinational rayons would be in keeping with the spirit of democratization of our union.

The idea that we need to live for a certain time in the conditions of the new federation and test the ideas of new thinking in practice has been received with understanding in society. Today, when the country is living through difficult times, the main thing is the consolidation of all forces which favor perestroyka. The CPSU has taken on this difficult task, it is trying to act on the basis of consensus, by developing the democratic process within the framework of rights, the law, and respect for civil liberties, without succumbing to the illusion that there are simple solutions, and without forgetting the interests of any of the peoples.

CPSU 'Democratic Platform' Drafts Statutes

PM2802150090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Account "prepared by G. Gusev" of draft CPSU Statutes prepared by "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" group: "We Propose Our Own Draft"]

[Text] Obviously the communist idea, and with it the organizers of its implementation, the communist parties, are in a profound crisis, primarily because of the inhuman behavior of its "high priests." But ideas are generated by man, and it is a characteristic of man to err.

Did not the ideas of Christianity, Islam, and other religions traverse a cruel and bloody path in the course of their establishment, a path which remains in the peoples' memory? Anything new and alive is always born in torment and in blood. Were all their preachers' models worthy of imitation? We are not saying this to vindicate the CPSU, but for the sake of historical objectivity. If you look at it more closely, the fierceness with which many people want to "remove" the communists is evidence of the *irreplaceability of the communist* idea. This is not a matter for the human will. But to change the organization that puts this idea into practice—that is within human powers. And that is what the members of the Moscow interclub (nonstatutory) party organization belonging to the association of communists known as the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" are trying to do.

The draft CPSU Statutes that we have drawn up will, in our view, enable us to eliminate the mistakes made by the party. The main principles are these:

The party is an integral part of the multiparty political system of the Soviet socialist society and carries out its activity in accordance with the USSR Constitution and laws.

The party's theoretical foundation is a scientific world outlook incorporating the entire philosophical heritage of mankind.

The party exercises its influence on society's life through its members elected to representative organs or appointed under a procedure common to all citizens, seeking to win the people's confidence through political responsibility for the implementation of the economic and political programs proposed and acknowledging panhuman values that are higher than group values, including national and class values.

The nomenklatura system in the selection and placing of cadres is to be replaced by a system based on election and hiring on a competitive basis.

The party is one party for the entire Union and is structured on the territorial principle, granting territorial (republican, oblast, okrug, rayon) primary organizations the right of full autonomy in choosing the means formulated in CPSU program documents for achieving the goal. Party committees are not to be set up at enterprises, nor are political organs to be set up in the Army, Navy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, or other state organizations.

The principle of democratic centralism is replaced by the principle of democratic administration, which means:

- the transfer of power within the party from elected organs (the Politburo, Central Committee, Secretariat, committees) to collective organs (the congress, conference, meeting);
- the executive and coordinating function of elected organs in relation to the primary organizations that elected them;
- elected organs will exercise leadership over a party apparatus consisting of hired employees in numbers permitted by the leading organs (congresses, meetings, conferences);

the transfer to primary organizations of the right to resolve all questions on the territory of their activity, including whether or not to impose a candidate stage for admission to the party;

CPSU congresses are to meet annually, and are the party's working organ. Congress delegates are elected in party okrugs by secret direct ballot on platforms, on a contested basis. The term of a delegate's powers is 4 years;

any delegate to congress or an elected organ who harms the people, an individual, society, or the party may be recalled by the primary organization that appointed him, at the request of any party member presenting evidence of the incompatibility of his conduct with party membership;

a party member has the right to enjoy the party's legal protection in the event of persecution for the fulfillment of statutory duties and party decisions. No one may be expelled from the party until his guilt has been established in accordance with the procedure common to all citizens of the Union;

in the course of the formulation of the principles of activity in the party, discussions are held, and, in the event of a lack of clarity in the positions of the majority and minority, referendums;

the CPSU Central Committee Politburo consists of secretaries of republican organizations and chairmen of commissions elected by the congress. The Politburo is headed by a party chairman who is elected for a term of 1 year;

the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat exercises leadership of the current work of the Central Committee apparatus and monitoring and organization of the fulfillment of decisions adopted by the congress. CPSU Central Committee secretaries may not be members of the Politburo;

republican, oblast, kray, city, and rayon organizations have the right to formulate their own platforms, implementing the CPSU Program in the light of local peculiarities;

the party's financial resources consist of its members' dues, income from its institutions, enterprises, and organizations, voluntary contributions from other organizations and individual citizens, and other revenue. The payment of membership dues is a matter of honor for a party member, not an obligation. Nonworking members of the CPSU pay dues on a voluntary basis;

primary party organizations send some of their dues to the higher territorial organization, and spend the remainder at the discretion of the meeting of the primary organization.

Of course, the draft statutes that have been drawn up do not claim fully to express the party's opinion, but we believe they could be used in the formulation of the CPSU Statutes to be adopted by the 28th Congress.

CPSU Platform Representative on Goals

AU2802214190 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 24-25 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy, rector of the Moscow Party College and member of the Coordinating Council of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU," by Roland Heine in Moscow: "Theory of Reform To Be Developed"; date not given]

[Text] This was inconceivable until recently—various platforms within the CPSU. One of them has meanwhile even developed into a national association that starts to play an independent role in the party's life: The Democratic Platform in the CPSU. According to estimates, the number of its members has more than doubled since the founding congress in January. Currently it has over 100,000 members. BERLINER ZEITUNG spoke with Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy, a member of the Coordinating Council and rector of the Moscow Party College. [Heine] A few days after the spectacular plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee in February, the Coordinating Council of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" met to discuss the new situation. How was the three-day debate of the Central Committee assessed?

[Shostakovskiy] We believe that the discussion underlined what had become visible prior to the plenary session—that the Central Committee would split. In the old form it has apparently reached the limits of its possibilities. It is not certain whether it will be able to prepare the CPSU Congress in a democratic manner. Much to our regret, the proposals for renewal by Boris Yeltsin, a member of our Coordinating Council, were not taken into consideration.

[Heine] How does the Coordinating Council assess the draft of the platform which was finally adopted by the Central Committee?

[Shostakovskiy] I would like to speak only on my own behalf, because the draft of the Central Committee was published quite late and was thus not available to the Coordinating Council two days after the plenary session. In my view, the draft can be split into three sections. First, it includes basic proposals for the renewal of the party. It not only contains the statement that our policy must be devoted to man, but also that the necessary conclusions have also been drawn.

Other sections of the draft are nothing but a reaction by the party to public pressure. This includes the initiative for the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution, which stipulates the CPSU's leading role, for example.

Other statements are completely insufficient. The section on the renewal of the party itself is an example of this. It does not contain a serious attempt to honestly analyze the current situation of the party.

The basic differences between the positions of the "Democratic Platform" and the draft of the Central Committee may be summed up as follows: We are in favor of transforming the CPSU into a parliamentary party that has the same rights as other parties. The Central Committee, however, wants to adhere to the CPSU's role as a vanguard party, despite the abolition of Article 6. We want to abandon any kind of centralism, and the Central Committee wants to modify it.

[Heine] Another point on the agenda of the CPSU Central Committee session was the secession of the Lithuanian party from the CPSU. The strong condemnation of the independent Communist Party by the Central Committee session was hardly the compromise that Mikhail Gorbachev mentioned repeatedly during his tour of the Baltic republic. What is the position of the Democratic Platform on this issue?

[Shostakovskiy] We have so far not adopted a decision in this respect, but we will send representatives to Vilnius and announce our rejection of the Central Committee resolution there. It is clearly in contradiction with the originally announced "open door" concept and testifies to the strength of the conservatives.

[Heine] The Democratic Platform has repeatedly stressed that it does not want to split the party but to win over the majority of the party basis and thus the majority of the party congress to their concept of democratic socialism. Is this realistic?

[Shostakovskiy] This can hardly be answered at this point, all the more so because there is still no real democracy within the party. Reverting to your question, I would like to express the hope that the better arguments will prevail.

[Heine] During the past few weeks, the "Democratic Platform" was repeatedly confronted with the accusation of being "social democratic"....

[Shostakovskiy] Well, the mass of the Soviet Communists have been trained to completely reject social democratic parties and their political practices. However, I believe that we must deal with the political experiences of social democracy in particular. We must do that without prejudices and without ideological blinders that continue to present an obstacle to basic changes in our country. It is quite obvious that a theory of reform must be developed.

[Heine] Boris Yeltsin is not only a controversial figure within the CPSU. How do you personally see his role in the Coordinating Council of the "Democratic Platform"?

[Shostakovskiy] First of all, I must say that Boris Yeltsin himself did not participate in either of the two sessions—in January he was in Japan and in February in Leningrad. Also, devoting much attention to individual figures would be in contradiction with the spirit that prevails within the "Democratic Platform." Boris Yeltsin is a colorful person, but we will strictly observe the principle of equality among all council members.

[Heine] A multiparty system, which will now also become possible in the USSR, cannot be an end in itself. It must serve the solution of problems in the country. However, most of the informal groups which may develop into parties in the future seem to be lacking concepts for solutions that would be accepted by a majority. Do you not consider it conceivable that the main elements of a multiparty system might develop from the CPSU itself?

[Shostakovskiy] There are many people who hold such views. However, as far as the "Democratic Platform" is concerned, I do not consider this desirable. As a matter of fact, the CPSU has a rich human potential. We must consider it our task to help as many people as possible to find an orientation. One cannot leave this sphere to the conservatives without a fight.

However, there are also voices claiming that the CPSU is not reformable and that one should abandon it. However, as I have already stressed, I believe that this position is wrong.

[Heine] Have other platforms of national significance formed meanwhile within the CPSU?

[Shostakovskiy] No, no other platforms with national structures have been formed. However, there are comparable efforts by conservative forces.

'Modernist' Leaders Slowly Emerging

PM0603165390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 90 Morning Edition p1

[Eduard Gonzalyez commentary under the rubric "Political Diary": "Who Should We Listen to, Who Should We Follow?"]

[Text] We have learned so much about ourselves, about our society and our country, that we can now live on our impressions. Recently the impressions that have prevailed are ones of alarm and instability. But there is, there really is some news to make us feel that changes are on the way. Feelings, as you well know, are hard to put into words. Especially as this news is quite diverse. But I will try anyway: It might make some people feel more enthusiastic.

All you can hear everyone around you saying is: What is the government thinking of? Where is the Supreme Soviet? What are the KGB and the militia doing? And sentence is instantly passed: The authorities cannot keep pace with events, cannot control events, the oars and the helm have been abandoned, and our "Titanic" left to the mercy of the winds. Unfortunately, the televised parliamentary debates do nothing to increase our optimism. They discuss the most important issues, yes, but how? You get the impression that the whole country is trying to persuade one man to forgo his principles and do what was done long ago by the prosperous world. But he is standing firm and demanding that he at least be allowed to choose his words.

People have been taking days and days to choose their words. Tempers are becoming frayed! But there is no point in getting angry: Everyone is different. In school, of course, we worked our way through the classics and revolutionary democrats and grumbled at the blackboard that they were ahead of their time. But who would agree that people living now, alongside us, are ahead of their time? There are some who have failed to keep step with the time and others who are not a single inch out of step. We are all faced with a choice: Who should we listen to, who should we follow?

It is a difficult choice. We can remember how everyone was stunned by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's first speech, in Leningrad, I think: We were hearing and seeing a modernist for the first time! And how society was shaken by the First Congress of USSR People's

Deputies: Its rostrum may be compared to a time machine, but the contrasts are particularly striking.

A struggle is now being waged. Everyone says they are in favor of authority, and that is so. But they are also in favor of their own notions on lifestyle.

After the party Central Committee plenum, you had the impression that the modernists were nevertheless gaining the upper hand. That had never happened before, not even when all the oblast bigwigs were sent tumbling from their perches. You could sense something phoney, opportunist, and futile in the mass resignations and replacements, which made you feel it was a piecemeal effort.

The first piece of news was carried by IZVESTIYA and was no more than 50 lines long: The provisional bureau of the Tyumen Oblast party committee has decided to abolish its list of nomenklatura positions. This is serious. This is something fundamental. This is an obvious intention to abandon one of the foundation stones of the administrative system. If the old recipe for cadre reproduction is lost, if ideas, knowledge, professionalism, and results are going to compete instead of questionnaires and personal ties, there is hope.

I still cannot shake off the feeling that the summer strike by the Kemerovo miners might have been avoided if the Supreme Soviet had confirmed a new minister. And the situation with medicines might not have been hopeless if deputies had shown greater firmness. Cadres do not only decide everything: Their appointment, replacement, and encouragement are the best indication of the leaders' true intentions.

There is now a lot of talk about social protection for the individual and we are doing at least something to this end. But what about protection for society? Protection against harmful ideas, decisions, people, and, ultimately, protection against itself. Technology long ago invented a compulsory fool-proof safety mechanism. For example, the cover of an electric socket swivels in such a way that it is not easy to stick your fingers into it. In other countries the role of protecting society against fools is played by laws, competition, opposition, and a press that recognizes no authority.

There is no point in putting bare wires together and giving our society a shock. I mean this literally: Nothing is to be gained froterms of time.

Let us consider the events in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus from this standpoint. The events in both regions have rocked the boat, knocked it from its newly charted course, and have generally been extremely painful. But we must be aware of the differences nevertheless. Although this does not mean that we do not need any protection against those who run a long way ahead: not only ahead of time but ahead of their own squealing voices.

Another piece of news: The draft Law on the Internal Security of the Country has come to fruition deep in the heart of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. Had anyone heard of the intention to produce this draft law? No, I had not heard anything about it either. But what could be more important today? And you say "where is the Supreme Soviet"?

If this law materializes, perhaps another question will disappear: "What are the KGB and the militia doing?" You get the impression that at the moment they are feeling rather confused. They have been protecting society against people ahead of their time for a long time now. Backed up, of course, by those who have failed to keep step with the time. Perhaps they are now unable to make a move without help from the sidelines.

The last piece of news will please business people. After all, they too need protection. So many economic workers ahead of their time have had to pay for "stepping out of line." Now the Committee for Questions of Economic Reform is pondering the draft of another law: on free enterprise, or, as they still bashfully say, on small-scale business, but, if we abandon the camouflage, it is a law on private entrepreneurial activity, which has long existed in our country anyway.

It is not true that the word "entrepreneur" is considered a term of abuse among the people. When the story of the cooperative millions broke, the public read about it and concluded that these people should be appointed ministers of finance—if not of the country then of the republic. Unfortunately, at that time the Finance Ministry was staffed with people who had difficulty in explaining the difference between the fixed ruble and the convertible ruble.

But Finance Ministry and bank personnel have done everything possible to liquidate the cooperatives. They were still looking over their shoulders at that time, however. First they cut off their revenue and waited to would be more honest to call private businesses—have managed to increase their volume of output 6.5 times in the space of a year, only people who have gotten stuck somewhere in the thirties could see them as enemies of society.

You get the feeling that modernists are gradually coming to the fore. In politics, management, the economy, and culture.... But as yet it is only a feeling.

Need for Sanctioned Opposition Seen

PM0203160190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by L. Shevtsova, candidate of historical sciences, under the rubric "Social Prognosis": "Opposition—a New Word in Our Political Vocabulary"]

[Text] We are living in times of rapid change. Things that seemed inconceivable and alien yesterday have become commonplace today. Notions and stereotypes are crumbling and their place is taken by others. Until quite recently concepts such as "market," "pluralism," and "separation of powers" were regarded as seditious in our country. Now we are beginning to understand that all that has been mentioned are elementary and essential norms of the functioning of society.

Now the turn of the holy of holies has come. I am referring to the decision of the latest CPSU Central Committee plenum on the renunciation of the party's monopoly of power. A long-overdue decision which, alas, comes too late in many respects. In the fifth year of perestroyka we have finally summoned up enough courage to embark on dismantling the foundations of the administrative-edict system. However, let us curb our optimism and muffle the fanfares proclaiming the victory of democratism, and let us reflect a little. Our country is in crisis. The former management mechanisms have been dismantled. Yet at the same time, the new mechanisms created during perestroyka have not yet been activated. Why? In many respects because they were created in accordance with old yardsticks and were geared to the one-party system, one form of ownership, and the obedience of the masses.

At the moment the gulf between the political and economic structure and social expectations has not only not decreased, it is increasing. The question of power is beginning to resound with new force and in a new fashion as a result of the fact that new participants are entering (have already entered!) the political arena. Is this appreciated inside society? Not entirely, I believe. Our parliamentarians are discussing what they regard as urgent matters: The affair of the 12 tanks which almost left the country, gold prices, the Gdlyan case, and so forth. Meanwhile, behind the doors of the parliament, quietly, a line of new people who wish to lay claim to power is beginning to form. You think I am exaggerating? Possibly. Let us return to this theme in a few months' time.

We are faced with a most urgent task: How can we effect the transition to pluralist forms of life at the lowest possible cost? How can we avoid social and national upheavals during this process, how can we avoid an irreconcilable struggle and "head-on" clashes? How can we avoid a revival of egoistic aspirations? It is not enough to discard dogmas and obsolete principles. It is necessary to create new social regulators (without delay, what is more). What regulators? A multiparty system? Yet in East Europe "elementary" [ruchnoy] pluralism existed for decades, and it produced nothing—aside from discrediting socialism. So that the point is not the number of parties. The point lies in the principle governing the functioning of political life.

Monopolism has been (and, incidentally, still is) the crux of our social order. The new system to which we are aspiring is to function on the basis of counterbalances. Therefore the question of opposition is coming to the fore. Yes, an opposition! Let us not try to soft-pedal this issue for fear of awakening old fears—of rivalry, competition, and confrontation, of informal organizations. No, it is a question of recognizing the fundamental need of the institution, the phenomenon, of opposition as an inalienable element of our social reality. Without this there can be no question of democracy, parliamentarism, or a rule-of-law state. You would have to be deaf and blind, or very naive, not to realize that an opposition system already exists in our society and is gathering strength.

An overt power struggle is also under way in our country, and what is more it is under way at all levels. This is no tragedy. This struggle existed in the past too, but it took place behind closed doors and within a limited circle of participants and usually ended with something along the lines of a palace revolution. Now the struggle for power has spilled into the streets and encompassed broad sections of society. By trying to prove that it does not or should not exist we will not make it go away. Our concern should be something else—how to give this struggle civilized forms and ensure its democratic outcome.

A multiplicity of voices of all sorts of political currents, movements, associations, fronts, clubs, and groups has come to the surface. There is a much greater political diversity in our country than in any other country of the world. The nature and content of our political pluralism is another matter. It would be wrong to idealize it. There are many people in the alternative movements who have a sense of civic duty and noble motives. But there is also a lot of scum, extremism, ambition, and even petty vanity. Sometimes you are struck by evidence of political infantilism and cheap demagoguery. True, all this exists. However, let us not forget that the new political forces and their leaders are not beings from another planet. They were born and grew up in an authoritarian society. They are its product. How can we demand the impossible from them, how can we demand that they immediately conform with the highest of ideals? After all, even the ruling forces are finding it difficult to rid themselves of old habits and "birthmarks" [rodimyye pyatna].

And there is another point: The political pluralism which has only just come into being in our country is highly unstable. The alternative forces have neither a firm social base nor clear-cut programs. So far they are being carried along by the wave of rejection and the force of society's dissatisfaction. They lack political experience, and in most cases also elementary political culture and knowledge. "Is this your opposition?"—Western journalists asked with puzzlement after attending a session of one of the relatively big alternative movements and failing to grasp what its participants wanted to achieve. It was obvious only what they did not want.

However, let us tone down our criticism of the alternative forces. They are much the same as the rest of us. In a certain sense they are our mirror. I do not intend in the least to whitewash crude, brutal extremism. However, even this extremism did not take shape in a vacuum. What happened in Fergana, Baku, and Dushanbe, what is smoldering and ready to flare up in other regions are the sores of our sick society which are breaking open.

Sometimes people ask in perplexity: "Is it worth paying attention to such minor groups? It's much ado about nothing!" True, the overwhelming majority of alternative parties and associations are small, numbering dozens or, at most, hundreds of members. Let us take the most "pluralist" city of all—Moscow. Some 150 informal associations operate here. According to the closest estimates, the number of their activists does not exceed 18,000 people. A very small number, as it were, for a city of many millions. The alternative forces have already demonstrated their fighting qualities and their ability to mobilize the masses. Last year's elections, and the recent many-thousands-strong demonstration staged by Muscovites on the eve of the CPSU Central Committee plenum are evidence of their potential. To this we must add the emergence of mass people's fronts in all the union and autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts. We also have to take into account the emergent structures of the independent workers movement. This adds up to hundreds of thousands of people (up to 2 million according to some estimates).

At present the alternative forces are entering a new stage of their development. From club-type action groups they are moving on to political self-organization and the creation of a financial and press base (in particular through alliance with the cooperative movement). The process of the formation of coalition blocs of these forces at republic and union level has started. It is possible to acknowledge the organizational development of parties, people's fronts, and independent trade unions. As regards the ideological characteristics of the alternative movement, several currents are discernible—social democratic, neoliberal, national patriotic, national democratic, populist, extreme left-wing, syndicalist, ecological, and Christian democratic. The emergence of a powerful opposition party is hardly to be expected in Soviet society in the near future. Coalitions consisting of a multitude of small associations are more likely. However, it is obvious that the national and populist currents will have the broadest social base.

However, is it possible to describe all the alternative forces which have emerged in the USSR as opposition forces? If you proceed from the premise that opposition is a form of resistance on the part of a social or political group to the official policy, and its desire to strive, if not for power then to influence power, then the majority of informal associations has a more or less pronounced oppositionist character. Incidentally, the dividing line between what constitutes alternativeness, rivalry, and opposition is sometimes difficult to define. We have gotten used to identifying the opposition with antisocialist activities, or to put it bluntly—with destructiveness and nothing else. Yet even the classical exponents of the communist movement, people such as G. Dimitrov, regarded the existence of an opposition as a precondition of the viability of any society and power. Virtually all the East European communist parties today believe that opposition and socialism are compatible.

True, there are forces in our society which proceed from an antisocialist platform. However, the majority of alternative movements pursue diverse socialist ideals, even though they interpret them from different angles. There are associations which, for instance, support M.S. Gorbachev while simultaneously criticizing his policy from the left or the right.

The very fact that opposition is not officially recognized in our society essentially places all informal forces in confrontation with the center.

At present we already have our own parliamentary opposition in the interregional group of people's deputies. Its social support comes from various informal associations which are in this way gaining access to the state level. The alternative movement within the CPSU is also strengthening. As is known, there is also in our country a republic-level opposition to the center. Apart from the organized opposition there are various manifestations of spontaneous opposition. Take, for instance, the conflicts between party members and nonparty people on the one hand and the oblast and rayon party leadership on the other hand, which have led to the replacement of local party leaders in a number of regions. And what about the special position of the Leningrad leaders on questions of perestroyka—is that not to be described as an opposition stance? Incidentally, it is difficult to decide to what extent it is spontaneous. The same can be said also about the attitude of certain members of the Central Committee and Politburo toward Gorbachev's course.

And so, let us not shrug off the realities: Various forms and levels of opposition exist in our country, opposition "from the left" and "from the right." However, the problem is that while these phenomena are developing mainly in the open, they are at the same time illegal, as it were. There is no mechanism for the inclusion of political pluralism in the official structure. The alternative movements are influencing the policy of the state up to a point. But how does this happen? Through pressure from below, through demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and even hunger strikes. This leads to nothing good, of course. Pluralism without a legal outlet becomes an explosive factor. This leads to a constant escalation of tension. Denial of recognition and intolerance on the part of some leads to hostility on the part of others. Clumsy attempts to combat the informals at local level usually end with the moral victory of the latter. "Do they not understand that in acting in this way they are playing into our hands?" one of the informals asked me.

We admit that it is difficult to cast off political stereotypes which have been imbibed with the mother's milk; that it hurts to have to overcome the habitual syndrome of viewing any opponent, rightly or wrongly, as an "enemy." But after all, we have succeeded in extending the new thinking to the sphere of foreign policy. We have managed to sit down at the negotiating table with the U.S. president and the British prime minister. Why are we so slow to renounce the militant rejection of other forces inside our own country? Why are we creating opponents for ourselves out of potential partners and allies?

What a pity we don't draw conclusions from other people's mistakes, but only from our own, and even then not always. Yet some of the events taking place in East Europe should be perceived by us—and especially by the party—as a warning.

And so, example No. 1—Poland. Here the ruling forces in the Communist Party not only gave up their monopoly on power but also sat down at the "roundtable" with the opposition "Solidarity" organization. This step made it possible to preserve the unity of the country and to avert a looming social explosion. And at the same time it ensured the Communists' participation in the coalition government. Although here too the communist party was too slow to give up its omnipotence—society's confidence in the party was virtually eroded.

Example No. 2—the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The ruling circles in these countries suppressed all manifestations of dissident thought to the last minute. And the result: A wave of hostility, fed by the massive discontent of the working people, swamped not only the authoritarian regimes but also the Communists as such, and swept them to the margins of societal life. A similar process is taking place in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, albeit in a less dramatic form. At upcoming elections in a number of countries Communists may clearly fail to gain public support. That means that the bearers of socialist ideals will end up in the opposition. Ought this not to force certain of our leaders to revise their rejection of the very institution of opposition?

The experience of East Europe indicates that political pluralism does not inevitably lead to society's polarization and destabilization. Disintegration can occur also in conditions of a one-party system. The emergence of diverse political organizations, although it introduces confusion into the once tranquil flow of life and shatters its silence, does at the same time create new integrational ties. As a rule, this pluralism curbs the danger of total anarchy and social luddism. An example of this is the current development in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Romania, where the first taste of democracy in the absence of the foundations of pluralism is causing frightening convulsions of the entire social organism, is another matter.

We are alarmed, and quite rightly so, by the extremes and, sometimes, the recklessness in the ranks of the alternative forces. Yet there is a treatment for the teething troubles manifested in "left-wing" and "right-wing" extremism. Just look at the evolution the leaders of Poland's "Solidarity" underwent when they started taking part in the affairs state! Clearly, the burden of responsibility makes people change, makes them move on from unrestrained criticizing to a quest for constructive stances.

The events in East Europe should prompt serious reflection. They show that there are universal natural laws governing the development of society. These natural laws have not been devised by any specific class. The principle of counterbalances, the mechanism of political struggle for the masses and for power, opposition as an institution—these are the natural norms of societal life. Incidentally, give it some thought: Why does Western society permit itself the luxury of fostering and cherishing an opposition? In some cases the state even maintains it. Why do bourgeois ruling circles calmly observe the activities of the communist parties and other new forces? And that in a society where everthing is built on calculation and pragmatism. Obviously, pluralism and opposition are precisely the means which make it possible to prevent stagnation in social development. "If the opposition did not exist, it would have to be invented!" a well-known Western figure once exclaimed. Well, we are having to learn some truths with which the whole civilized world has been familiar for a long time. But better late than never.

You get the impression that some people in our country are prepared to reconcile themselves to the existence of an opposition. On one condition, however—that it be socialist. Excuse me, but we still do not know what constitute the criteria of "socialistness." According to what yardstick are some to be admitted to the socialist society, while others... And what will we do with these others, incidentally? After all, there are Stalinist methods of combating the antisocialist opposition, and there are Brezhnevite methods. Ultimately, who is to judge? Who is to determine the degree of "socialistness" of a specific movement. I believe that world development has shown convincingly enough that there cannot be either a socialist or a bourgeois pluralism, market, democracy. They either exist or they don't. Therefore let all political forces (with the exception, of course, of those which preach racism and misanthropy) prove their worth and vie for the favor of the masses. Society cannot be deceived. It will decide for itself what is what. But as soon as we try "barring" some people, this will spell the end of both democracy and perestroyka.

Our present situation is such that one political force clearly cannot shoulder on its own the whole burden of the problems which have accumulated. The crisis in society has reached a stage which threatens its survival. In these circumstance a sort of social contract between all the political forces operating in our country is needed. What does this mean? Only one thing—the time has come for representatives of the CPSU leadership to pool their efforts with the leaders of the main alternative associations and fronts, strike committees, and "independent" trade unions in a quest for ways to achieve this goal. Dialogue between Communists and the opposition has become the practice in all countries of Eastern Europe (with the exception of Albania). This idea has also been put forward by our alternative forces. Sooner or later it will have to be implemented. But it would be advisable not to postpone this matter until things get worse.

However, there is one characteristic feature in our society which distinguishes it from most of the countries of East Europe. There, the fall in the prestige of the communist parties (a distressing fact in itself, of course) did not halt the development of the countries in question, it did not give rise to tectonic social explosions. The power that has slipped from the Communists' hands has been picked up by other political parties and life goes on, albeit in different forms.

In our country the situation is totally different, I believe. There is no opposition force in our society (at least not yet) capable of becoming the dominant factor. Therefore our future destiny will be shaped to a decisive degree by the processes which are taking place within the CPSU. Unfortunately, the draft CPSU Platform does not provide a clear answer to the question of what the Communist Party should be like in conditions of competition and political struggle. The draft proceeds from the premise that the party remains the monopoly force. Meanwhile there is much to indicate that the creation of two parties on the basis of the CPSU would be the optimum solution in our conditions. This idea, put forward at the CPSU Central Committee plenum by Academician Ye. Velikhov, has long been discussed in the Marxist circles of East European countries. It was first put forward by Z. Mlynar and other reformers in the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party back during the 1968 "Prague Spring." In most of the neighboring countries there already are a minimum of two or more parties in existence on a socialist platform.

The main argument against such a step in our country is the fear that a division of the left-wing forces might result in their weakening. However, the CPSU is already the embodiment of a multiparty system in miniature, and this is making it difficult for it to function purposefully. The establishment of two parties would make it possible to create in our society the system of counterbalances it so urgently needs, and to do it on a socialist basis. The new parties would also incorporate some of the alternative movements. They might even form the skeleton of a broader multiparty system. As the experience of East Europe has shown, it is much worse if the delimitation of left-wing forces takes place in conditions whereby they no longer hold the dominant positions in the life of society.

The opinion has also been expressed that it is necessary to preserve a single Communist Party while legalizing internal opposition in the shape of the factions within it. The emergence of factions is no disaster. They existed in the Bolshevik party even under V.I. Lenin. However, it is interesting that in Western parties, where there is a broad pluralism and freedom of currents, factions, as a rule, do not exist. If they do emerge, they sooner or later become independent parties. The same is happening with factions in the East European communist parties. It appears that when a truly democratic atmosphere and freedom of choice are created in society, the need for intraparty factions disappears. Those who disagree with the party line are free to join another party.

Why am I saying this? To show that pluralism is also a method for the internal consolidation of our party. Although, no matter what we may say now, delimitation within the CPSU will sooner or later have a logical outcome—be it at the congress or immediately afterward. It is important for this process not to catch us unawares.

Indeed, pluralism and opposition are two natural forms of development of a civil society. But they are by no means a panacea for all ills. These principles can operate both for the benefit of society and to its detriment. The spontaneous development of political struggle threatens to exacerbate the already obvious uncontrolledness [neupravlyayemost] of our lives. Therefore the swiftest possible elaboration of a legal framework to regulate political pluralism (its basis should be provided by the Law on Parties and the mechanism for their registration), and the creation of forms (as yet temporary) for the coordination of the positions of the various forces are no less important. No time must be lost, the opportunity for dialogue must not be wasted.

Role of Party Professionals Defended

PM0603163590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Dmitriy Barabashov, instructor of the CPSU Central Committee Socioeconomic Department, conducted by V. Tiksin: "The Multidimensionality of Truth: Why the 'Apparatchiks' Do Not Thrust Themselves Forward..."—place, date not specified]

[Text] How is one to explain that not a trace is to be seen or heard of many party and state apparatus workers in our tumultuous and taxing times? Where have our professional ideologues, propagandists, organizers, and leaders of the party masses concealed themselves under the pressure exerted by the clamorous, evermore-confident leaders of informal organizations? These questions are frequently encountered in the letters of readers disturbed by the development of the situation in the country. We present here for our readers' attention the reflections on this topic of Dmitriy Barabashov, instructor at the CPSU Central Committee Socioeconomic Department, who is not keeping a low profile and is playing an active part in the political and ideological struggle under way in our country. A candidate for RSFSR people's deputy and cochairman of the Rossiya club, he often addresses labor collectives and voters, successfully defending the party line in sharp encounters with those who dislike it.

[Tiksin] The passivity and inertness of the work of the CPSU Central Committee's new apparatus is now proverbial. This is usually put down to the fact that the the old "command and instruction" style has been rejected but a new one has not yet been devised, and people are disheartened. Do you agree with these explanations?

[Barabashov] That assessment is somewhat peremptory, although it does undoubtedly contain a fair amount of truth. Moreover, I would not put everything down to one cause, even if it is an obvious one. The issue is far more complex. Oddly enough, many of the apparatus' current defects stem from its merits.

[Tiksin] What do you mean specifically?

[Barabashov] Above all the discipline and authoritative example of the leadership, whose work style and methods determine in many respects the actual apparatus' image. Nowadays, in this era of seething democracy and glasnost, these notions are ridiculed as being "stagnant" and "bureaucratic." Wrongly. Strict apparatus discipline and high prestige in the leader are, as the experience of all advanced countries without exception shows, absolutely essential for their rapid and assured development. It is necessary merely that this discipline be conscious rather than mechanical and that the prestige be achieved through actual deeds rather than be hollow. In our country, however, leaders often adopt a wait-and-see, neutral stance on many "hot" issues of the day and sometimes simply shirk the task of setting out their own views. Following their "authoritative" example, the middle-tier leaders and then we rank-and-file apparatchiks conduct ourselves in exactly the same way. However, I am not making any great revelation here. All this has been stated loudly and clearly at party Central Committee plenums and various meetings and conferences. But talk is cheap, and in actuality everything remains as it was.

[Tiksin] I do not altogether agree with you there. Almost every day our newspapers carry articles by or interviews with our party leaders, and they regularly visit and talk at labor collectives—which also receives coverage all the time in the mass media.

[Barabashov] Speeches—yes... But I'll give you a specific example. Masterpieces of the kind represented by V. Grossman's "Forever Flowing" and Solzhenitsyn's "The Gulag Archipelago"... are now at the epicenter of ideological skirmishes. Has any of our leading party ideologues given a detailed and precise analysis of these works from the standpoint of renewed Marxism? Not, of course, in the form of woolly judgments about "damaging extremes" and the benefits of the "golden mean" but in actual "face-to-face" debate with those who passionately extol the "absolute historical truth" revealed by Grossman and Solzhenitsyn. Or why should not some of our leading state politicians meet with USSR People's Deputy N.P. Shmelev in a television roundtable discussion and give their informed view on specific points of the interregional group's economic program? Alas, the more "comfortable" and customary methods of solo speeches followed by questions and answers are preferred. As a result a kind of vacuum occurs in public opinion, particularly among uninformed people, which is immediately filled by the opponents of socialist values who act in an aggressive, pushy, and unceremonious way. And yet it is far easier to present bourgeois and particularly nationalist ideology with its primitivism, one-dimensionality, and appeals to the worst aspects of human nature than to advance complex, "multidimensional" truth. That, unfortunately, is not taken account of at all, and the result is obvious...

[Tiksin] Your judgments do make some sense, but are they not at the same time an actual admission that under the prevailing conditions communists are bound to progressively cede their positions?

[Tarabashov] In no way. The truth of life is on our side. When communists adopt firm, principled positions, not fearing to go against the trend or address the disoriented "majority," their arguments will ultimately prove more powerful and cogent. Take, for example, M.S. Gorbachev's trip to Lithuania. Any unprejudiced person will acknowledge that Mikhail Segeyevich emerged the victor from his very stiff "face-to-face" skirmish with nationalist demagogues, having driven them into a corner by means of his logic, facts, and arguments. But all this applies, of course, to unprejudiced people. In Lithuania, however, the population prior to Gorbachev's arrival was exclusively conditioned to think, as it still is, in an unbridled nationalist way. It therefore paid no heed to the voice of reason, and it continues that way even now. If that monopoly had been shaken the picture would, I am convinced, be altogether different. Ordinary people would have quickly realized what was what and the "professorial" option of withdrawing from the Union would have lost its attractiveness. There are realistically minded people in the Baltic region who would demolish this "option." But they are not allowed to speak. And not just in the Baltic.

[Tiksin] In brief, if I have understood you correctly, the existing monopoly on the expression of views is one of the reasons that apparatus workers prefer "not to thrust themselves forward"...

[Barabashov] Absolutely right. I am not idealizing the apparatus. There is no shortage of bureaucracy, incompetence, and time-serving there. But isn't that also true, and dangerously so, of those who have now made it their "profession" to unmask "apparatchiks"? Meanwhile, people selected for the apparat are, believe me, by no means the worst, even though, of course, there is much that needs improvement here. It is necessary to improve the apparatus by recruiting fresh forces from the working masses and to mark off sharply those "intellectuals" obsessed with their own selfish, often careerist, interests. Unfortunately, it is precisely those "intellectuals" who are making use of the benefits of full "pluralism" here rather than ordinary workers, peasants, and employees. But let them speak out really freely and you will see how before your very eyes they turn their opponents into common or garden philistines who are ideologically and politically utterly bankrupt. Yet they aren't allowed to speak out or, if they are, there's such a fuss about an imaginary "conservatism" that it makes you sick. For example, look at the persecution and defamation campaign that was mounted against V.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad party obkom. And what about us ordinary apparatchiks?

[Tiksin] Judging by the "painful chord" that struck, they must be really getting at you, mustn't they?

[Barabashov] I am not going to list all my woes and grievances. I shall illustrate my words by just one example which, I think, is highly characteristic. Recently MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI accused me and a colleague of mine, B. Volkov, an instructor in the CPSU Central Committee Socioeconomic Department, of sympathizing with the chauvinists and rabble rousers from Pamyat. As an "argument," they cite anonymous letters which say that I took 50-60 Pamyat rabble rousers to a meeting with voters in Tushinskiy Rayon, where they are claimed to have terrorized the audience by their "foul" language... The utter falseness of these claims can be confirmed not anonymously but by all those actually present at the meeting, including L. Tikhomirov, secretary of the electoral commission, and USSR People's Deputy Ye. Kim. Later on, G. Zhavoronkov, a correspondent for the newspaper, tells readers that the party committee of the Central Committee apparatus "held a conversation with them (that is, with Volkov and me)... and warned them of the possibility of administrative sanctions against them." This is utter drivel, completely at odds with the style of our party committee's work. Naturally, we asked the editorial office of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI to print a retraction, but it refused. This is a legal matter. The newspaper article appeared a few days before the RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections. It was an attempt to compromise me as a candidate deputy using deliberately false information which, according to Article 14 of the republic Law on Elections, is strict punishable...

They say to me: "Don't get mixed up with them, don't you know who they are...?" I do know them , and that is why I don't want to meekly keep silent. Why should we allow dishonorable people to introduce with impunity into the masses' consciousness the false stereotype of the "conservative, retrograde apparatchik" who for selfish reasons opposes the "perestroyka changes" and who, to cut a long story short, is the "enemy of the people" of the nineties? Slander must be nipped in the bud right away before it develops. Otherwise it will take "heroic efforts" to overcome the artificially created difficulties. Sometimes it goes as far as mass reprisals against apparatus workers, and we have already seen how that happens.

[Tiksin] But such things are impossible here: We have insured ourselves against that through perestroyka, so to speak...

[Barabashov] In the Ukraine, for example, almost one-third of the obkom first secretaries have been ousted as a result of stormy rallies and demonstrations, in a number of cases quite unjustifiably. In an orgy of passions and emotions, decisions are taken which are often far from the best and which ultimately hurt those who insisted on them. In this connection I am reminded of the infamous "Cultural Revolution" in China. There, too, the "progressive" mass media aroused "revolutionaries," mainly immature youngsters, to attack "reactionary staffs." And years later they were forced to restore the slandered and persecuted "conservatives" to their old jobs to repair the wrecked economy and life which had been torn asunder...

[Tiksin] As far I am aware, you are one of the few Central Committee apparatus staffers who has dared to openly criticize leaders in person. Has that not affected your official position? And then again, isn't it a breach of party ethics that you are speaking out using your own name and at the same time your own title, that is, "pressure using the prestige of the company name"?

[Barabashov] Party documents and M.S. Gorbachev's speeches direct communists to engage in an open and honest struggle for our aims and ideals. Biding your time sitting it out in offices nowadays is a crime. And now people pay no attention to the "company name"—they demand arguments and evidence. So only people completely divorced from real life can accuse someone of attempting to "use his title to pressure" others. And then again, according to the party rules I can criticize a leader of any rank. As is well known, such criticism is now being expressed both in the press and at CPSU Central Committee plenums. But as the ancient proverb has it: What Jupiter may do, a bullock may not... After my speeches at labor collectives and in front of voters a leader of my department spoke with me several times and made it clear, politely but quite firmly, that after the 4 March elections the department will no longer be needing my services...

[Tiksin] So MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI can chalk up a victory over another "conservative" and "jingoist"? You should fight for that reason alone, it seems to me...

[Barabashov] For what, for my position? I am not going to. Discipline is discipline; if it is not observed within the

Central Committee apparatus, how can it be demanded of ordinary communists? And who can you work flat-out if your immediate leader reminds you that you are dispensable? I harbor no illusions—our department and the Central Committee apparatus as a whole have a good few intelligent, competent, and knowledgeable people and from the professional standpoint my departure will hardly cause any perceptible damage. The problem is different—there are fewer and fewer people in the apparatus who are prepared to "thrust themselves forward"...

Poll on Public Attitudes to Cooperatives

PM0603165490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[E. Gonzalyez article under the rubric "Statistics and Our Commentary": "Cooperatives: Let Us Explain the System Again"]

[Text] From time to time the results of a poll among the population on the subject of cooperative and individual labor activity appear in the press. These polls are conducted by sociologists at various centers and institutes, and usually cover several thousand people. And every time, we learn to our astonishment that contrary to the very widespread assertions, the population is not all that unanimous in its opposition to the new sector of the economy. But this does not prevent the departments and the authorities from continuing the war in the name of the people, without reckoning in the slightest with the interests of the population.

Yet another such study of public opinion was recently completed by the USSR State Committee for Statistics. It differs from preceding studies only by virtue of its scale. Some 101,000 workers, employees, kolkhoz members, and pensioners, in all republics, krays, and oblasts, were polled. The result was the same: Only 29 percent of those polled have a negative attitude to cooperatives and individual labor activity. True, even fewer are unreservedly in favor of cooperatives—only 15 percent. The rest have varying attitudes to it—without being hostile, they see pluses and minuses, while approximately 13 percent are totally indifferent to the cooperative system—whether it exists or not...

I personally have great sympathy with these 13 percent: Evidently they themselves do not resort to the services of cooperatives, but they realize that some people may need these services: After all, the 15 percent who are supporters amount to more than 30 million people. If only this approach could become the norm in our society!

But that is beside the point. Some 75,000 people—a substantial cross-section of society—admit to no doubts, but express an opinion of cooperatives, without ever having belonged to one. If such opinions tell us anything, it is probably less about the cooperative system than about its supporters and opponents themselves. Who are they?

In terms of jobs, it breaks down like this: Among leading workers, one-fourth are "for" and slightly fewer are "against." So the managers give no advantages to either side. Remember that.

The opponents of the cooperative system secured their predominance because of pensioners, kolkhoz members, and sovkhoz workers ("for"—10 percent, "against"—30 percent). Here it must, of course, be noted that there are not very many young people among these population groups. And in general sociologists note that elderly people have a more belligerent attitude than young people. They firmly and even aggressively uphold this basic principle in life: "Let everyone live like everyone else." Which means, like they themselves.

The percentage of supporters of the cooperative system increases with the level of education. In any event, 24 percent of citizens with higher education came out firmly in favor of cooperatives, compared with fewer than 10 percent with primary and incomplete secondary education.

Naturally, the level of wages influences attitudes no less than educational levels. A sum of 80 rubles a month allows only 8 percent of those receiving that wage to tolerate "scroungers who rob the people." Whereas R250 turns one-fifth of people into supporters of cooperative members. And what is R250? Very nearly the average wage.

There are more opponents among women than among men. Women over the age of 60 are particularly categorical in their views.

In Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan there are two or three times more unconditional supporters of cooperatives and individual labor activity than in Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, and Tajikistan.

So now we seem to have sufficient data to draw up a verbal portrait of the typical ideologically implacable opponent of cooperative and individual labor activity. A collective and, of course, highly standardized portrait.

So, it is an elderly, not very highly educated person with the character of an old woman, living in some decaying village, if there ever were any of those in Central Asia. Any field of activity except, apparently, management is possible. Wages—not enviable.

This collective portrait might look to some people as if we wish to cause offense, but believe me, there is no such intention. Indeed, you are hardly likely to find in reality many people who possess all the traits and characteristics enumerated. In reality, too, they are by no means all compulsory.

The most implacable persecutors of the cooperatives today are undoubtedly some leaders of city, oblast, and kray soviet ispolkoms [executive committees]. And what do they have in common with the collective portrait? Only the fact that they too have never had recourse to a cooperative—they had no need. It must be one of two things: Either an inner unity, in the philosophical sphere, with the standardized, collective type, enables them to say without flinching: "The people demand..." Or else it is convenient to do this. Or perhaps both, in arbitrary proportions.

And also, a lack of responsibility for the consequences. An extraordinary congress of the capital's cooperative members was held in Moscow recently in connection with the Provisional Procedure for the Organization of Cooperative Activity and the Resolution on Regulating the Activity of Cooperatives that were adopted by Moscow City Soviet. Much has already been written about these documents. Saying both that they are far from being fully in accordance with the law, and that there should not be any provisional conditions at all in such a matter—after all, we are talking about commerce and production!

But let us approach the situation from the other side: It is the rayon ispolkoms that have to implement the decision of Moscow City Soviet. And it is they, or rather their budgets, that will suffer as a result of implementing it. And, therefore, the population! But will the authors of these documents be held accountable for this?

The picture is the same in certain other regions of the country—it is particularly evident in Krasnodar Kray. Krasnodar itself, according to rough estimates, last year received at least R50 million from cooperative members—enough to build 50 apartment blocks. And in the same year—near the end of the year—more than 1,000 cooperatives in the kray were abolished.

Only recently it would have been possible to assert with 100-percent certainty that after that, the Krasnodar and Moscow leaders could sleep easily. Who would call them to account for the rubles not received, the goods not sold, the services not offered? But now, it seems, there is no such guarantee. Elections, soon! And perhaps some of the voters, on receiving their ballot papers, will remember the standardized, collective portrait of the opponent of the cooperative system.

And to give someone your trust, or to abstain—that, unlike the attitude to cooperatives, is a purely personal matter.

In conclusion, one doubt that is suggested by the frequent repetition of sociological polls on this subject. Is it at all necessary to take such a persistent interest in the opinions of people who have nothing whatever to do with the cooperative system? Neither as buyers, nor as sellers. Today 4.5 million people work in the cooperative system and 30 million want to have dealings with them, without any "buts." So why should this huge number of people have to ask anyone's permission? Even if "anyone" is the chairman of a city, oblast, or kray ispolkom.

Incidentally, sociologists from the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion once conducted another poll. Among other things, they asked: Who in our society, in your opinion, enjoys benefits not in accordance with their labor and services? Then there was a long list of professions, posts, vocations, and even nationalities. It turned out that according to the citizens' responses, the cooperative memebers only came second. It was party and soviet workers who came first, winning 1.5 percent more votes.

Yet we have just increased their wages and, after stormy debates, agreed that we have done the right thing. At best, we did not choose a very appropriate time. And you will agree that it is hard to imagine that the abolition of city, oblast, and kray ispolkoms is about to begin. Even if they were to hold three polls a day....

Misgivings on Presidency Bill Aired

*PM0503132390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1*

["Selection of Opinions" voiced by USSR People's Deputies V. Tso, Yu. Komarov, and O. Yegorov under the "Topical Subject" rubric: "Both Power and Democracy"—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction

[Text] What will the USSR president's status be? What changes and additions will be made to the USSR Constitution in connection with this major political innovation? These questions are central to the work of USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions. Today we publish a selection of opinions from USSR people's deputies on the future presidency.

The voting at the session illustrated that most deputies support the immediate establishment of presidential rule. This imposes a tremendous responsibility on us with regard to the quality of our analysis of the draft law.

What is the strength of presidential power? The fact that the majority of the country's population supports it, expressing its will through a direct secret ballot. The president thus obtains a moral and political basis for vast executive power. I believe in this connection that a special mechanism for presidential elections different from Western models is needed in our multinational federative state. What kind of mechanism? The president is deemed elected if at least half of the population of the constitutional republics vote for his candidacy.

I also have serious misgivings regarding the president's right, according to the draft law, to declare a "state of war if necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations regarding mutual defense against aggression." Memories of Afghanistan are still fresh in our minds, and there was also Czechoslovakia in 1968...

Then too it was a question of fulfilling "treaty obligations." Then too decisions were in effect adopted individually without any controlling mechanism. They are now deemed to have been mistaken and have been condemned.

By and large I am sure that, for all the likely difficulties involved in establishing it, presidential rule will create

new opportunities for laying the foundations of a rule-of-law state as speedily as possible.
[Signed] V. Tso, Tashkent

A great deal has already been said about shortcomings in the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is partly this that has made it necessary to institute the presidency. Well, a powerful center controlling the USSR Supreme Soviet's legislative activity and its results is now emerging. I believe that the USSR Supreme Soviet's role must be reinforced when finalizing the proposed draft law in order to to ensure that there is also a strong parliament when there is a strong president. I will explain my point. The original draft made provision for the president to submit a proposal to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies regarding the election of a new Supreme Soviet in the event of insuperable disagreements between the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers. This is indisputably a powerful lever for pressure on deputies, it would stimulate the quest for compromises and more profound and reasoned discussion of contentious problems. But it would also create an opportunity for harsh pressure if the president wanted to "push through" what was known to be an extremely contentious draft law using his right of legislative initiative. Perhaps the Congress of USSR People's Deputies should be given the right to initiate the reelection of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the event of a crisis.

In addition to an age qualification, other mandatory requirements of a president must also be strictly laid down: For instance, as in the United States, he must without fail be born on USSR territory, not change his citizenship, not have a criminal record, pass a physical fitness test, fulfill his presidential functions, and be married only to a USSR citizen.
[Signed] Yu. Komarov, Tuva ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]

My stance is that presidential rule is necessary. But it would be good "to hasten slowly " when discussing his status. In my view, the equilibrium in the emerging balanced triad of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial—may be tipped in favor of the executive with the introduction of the presidency.

I would stress that we are establishing a highly important state post not "to suit the man" but "to suit" criteria of democratic socialism. Therefore we must proceed on the premise that the presidential post with its vast powers and potential will be extremely tempting to "candidates" from those social groups which have clearly come to light of late. I am referring to representatives of the shadow economy and also to the newfound nouveaux riches who have legalized or increased their capital via the cooperatives. The story of the "ANT" cooperative attests that they can influence the top echelons of state executive power. Moreover, in a multiparty system these social groups will naturally become overtly politicized, entering the power struggle. These factors must be taken into consideration not only when establishing the status of a candidate for president but also—and this is rather more important—when determining the reasons why the president may be removed from his post. The wording of the draft law "if he violates the USSR Constitution" is rather bland. It must be spelled out by formulating a clear procedure for removing the president, similar to "impeachment" in the United States.
[Signed] O. Yegorov, Leningrad

Yeltsin, Presidency, No 'Competitor' to Gorbachev

PM0703115490

[Editorial Report] London ITV Television Network in English at 1900 GMT on 5 March carries interviews with CPSU Central Committee member Nikolay Shishlin and OGONEK Editor Vitaliy Korotich during a video report from the Soviet Union. Following Smith's comments on USSR People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin's victory at the polls, Korotich says of Yeltsin: "He'll be president of Russia, I think, but Yeltsin's role as the pretendent ("pretendent" is a Russian word meaning aspirant to or candidate for) of the first position in the country is unrealistic. I think he's not a real competitor to Gorbachev. From another point, he's very important because so-called simple people identify themselves with Yeltsin."

Shishlin tells Smith that "Boris isn't the best candidate, in my opinion, but let people make their own choice." Smith asks him: "Do you think Yeltsin will be a threat to the president?" Shishlin answers: "I think not, I think not. He's not a bright person: He's a popular person, but he's not bright."

On the nationalist movement in the Ukraine, Korotich tells Smith: "The real movement for independence: It will be possible to discuss it in Ukraine only in the middle of nineties, because now Ukraine is full of fear. Ukraine is full of fear because all Ukrainian experience is punishment: It was punishments, it was executions, it was really terrible years."

Smith comments: "In the view of his advisers, this summer's congress represents the last opportunity for the party to catch up and Mr. Gorbachev's new-style presidency his last chance." Shishlin tells Smith: "I think that the party congress will prove that the party can act, can think, and the party has enough influence to act. But the party mustn't wait, otherwise it will lose."

Army General Margenov Dies

LD0703095990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1745 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 6 March (TASS)—Army General Vasiliy Margenov, a prominent Soviet military commander, an active participant in the Great Patriotic War, a USSR state prizewinner and a Hero of the Soviet Union, died suddenly at the age of 82 on 4 March. He devoted all his conscious life to the selfless service of the socialist motherland and to the cause of the Communist Party, of which he was a member from 1929 onwards.

From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was on active service in the army. He commanded a regiment and a division. He fought on the Leningrad, Northwestern, Stalingrad, Southern, and the 4th and 3d Ukrainian Fronts. In the difficult conditions of the combat situation, he displayed firmness, personal courage, and fearlessness.

In the postwar period, he was a commander of airborne-assault troops, doing a great deal of work to supply them with modern equipment, weapons, and airborne-assault means. From 1979, he was a military inspector and adviser to a group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

For his services, Vasiliy Margelov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and was decorated with four Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov (second grade), and many other orders and medals. He was presented with a number of awards from socialist countries.

The obituary, signed by party and state leaders and by prominent military commanders, says that the bright memory of Vasiliy Margelov will always be preserved in our hearts.

Ligachev Comments on Veterans, Komsomol

90UN0777A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 5 29 Jan-4 Feb 90 pp 2-4

[Interview with Ye.K. Ligachev, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of CPSU Central Committee, by N. Kuznetsova: "An Atmosphere of Creativity Is Necessary"; place, date not given]

[Text] [Kuznetsova] The First and Second Congresses of People's Deputies and the two sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet discussed with passion and involvement the issues of increasing the pensions of veterans—representatives of the generation that went through the crucible of the Great Patriotic War and brought victory, which restored the country in a short period of time, and which still went through the trials of many so-called social experiments and through repressive regimes. As we know, a decision has been made to increase the minimum amount of pensions for individual categories of citizens. The draft law on pensions has been presented for nationwide discussion. But the veterans are disturbed by something else—that their social, professional, and spiritual potential is far from being fully utilized.

What role do you assign to veterans in the country's social life?

[Ligachev] First I would like to tell you my attitude toward those heated discussions about our history. It seems to me that this pertains directly to the destiny of the veterans and the way they feel about themselves. It is obvious that in the life of one society or another and of humankind as a whole there are periods when history becomes the center of the present, when it is an especially important character in the social arena. I think that we are experiencing precisely such a period now.

There was a time when we wrote about our history too simple-mindedly and frequently in rosy colors. This was incomplete and to a certain degree unreliable and it did not elicit the confidence of those who were participants and also victims of certain historical periods and cataclysms.

But it is very disturbing that frequently the "blank spots" of our past look like "black holes." Such a one-sided approach to history causes a great deal of harm to the society, particularly the youth.

The experience of nations shows that when things become difficult for them they begin to call upon the history of their forebears for help. Such was the case for us during the years of the Great October Revolution and at other critical moments in our life. Unfortunately we were unable to take the patriotic, heroic pages of our past—which also included tragedy—as allies in the complicated matter of overcoming our political and economic difficulties; during the period of perestroyka we were unable to place these pages in the service of social change. I am convinced we lost a great deal because of this.

Lenin had this idea: In order to evaluate historical figures correctly, one must look not at what they gave us in comparison to modern demands but at what they gave us in comparison to their predecessors. Of course one must not forget about the means with which this was done.

If we look at our history from this position we shall see that the country has traveled a colossal path and has managed to become a truly great power which has immense influence in the international arena. And all this is during the life time of one generation.

Significant problems of all human civilization could not be solved without our country's participation. Therefore I think that (with all of its distortions and deviations) socialism has released humankind from exploitation and oppression and has saved humankind from fascism. And we began the ascent to socialism from an extremely low level. God forbid that we forget this. I would even say that it was our state that prevented more world wars. We have gone 45 years without a war—this is to the credit of our country, of all generations; including the older ones, our veterans—of the party, war, and labor. And no price can be placed on this.

[Kuznetsova] Some include these people in the passive part of the society. Of course many of them are physically exhausted: They have spent days at the machine for meager military wages, they have spent months in trenches with bullets flying overhead... But what is a former soldier who has gone through the entire war to think today when he reads that he has defended not his people, not his homeland, but the Stalinist totalitarian system? One veteran wrote to our editorial office: Do not nullify our past, do not re-open our wounds, let us die in peace....

[Ligachev] I can understand the feelings of insulted dignity of the people of older generations caused by a distortion of history. And one feels a bitter compassion that this is done without pain, even with a certain malice, without empathy for those who against their will were cast into various kinds of social distortions and tragedies. For, unfortunately, we have not revealed the true face of bourgeois reality. World wars, fascism, unemployment, homelessness, crime, drug addiction, and many other things have been brought to mankind by capitalism. Of course we all understand that there is much in the capitalist society on the economic, scientific-technical, and technological plane that we should adopt. But I should like to draw attention to attempts to idealize capitalism and categorically rise up against the efforts of certain people to erase our past, present, and hence our future.

[Kuznetsova] A couple of days ago the editorial office received a letter from Novgorod from a veteran of the party, war, and labor, A. Tulin, concerning an article by the American commentator Michael Davidow, "I Would Not Wish You the Knout." "He opened my eyes to all the events in our country and in the United States," it says in the letter. I shall explain: M. Davidow, reflecting on the destinies of socialism and capitalism, is protesting against the "need" to restore the knout of fear here, the knout of unemployment, the knout of social defenselessness.

It is possible that this may be refuted but I shall say that the veterans have every reason to be proud of what they have done. I am convinced that the foundation of perestroyka is our mighty country itself with its gigantic economic and intellectual potential and our party with its heroic and glorious although tragic history.

The poet Rasul Gamzatov expressed this idea: Those who shoot at the past with a pistol the future will shoot at with a machine gun.

Answering the question you raised at the very beginning, I wish to say that in spite of their age the veterans have a certain special spiritual energy. I have been convinced of this repeatedly during my trips throughout the country. When I met with the veterans in Kirghizia (in keeping with national custom, over a cup of tea in a teahouse) I understood once again: They are not only concerned about all that is taking place but are also doing everything possible to make life better. And in general we had a remarkable meeting and a frank conversation. I can tell you that in the City of Frunze they built a wonderful teahouse of veterans; it is a kind of club where they can gather.

[Kuznetsova] Having worked for almost two years at the weekly I somehow came to understand more clearly that veterans and youth are something inseparable in the chain of generations. Recently (again I am referring to fresh mail) G. Kuchuk from Volnovakhi in Donetsk Oblast sent us a cartoon from a magazine. Some beast-like person against the background of a portrait of Beria responds to a question apparently from his grandson: "Grandpa, how many enemies did you kill with this pistol?" He answers: "Now they have started counting..." Perhaps the cartoonist did not want to generalize at all but our reader sees in this a lack of respect for all veterans who have lived an honorable life who are placed side by side with Beria's hatchet men. The worldly person also sees in this an attempt to drive a wedge into relations between generations, "introducing a certain dose of poison into the souls of the young."

Here is another collective letter from Birobidzhan in Khabarovsky Kray signed by A. Umanskiy, et al. (Incidentally, it was printed in VETERAN under the title "Until the Disaster Comes".) It is about the fact that the nihilism that exists in the society, penetrating into the hearts of the young, leads to a situation where some of them are even using fascist symbols.

What do you and your colleagues in the Politburo think about that?

[Ligachev] This concern on the part of veterans for the attitudes of youth is also being conveyed to us. Understandably, these negative phenomena are no accident: They bear the stamp of life itself—particularly the time of stagnant phenomena and, of course, that stream of disclosures "from and to." Populists wanting applause will resort to anything to get an audience and it makes no difference whether it is in the press or on the street. Try to speak from the podium today about production, about organization of labor—they might listen to you out of politeness or they might "drown you out with clapping." But if a speaker engages in "criticism," especially of the center, then there is applause and approval. Alas, these attitudes exist in the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] as well.

[Kuznetsova] As statistics show, the Komsomol is experiencing a period of "ebbing"—some people are leaving its ranks. Today it is no longer the same organization that led the youth during the prewar, war, and postwar years. And in the sixties and seventies there was even a formula defining the tendency of "short circuit," that is the movement of current through a closed chain of a certain elite part of the union: meetings, guidelines, greetings—this is where the energy of the leaders went. And all the while young souls were left to their own devices.

[Ligachev] Unfortunately, even now work with youth is not always in the foreground. Many Komsomol workers are more absorbed by questions of reforming the Komsomol. Of course, like the rest of the society, the Komsomol needs to be renewed. But as I understand it this is not a goal in itself.

Action—this is the main thing. From my own personal work experience I know that if youth do not have any specific jobs, even if they are small ones, then one cannot really count on having one or another Komsomol organization be effective and influential.

We were reared on labor and patriotism. This is why I think the main thing is to attract youth with work and socially useful activity. I am against grumbling: The youth have not turned out right, they say. It seems to me that unless we return the honor and glory to work in the society there will be no perestroyka. Success will be achieved not by words and not by phrases (even if they be loud ones) but by actions, deeds. Of course this does not pertain just to youth. We need very much to have an atmosphere of creativity. For you will agree that we can distribute only that which has been created and accomplished.

It is no accident that at the recent All-Union conference of representatives of the working class, the peasantry, and engineering and technical personnel in the Kremlin, they emphasized the need to increase work and raise the prestige of labor.

Years will pass and we will be asked what we did during perestroyka. Some people will not be able to remember anything except speculations about difficulties, all kinds of meetings, demonstrations, and strikes. And yet the time will come when they will ask.

I should like to express my chagrin about something else as well: Many political figures, writers, artists, and outstanding workers and peasants, whose fate in itself is a school of life, have left the youth audience. In the name of our future (and today's 15- and 17-year-olds are our tomorrow) we must do everything possible so that wise adults return to the Komsomol audience. And regardless of how difficult it may be for some people, they must go there.

In recent years I have visited many oblasts and republics and I have seen that the monologue is coming to an end, and we need dialogue. And what kind of dialogue! Direct, honest, and open. But everyone is insisting on his own personal point of view. If someone tries to fuss—he loses people's confidence in a moment.

[Kuznetsova] Yegor Kuzmich, in our society there is free dialogue with all segments of the society. An example of this is the student forum at which delegates from all regions were not simply listeners but active participants in the discussions. There they also discussed the possible contribution of youth to the process of creation and that this could have an appreciable affect on perestroyka.

After all, you yourself were at this forum and worked in a section.

[Ligachev] This reminds me of the student construction detachments. I devoted much energy to this when I was working in Tomsk as first secretary of the CPSU obkom. The students did a lot of good. I think that the person who created the first student construction society, the first detachment, should have a monument raised to him while he is still living and the entire country should say thank you.

[Kuznetsova] If my memory does not deceive me this detachment began at Leningrad University at the beginning of the fifties.

[Ligachev] In recent years millions have been included in this movement.

[Kuznetsova] So you are in favor of the construction detachments. Does it not seem to you that the students, say, of artistic VUZ's [higher educational institutions] could work on restoring the monuments of history and architecture, the railroad students could work as conductors, and the pedagogical students could work as educators in boarding schools for orphans... Incidentally, this kind of practice exists.

[Ligachev] That is right. But I still prefer construction detachments. The fact that students are working side by side with laborers and solving large economic problems means a lot for the development of the individual. Moreover they have the opportunity to see the country. I know that many of them would be glad to go to Siberia and the Far East where remarkable people live. As Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovskiy wrote about them, they are "collective but selective."

[Kuznetsova] One of the directions of the Komsomol movement could be charity. For there are plenty of people who are alone and sick and old and also people who were disabled in the Great Patriotic War.

[Ligachev] I agree. This is very necessary. Of course the youth will respond. Remember the Timurov movement when the pioneers took care of families of Red Army soldiers and then soldiers on the front line and those who died. Thus the Timurov movement is an unturned page in our history.

[Kuznetsova] I should like to hear your opinion about a crucial issue. That is the events that are developing so rapidly in the countries of East Europe. It is clear to everyone that there is the question of reunification of the German nation. But will this not lead to a revision of the results of World War II? From the press we know that in the FRG, for example, revisionist forces are raising their heads and they want to change the border along the Oder-Neisse. Veterans are disturbed, particularly by the fact that these processes are becoming unpredictable. Does this turn of events not threaten what our country has finally accumulated because of the new political thinking on the international plane—nuclear disarmament, economic and cultural ties with the West, and conversion? As the writer Aleksandr Prokhanov noted, "the political map of Europe is changing its color and configuration, and the skeletons of Russian infantrymen are rattling in their unmarked graves." And what can we say about the living...

[Ligachev] Let us believe in the best.

I wish to touch upon the essence of the problem. The changes in East Europe are the result of internal development and external influence. The situation here is contradictory and complicated. It is different in each country. Along with the desire to renew socialism and restructure the communist party, in certain countries they are breaking down socialism and the communist parties are forfeiting their role as the leading parties. In Europe there are forces that are in favor of revising the results of World War II and reunifying Germany immediately. We must not forget that world wars have started here twice already. The existence of two German states is a factor in the stability on the European continent.

We should recall the conclusion of the 19th All-Union Party Conference to the effect that international relations are not losing their class character and at the same time are becoming more like relations among nations. We know that we have many friends in the world who sincerely wish for the success of the perestroyka policy. But there are also reactionary forces who invest perestroyka with different content: capitalization of the society. An American newspaper recently, in January, published an article which answers the question of whether or not the USSR should be assisted in perestroyka. If by the success of perestroyka we mean the creation of a communist system which will be economically effective and politically democratic, writes the newspaper, the answer should be negative. Aid from the West, in the opinion of the newspaper, should be directed toward the development of structures in the private sector that function according to market principles so as to contribute to economic and, later, political pluralism.

[Kuznetsova] Now I should like to ask you about the party. Now people are writing, arguing, and saying a lot about it everywhere. We know of the kinds of debates going on about Article 6 of the Constitution and what is happening in Lithuania. What is the matter? After all, party ideals are the most humane and the purest (equality, liberty, fraternity), and the perestroyka initiated by the party is in progress. It is proceeding with difficulty, but who expected that it would be easy? Only the naive. So where does this tendency to separatism come from? I do not want to use the word "schism" but that is actually what it is.

I saw all the television showing M.S. Gorbachev and his comrades in Lithuania. I saw many familiar faces at the meeting with the creative intelligentsia. Including the national writer of Lithuania Yuozas Baltushis. His novel "A Tale of Yuzas" is a hymn to the Lithuanian national character, strong and pure; it is a prose poem about a peasant worker. But it is also the truth of history. I looked at this man who is, alas, no longer young and I thought sadly: God, how did he live through all that—for not long before that I had read in LITERATURKA that at a meeting some people had called for having his books burned. It reminds us of certain events from history, does it not? They say that you cannot buy his books in the stores. Yet you can find them in every Lithuanian home.

Incidentally his two-volume autobiographical work and the documents of the seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet first term (1-7 August 1940) coincide surprisingly in terms of content and they show that the Lithuanian peasant was done in and his native language was essentially forbidden as a literary language; only peasants spoke it.

On those days I could not get this idea out of my head: Do our Lithuanian compatriots really not know that manuscripts are not being burnt? Do the Lithuanian leaders and representatives of the intelligentsia not know that the flourishing of culture in the republic coincides precisely with the period of the sixties to the eighties?

[Ligachev] And what positions does Baltushis hold now?

[Kuznetsova] He is a real and not a pro forma internationalist, a communist, and a great artist. I asked him on the telephone just before the combined plenum: "So, are you and I now in different parties?" He sighed sadly and responded: "We are in the same one. And I believe in the wisdom of my people."

[Ligachev] You have touched upon the very core of what is happening in the society. Popularization is a very dangerous thing. The most important thing now is unity of the party, ideological and organizational reinforcement of the party ranks, and ties between it and the social organizations, social movements, and the masses. I know and I am convinced that the majority of communists through faith and truth serve our common cause, overcoming political and economic difficulties. But now there are not only individual communists but whole groups of them who are participating in anti-socialist, nationalist, separatist organizations and even head them.

[Kuznetsova] They are probably the same ones who entered the party when it was advantageous, as V.G. Rasputin said at the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

[Ligachev] And now it is advantageous for them, their party card in their pockets, to engage in other business—shaking up the party and, moreover, taking it over from within. I think—and I discussed this at the December (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on Lithuania—that the participation of communists in any kind of anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, nationalist, separatist groups is incompatible with being in the party. A person whose actions contradict the purposes of the party should leave its ranks. Otherwise the party will become a community of people with varying political views. The party is not a discussion club, it is a militant organization which rallies and leads people to great deeds, holding the political initiative in its hands.

But our unity should stand on a democratic basis, on the basis of all-round development of democracy within the party, on the basis of Lenin's understanding of democratic centralism which takes into account the opinions of all communists, where broad discussion and free exchange of opinions when developing decisions are a mandatory norm. The opinions of the minority should also be taken into account. But under one condition: that the decisions are carried out by all communists. That is my position regarding this issue.

[Kuznetsova] In the work of the party committee, like that of the entire organization, a very great deal depends on the first secretary. But people frequently refer to the idea that a secretary is very frequently promoted to first secretary, that is, one apparatus worker replaces another and there is no new blood.

[Ligachev] Indeed, a very, very great deal depends on the first secretary. He should be a real personality. Of course, he does not have to be from among the party and soviet workers. There can be no common standard here. But a first secretary is not made in an hour. He must be trained. Before becoming the first secretary he must have been a worker or an engineer, a scholar or an economist, he must gain experience in the labor collective, and he must go through the stages of gaining experience in life and the society. And I think everyone will agree that political activity requires knowledge and experience, especially in our time when it is necessary to master information we could have done without even two or three years ago. It is necessary to have a clear position and to be able to explain it and to be a man of high culture. He must not be afraid of any audience—he simply must prepare well for meeting them. And if something does not turn out he must not despair but go back to the people and persuade them.

But again I wish to emphasize that the most important thing in affairs within the party is expansion of the rights and opportunities of communists and local organizations which could really influence party policy and the activity of the organs it elects. We must help every communist to be a political militant.

Perestroyka is going on in the party. Recently the Politburo considered the draft of the platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress. As was reported, this document will be brought up for consideration at the next Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which will be held on 5-6 February.

[Kuznetsova] Yegor Kuzmich, I should like to return again to our veterans and the question I raised to you at the very beginning: What role do you assign to this detachment of 58 million in life and in perestroyka? A veteran M. Shevchenko from the City of Osh in the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] wrote to our weekly (this letter was published) that "...as soon as a person reaches pension age he is removed from the collective. And not only from the collective but he is also pushed out of the party organization." That is, when a veteran becomes independent because under the most unfavorable circumstances he will always have something to eat, he will have his pension —then he becomes unnecessary and his experience is not needed.

[Ligachev] This is an eternal problem: The interests of the old and the young come into conflict in the process of life. We must look for solutions. We have made progress. We are now solving the problem of allowing everyone who is on a pension to work without establishing maximum earnings. This is important. This will lead to a situation where millions of people will again be engaged in socially useful labor, instead of playing dominoes in the squares.

In your questions I see one very important thing—personal yards and garden and orchard plots. I should like to speak through the weekly to congratulate all the veterans for their participation in the work in the gardens. What are we talking about?

Everyone understands how important the food issue is. Some people say that the food problem is at an impasse, that our agriculture has been destroyed. I think they say this either out of delusion or out of malicious intent. Here are the facts. Under the current five-year plan there has been a constant increase in food resources by an average of two to three percent per year. But the monetary mass is increasing many times more rapidly. During 1988-1989 the growth of incomes amounted to R110 billion. This is more than during the preceding eight years. Incomes have not increased so rapidly in the past—by R10 billion-R12 billion a year and this was basically covered by commodities.

On the other hand, food production is still increasing slowly. The reasons are the great inflexibility of the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], the slow introduction of economic accountability, the low level of technical equipment, and the low level of social amenities for the peasants.

We are discussing forms of ownership. This is indeed a vital problem. But if a person does not have the proper technical equipment and is not socially provided for, then one cannot expect good results.

What has actually happened? The Soviet peasant is now set up the way the American farmer was in the fifties. That is, we are lagging behind by 30 years. Incidentally, during the fifties the American farmers were producing about as much as we are now. In recent years our grain yield has been 18 quintals per hectare while the American farmer at that time received 17 quintals and received 2,600 liters of milk per cow while our kolkhoz worker now receives 2,850.

This means, moreover, that in order to have progressive forms of ownership, the peasant must have the basic technical equipment and his life must be improved. It is generally known that what is good for the farmer is good for the country. Unfortunately, we did not perceive this truth on time. True, there were also objective reasons for this. Much was done at the expense of the rural areas:

Industry was created and the country was restored. At the same time the peasantry frequently experienced force and command methods.

It will take years for us to provide the country with plenty of food in the necessary assortment. We shall not be able to do this unless we turn our material and technical and financial resources in the direction of rural areas.

Further. Losses: We are losing as much as we are buying. For hard currency. So we can have an advanced form of ownership and the most conscientious workers but if we do not reduce losses in the very near future we shall not have an abundance of food. A paradox: The more we produce, the more we lose. An especially large amount is lost during transportation and processing and also in trade. One can say that we are now creating modern storage bases and the food industry from the ground up. The defense industry will help in this.

There are long-term ways of solving the food problem. But there is also a shorter path—the development of the personal garden (family farms). These can give us an additional yield today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow. We welcome this fully. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes produce 75 percent of the products and the personal gardens, which take up three to four percent of the plowed land—24 percent. What is going on here? The family farms are integrated with the kolkhozes and sovkhozes—they are a part of the socialist sector of the economy. They receive from the farms young animals, seeds, feed, and help in cultivating the land.

One must keep in mind that the peasant receives 20-40 percent of his overall income from the family farm.

Unnecessary restrictions have been removed from the private sector. We think that veterans (and not only they) and everyone engaged in private farming should be allotted as much land as they can use—they can have a hectare or more if they wish. Let them have five or six cows if they can enlist young people in the work. I met a veteran like this in Kaluga Oblast—things are going well for him. We must give these people seeds and feed, but only of the highest quality so that the private farm is run on a modern level. And everything must be done to give them the opportunity to sell their products in the region. To this end procurement-processing enterprises are being created in the large villages and rayon centers.

[Kuznetsova] This is the problem of problems. I know the Vologda area well and I have repeatedly heard from veterans that during the time it takes to sell a steer or sheep they lose 5-10 kg of weight.

[Ligachev] This must not be allowed. Moreover, small-scale technical equipment is needed on the farms.

[Kuznetsova] Will it be produced as a result of conversion?

[Ligachev] Yes. Both minitractors and power units for subsidiary farms. During the past four years we have done less than is planned for 1990. For we have no minitractors at all while in the United States there are millions.

[Kuznetsova] What are the prospects here?

[Ligachev] The country is developing the production of small equipment for agriculture. This year we expect to produce 307,000 minitractors and power units. Now everybody is trying to buy a car. I have nothing against cars—they are fast and convenient. But, unlike a car, a minitractor contributes to the production of another product—food. This should be encouraged.

[Kuznetsova] Yegor Kuzmich, what do you think about procurement prices? Do you know how much one kg of carrots costs in the stores.

[Ligachev] I do.

[Kuznetsova] So you can see that it is not advantageous to raise them.

[Ligachev] I know that it is disadvantageous for many farms to produce potatoes as well. And they cost a ruble per kg on the market. And this price is fantastic. Here the city dweller is hurt. This means there is one way out: to bring wholesale and procurement prices in line with one another. And retail prices as well. But wholesale and procurement first of all, beginning already in 1991. And through prices we can encourage the labor of the peasants. In addition to this we should give agriculture grants, subsidies, and credit.

[Kuznetsova] Will we be able to feed the country even in the next few years?

[Ligachev] I think we shall make significant improvement in the production of food. But all the demands are not yet satisfied. The situation must be assessed realistically. Illusions are inappropriate here. Immense material-technical resources and financial expenditures are needed here. I repeat, we must bring the social amenities of the peasants closer to those of the city dwellers. Here are some figures: The provision of apartments in the cities is close to 90 percent and in rural areas—12 percent. A person works on a farm for 7-10 hours a day. He comes home and before lighting the fire and fixing something to eat he has to go out and cut some wood and then chop it.

I want to repeat: There can be no good society in which the peasant is living poorly.

[Kuznetsova] This question might not fit into our conversation: What is your attitude toward a possible monetary reform?

[Ligachev] The one proposed by the trade unions? I support it. Exchanging R10,000-R15,000 one to one, if it is more, be so kind as to document your income or exchange it at 10:1, and the rest you must turn over. As you wish.

[Kuznetsova] The reform will indeed separate the honest person from the dishonest one. When you hear about the billions they have in the shadow economy it seems terrible—for these people today are grabbing for power or else subsidizing those who are grabbing for it. One can easily imagine how it will all end...

I think that if we had a referendum the reform would pass. It seems to me that it does not work to confine the solutions to some problems to the framework of the Congress of People's Deputies or the session of the Supreme Soviet. Frequently the people do not think that way, certain chosen ones who hog the microphones say they do.

[Ligachev] Yes, we must constantly be aware of the mood of the people and base our actions on their opinion.

[Kuznetsova] In which group do you include yourself—conservatives or radicals?

[Ligachev] I always have been and still am a realist. Conservatives are those who are trying to lead the country on a capitalist path of development. Russia has already had capitalism and we know what it did for the people.

[Kuznetsova] I should like to ask, Yegor Kuzmich, what helped you to stand up and not break down during the period when monstrous accusations were hurled at you from the investigators?

[Ligachev] I felt and still do feel confident, I knew and I still know that this was vicious slander. Somebody needed it for political purposes. Who? I am receiving many letters from throughout the country. Including from veterans and youth. These letters are very valuable to me. I would like to sincerely thank those who supported me during such a difficult time. These letters are profoundly human documents. In them the people write that glasnost and the direct television broadcasts of the congresses and sessions have helped them to understand who is who.

[Kuznetsova] Departure from the principles of glasnost sometimes leads to unpredictable results. One time the Central Committee failed to make public the stenographic report of the October (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. There were discussions and interviews... Public opinion developed in spite of the truth contained in the stenographic report published subsequently. B.N. Yeltsin was presented to us as a suffering figure, persecuted by the apparatus. And a Russian person is always responsive, ready for compassion. I voted for him in the elections. But his subsequent behavior... I am no doctor and will not pass judgment on his condition shown in the videotape received from the United States. I am disturbed and offended by the essence of what he said: How can one be so unaware of the nature of our people as to regard them as having taken only the "Short Course" in the history of our country and unfamiliar with either the history or the culture of the United States... For even during the time of stagnation there were books by Faulkner, Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Steinbeck, M. Mitchell, and O'Henry... And they were and still are our spiritual wealth. Why apply his own "personal" experience to the rest of the country? It is offensive to the state!

[Ligachev] I have already expressed my position about a number of crucial problems, so that my position is clear and definite.

[Kuznetsova] In one letter to you I read: You are a courageous man, not a careerist. This is shown by the fact that you married the daughter of a victim of repression. This is an interesting assessment, is it not?

[Ligachev] When the accusations were cast down on me last year my wife was dangerously ill... One problem will not go away. During those days I became acquainted with the "case" of my wife's father. He was involved in the affair of the Tukhachevskiy group and was executed in 1937. That was the way the fate of the former Red Army soldier, a Soviet commander, developed. He was fully rehabilitated after the 20th CPSU Congress, in 1957.

The good name of their husband and father having been restored, his wife, two daughters, and son entered the party. The head of the family had been executed but the members of the family became communists.

[Kuznetsova] Our belief in ideals has been immense. Both of my grandfathers were executed without a trial or investigation and my father was expelled from the Komsomol and from an educational institution two months before completion because of his social origin. But he has always educated me in the ideals which I profess to this day. When I entered the party it seemed that I had gone through purgatory.

But I think we should raise the moral plane of the party.

Yegor Kuzmich, I have one more question: What do you read?

[Ligachev] I just finished the book "The Great Year of Russia" and I am reading the "Articles and Letters" of the Russian thinker P.Ya. Chaadayev. In the Central Academic Theater of the Soviet Army I saw a new production of "Paul I." I liked Oleg Borisov in the leading role very much—a brilliant performance.

[Kuznetsova] What would you like to wish our veteran readers?

[Ligachev] Health, satisfaction in life, and success to all veterans. Happiness to families, children, and grandchildren. To your collective—an interesting and intelligent newspaper. I believe deeply in our people. I think we shall be able to cope with the difficulties that arise during the process of perestroyka.

[Kuznetsova] Thank you

Economic

Regional Factors Behind Consumer Shortages Viewed

904A0204A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 7, Feb 90 pp 4-5

[Article by Ye. Sosnin: "A 'Hot' Market"]

[Text] As PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK has already reported, on 27 January a meeting of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers with the participation of the leadership of the Councils of Ministers of the union republics, chairmen of a number of kray and oblast executive committees, as well as the Moscow and Leningrad City Soviets, was held to consider the issue of urgent measures aimed at reinvigorating the consumer market and ways to normalize monetary circulation. We are publishing notes from this meeting.

A Difficult Time of Changes

Hardly anyone found the data of the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] on the condition of the consumer market last year encouraging. The consumer market was literally beaten down by all the woes of our economy in crisis. Despite the measures taken, store shelves are becoming more barren by the day. According to data of the VNIIKS [All-Union Research Institute for the Study of Population Demand for Consumer Goods and Retail Trade Trends] of the USSR Ministry of Trade, out of the 275 kinds of cultural and consumer goods monitored in 1988, trade in 38 was basically undisrupted. By the end of last year, this figure was only 10. At present, even pots, buckets, tableware, electric stoves, and tea sets are considered to be in short supply.

The scope of demand which is not met is alarming. In 1988 it amounted to 142 billion rubles [R]; by now, it has increased by another R23 billion. Why? This is mainly explained by incomes of the populace growing considerably faster than the production of goods. Moreover, the trade sector failed to receive consumer goods worth R13.5 billion, including R9 billion in the non-food group.

An abrupt decline in the resources of common merchandise brings about the spread of rationing. It is hard to admit but it is still a fact. In many cities, ration cards for some foodstuffs, sugar, soap, and detergents have become the norm.

Recently panic buying has picked up. The populace has been trying immediately to invest available money in goods. In the process, as sample studies show, some families have "stocked up" on, for example, six-eight months worth of soap and detergents.

As is known, the government has made the stabilization of consumer demand and monetary circulation one of the main components of the program of reinvigorating the economy. Our life has shown that the choice of this priority was correct. To this end, it is planned immediately to implement a set of major measures of a structural and investment nature aimed at a radical improvement in the state of affairs in the social sphere and at meeting the urgent needs of the people.

The choice has been made. Last year became a crucial one to a certain degree because social orientation became clearly apparent. The rate of increase in the production of consumer items exceeded that in producing the means of production. However, these are the first and quite timid steps.

Problems Remain

If we analyze recent operations of the government we can see quite clearly the efforts which have been made in order to stabilize the consumer market. Without exaggerating much, at present this is the focal point of government activities.

What was the result of these steps? As is known, the volume of sales of consumer goods increased by R30 billion last year, or by seven percent compared to the 1988 level. In the process, the enterprises of defense industries achieved an 11-percent increment in the goods of this group. No such growth rates were achieved in previous years. However, enthusiasm is not in order because much of what was planned still was not accomplished.

Last year, state orders for the production of many types of goods were not filled. Thus, deliveries of TV sets fell short by 420,000, radio sets by 740,000, washing machines by 353,000, and furniture by R294 million. Quotas were not met for goods such as refrigerators, sewing machines, and electric vacuum cleaners.

To be sure, there are particular reasons in every specific case. In some instances, capacities were not freed up on time, and subcontractors failed producers. We cannot disregard the abrupt decline of production and technological discipline. At the meeting of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, the situation associated with the worsening performance of some union republics and a number of sectors of the national economy, especially transportation, was discussed.

The chairman of the Perm Oblast Executive Committee, V.A. Petrov, noted in his presentation: "The situation is quite complicated. Given this, the authorities should exercise their powers and functions resolutely and precisely. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily done..."

It is difficult to disagree with this point of view. At present, this lack of control in the consumer market is seen quite clearly. Taking advantage of the lack of control, some enterprises, so to speak, pull "stunts" which make the buyers literally moan. Judge for yourselves. The share of expensive products at the enterprises of the Ministry of Light Industry of Belorusssia came to 48 percent due to changes in production lines, and at the enterprises of the Ministry of the Local Industry—to 41 percent. The production of goods at contract prices at union-run enterprises in the republic increased by a factor of almost two.

Unfortunately such cases are not isolated. In Moscow Oblast the output of goods sold at contract prices increased by 42 percent. At the same time, the supply of light industry products declined by 5.5 percent. According to the data of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Ministry of Trade, in the course of purchasing goods for this year, industry sold ladies' polyester jackets at an average price of R65.4. One year ago, they were R6.4 cheaper. Prices for cotton sports shirts, coats for children, and some other products also grew "heavier."

Unjustified increases in consumer goods prices—that is, padding the volume of sales—is a common disease. Sometimes it becomes absurd. For example, the Uralsk Metal Products Plant in the Kazakh SSR managed to increase the value of a skillet by a factor of 1.7. Indeed, the sky is the limit. However, are such innovations going to be any use?

Wasted Opportunities

It hardly needs to be argued that increases in consumer goods under current circumstances are associated in many instances with boosting production capacity. Why? The point is that our economy had a different orientation for a long time. Production mainly existed for the sake of production. Now we have to reorganize virtually on the spot, develop capacities for the production of consumer goods at operating enterprises, and retool defense plants for these purposes. However, new plants also have to be built.

This is also being done, and on a large scale at that. Suffice it to say that dozens of major enterprises producing footwear, clothing, and various consumer goods are under construction in our country.

However, do they always pay due attention to these facilities in the field? Let us look at the facts. In 1989 facilities were not commissioned for the production of 26.5 million knitted products at the garments and knitted wear factory in the city of Staryy Oskol. The Rostov plant "Krasnyy Metallist" failed to meet the deadline for starting up capacities for the production of 1,800 tons of enameled utensils. At the Moscow Knitted Wear Factory, shops producing 2 million units of products annually were not commissioned.

There is no argument: At a moment like this, it is important to commission in a timely manner the facilities which should saturate the market with the products needed. However, how are we to explain this paradox: Quite a few enterprises are not being used anywhere close to their capacity. For example, in the Uzbek SSR the capacity was fully utilized within the periods envisaged only at one factory out of the seven footwear factories commissioned in the last two years, whereas at the rest of the factories capacity utilization ranges between 41 and 90 percent. In the Estonian SSR, the situation is similar. There, the degree of equipment utilization at the enterprises of light industry ranges between 69 and 94 percent. What kind of a statesmanlike approach to business is this?

Why Are Grocery Stores Empty?

As specialists estimate, foodstuffs account for about R40 billion in the overall volume of unsatisfied consumer demand of the populace for goods and services. Is this a little or a lot? Overall, 132 billion rubles worth of them were furnished to retail trade outlets. Therefore, it turns out that this is a lot.

Last year deliveries fell short of the planned levels by 386,000 tons of flour, 269,000 tons of margarine, and almost 2 million tons of vegetables and fruit each. As far as meat products are concerned, their deliveries to retail trade increased only by two percent, and those of dairy products by only one percent.

Of course, as they say, foodstuffs are not a gift of the heavens. The gross product of agriculture increased by only one percent last year compared to the previous year. Definitely these growth rates cannot satisfy us. More efficient operation of the agricultural complex is required. However, in this instance something else is at issue; namely, discipline and responsibility. Last year, the plan for the delivery of meat and meat products to all-union stocks was set at 2,648,000 tons, and 130,000 tons less were delivered. Unfortunately many union republics "contributed" to this. However, how are we to interpret the fact that against the background of failing to fulfill the plan for the deliveries of this product to the all-union stocks, resources for local consumption in Kazakhstan, Belorussia, Estonia, and Moldavia increased by four to 15 percent? In the course of this, those "in arrears" remember to demand that the center additionally supply grain fodder from state stocks. What kind of logic is this?

First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers V.V. Nikitin said in his speech: "We should proceed more resolutely in increasing economic incentives and responsibility for the final results of work. It is time to introduce a mechanism for a mutual correlation between the deliveries of foodstuffs to the union stocks and counterdeliveries of fodder and mineral fertilizer from the union stocks.

Many aspects of the supply of foodstuffs to the populace were discussed at the meeting of the government presidium. Relevant assignments were given to the Council of Ministers State Commission for Foodstuffs and Procurement, the USSR Ministry of Trade, the Central Union of Consumer Societies, and the Councils of Ministers of union republics.

How Are the Disproportions To Be Evened Out?

The detachment of the increase of monetary income from the results of production is a serious problem which was discussed by many speakers at the meeting of the presidium of the Council of Ministers. The following data show how aggravated the situation has become. Last year monetary income of the population increased by 12.9 percent whereas the gross national product in comparable prices increased by a mere three percent, and industrial output by 1.7 percent. If the rate of increase of the monetary income of the populace is compared to that of outlays for the purchases of goods and payments for services, the latter increased 1.4 times faster.

What does all of this mean? The answer is obvious: The economic mechanism does not kick in. The enterprises boost the volume of profits and the fund of economic incentives without an appropriate contribution on quite a few occasions due to imperfections in this mechanism, especially price setting. What is to be done to improve the situation? This is exactly the avenue along which the search for optimal variants in making the increment of remunerations for labor commensurate with the increment of the volume of production proceeded.

Taking into account the fact that in a number of instances procedures for the progressive taxation of the growth of the remuneration fund at enterprises and organizations do not promote their interest in increasing the output of the products which the national economy and the population need, many participants in the meeting came out in favor of making the procedures more precise. The decision was made to closely tie increases in remunerations to increasing the volume of production within the framework of the already codified system of taxation. Such a mechanism has now been found. The principle is like this: The terms of taxation are more liberal for those who ensure high increments of output.

Bypassing the Stores

People attached great hopes for improving the situation in the consumer market to the cooperative movement. In all fairness, we should say that some cooperative members indeed do a lot in this sphere. However, on the whole the situation leaves a lot to be desired. Perhaps the chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, V.T. Saykin, made a very apt remark in this matter at the meeting of the presidium of the Council of Ministers: "There have been many promises, but reality is quite different."

Could it be that this situation is only characteristic of the capital? Not at all. As of the end of 1989, about 115,000 cooperatives operated in the Russian Federation. Last year they produced goods and rendered various services worth R27 billion. This is a lot. It is interesting that the volume increased by a factor of eight compared to 1988. However, the following gives rise to concern. Only one-fifth of the volume of products turned out by the cooperatives is sold directly to the populace; the rest is sold to enterprises and organizations by virtue of contracts.

Approximately similar trends are characteristic of cooperatives in other republics. We should note that this process entails one more negative phenomenon. An intensive conversion of non-cash funds into cash is underway. The profit segment of the cooperatives is allocated primarily for labor remuneration. Last year, cooperatives accounted for one-fifth of the overall increment of the monetary income of the populace. Payments to their members increased by R13 billion whereas the entire volume of products and services amounted to as little as R7 billion. One can imagine what pressure the hot money which ended up with cooperative members puts on the consumer market.

At the meeting of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, the issue was raised sharply of putting the registration of cooperatives in order, or perhaps conducting a repeat registration of cooperatives and introducing licenses so that the executive committees of local soviets would thoroughly verify the justification for setting up the cooperatives. It was proposed to introduce non-cash settlements for payments for the work and services performed by the cooperatives with a view to preventing the unjustified conversion of non-cash funds into cash.

These problems have existed for some time. The finance and planning organs have been looking into them for a long time. Various points of view have clashed many times. However, the issue of putting the financial activities of cooperatives in order is on the agenda, and it should be resolved on the basis of overall national interests. The State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Economic Reform was charged with preparing a proposal for amending the USSR Law "On Cooperatives in the USSR" for the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Ruble Should Get Stronger

How is the money not actually covered by the deliveries of goods to be "bound?" This is not a simple problem. Moreover, this year the plan provides for a seven-percent increment of the monetary income of the populace, including a five-percent increment of wages.

Late last year and early this year, the government developed a number of measures to stabilize monetary circulation. Let us recall that it has been resolved to issue state special-purpose bonds worth R10 billion, and interest rates for long-term deposits have been increased. Auction sales are beginning to develop. However, so far this has not solved the problem in a decisive manner. More resolute steps are called for.

What is the government planning in order to develop new, unconventional channels for spending the monetary income of the populace? It is the expansion of used-goods and commercial trade. The measures include allocating credit for building garden sheds, putting rent payments in order, and expanding the sale of apartments to citizens as their personal property. As specialists calculate, this will make it possible to support the ruble with the deliveries of goods to a considerable degree.

One more idea was aired many times in the course of the meeting. At issue is the widespread practice of selling goods in short supply through enterprises and organizations. In the opinion of many people, this type of relations in distribution is far from perfect and even questionable. Actually, this is how it works out: A shortage brings about a still greater shortage. Under the circumstances, speculation, profiteering, and obtaining unearned profits cannot be ruled out. Specific suggestions were made aimed at normalizing trade and ensuring the purchasing power of the ruble.

What Lies Ahead for Us

This year, it is planned to increase the production of consumer goods by R60 billion taking into account their actual production in 1989. Preparations for solving this significant problem have been underway for a long time. Versions have been considered, as well as the balance of material resources for the planned amounts of production of consumer goods. A specific allocation of material and technical resources to this sphere has been entered in the state plan as a separate line item for the first time.

What is the early performance of the national economic complexes and union republics in implementing this large-scale program of saturating the consumer market with goods? Unfortunately so far some things have not been smooth. Disruptions have occurred even in the course of signing contracts for the delivery of non-food goods. Thus, by mid-January the overall total for 25 industrial ministries, associations, and concerns was R11 billion less than the state order calls for. The situation is particularly unfavorable at the enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry and the USSR Ministry of Communications. The level of contract signing for light-industry products amounted to 89 percent. The plans of enterprises in this branch in the union republics are almost R6 billion, or six percent, smaller than control statistics.

The distribution of production plans among the months of the year continues to be uneven. Thus, January accounts for 8.7 percent of the annual work time whereas the enterprises planned to produce during this month, for example, only between 3.4 and 7.6 percent of the overall volume of production of TV and radio equipment and tape recorders. The same is the case with electric vacuum cleaners, washing machines, and furniture. Meanwhile, such practices bring about reductions in the volume of production and pose the danger of failing to meet annual quotas.

Naturally this situation gives rise to concern. As was stressed at the meeting, serious measures are needed in order to ameliorate the situation soon.

Such measures were worked out in the resolution of the government on urgent measures to normalize the consumer market and monetary circulation and to reinforce the state monitoring of prices. In particular preferences were envisaged for producing the goods of light industry and assortments for children, providing material resources, and drawing above-the-norm stocks into circulation. Avenues for reinforcing the state monitoring of prices were planned. Prices for a number of foodstuffs and manufactured goods are to be stabilized. The practice of setting contract prices is to be restricted. The role of local organs and public organizations is to be augmented with a view to controlling the price policy.

...Returning home from the meeting of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, I visited the country's main department store, GUM. I went through the sales floor. It did not give me any joy. However, I would like to believe that this is a temporary phenomenon.

Joint Venture Bureaucratic Problems Discussed

90UI0406A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[Report on an interview with President of the West German company Heinemann Reiner Roland Lang by A. Lopukhin; date and place not given: "Of Course, Everybody Is in Favor, So Who Is Against?"]

[Text] Reiner Roland Lang, president of the West German company Heinemann, does not only sympathize with perestroyka; he has also invested money in an endeavor born by perestroyka. As they say, he has a vested interest in our economic policy succeeding. However, at present he is very much concerned about the future of an enterprise to which he has devoted his effort and his soul rather than the fate of his capital.

Let me recall that PRAVDA has written twice (7 September 1987 and 22 June 1988) about this energetic, assertive, and fast-thinking businessman. His Schwarzwald company and the Moscow Production Association "S. Ordzhonikidze Machine Tool Plant" created one of the first joint ventures which was named KhOMATEK.

By now, many of the barriers which the above publications referred to have been overcome. KhOMATEK is one of the few joint ventures which are turning out real products from among the more than 1,000 created in our country. KhOMATEK succeeded in turning a profit rather quickly: As soon as last year, it amounted to 3 million rubles [R] a year, and this year an amount three times greater is expected.

It would seem that one could work to his heart's content and develop the undertaking to our mutual benefit. However, R. Lang started the conversation sharply and categorically.

[Lang] There will be no success as long as the management personnel of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Machine Building, the USSR Minstankoprom [Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry], and the Stankoimport [All-Union Association for Machine Tool Imports] continue working as they have been. I have been cooperating with your country for a long time, and actually I am a Soviet entrepreneur; this is why I can state that, after all, I understand the situation which has emerged.

[Lopukhin] What do you think is the main difficulty? Bureaucracy?

[Lang] I do not think that we encounter many insurmountable obstacles here, but there is one major obstacle—I do not see the people whom we can approach for help with solving our problems.

What is the function of managerial echelons? As I see it, managing the economy means coordinating the work of enterprises, helping them solve their problems rather than dictating. Bureaucracy is not the point. To my mind, this notion conceals people who do not want to make any decisions at all. After all, you would not maintain that tens of millions of Soviet people do not work or do not know how to work. They are as diligent or as lazy as West German workers. The worker and the enterprise are not the issue; the divergent interests of the managers and producers are the issue. After all, it is unnatural for the management apparatus not to be interested in the successful work of enterprises which create material wealth for society.

At present, many of the people I meet here swear their loyalty to perestroyka. However, I do understand, for example, people's deputies traveling abroad and saying outloud that the Soviet economy is sliding toward a catastrophe. I experience physical pain when they in the West pick up these panicky and helpless predictions. How can I attract capital and find partners prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union under such circumstances? Who will evaluate the losses inflicted on the country by these ill-considered statements? Indeed, the problems are many, and they are known. However, we will not be able to overcome all the difficulties if all we do is trumpet how bad we are and threaten an apocalypse. We should be proud of Russia; not everything is that bad. To my mind, this is what should be said: Yes, there are many difficulties, but we will overcome them. The main point is to do business. Politicians should protect microeconomics too.

[Lopukhin] Specifically, what obstacles have you encountered?

[Lang] For example, there is an instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers on building an international technology and commerce center for the KhOMATEK joint venture in 1989-90 in the compound of the S. Ordzhonikidze Plant. It will perform many useful functions for the workers of the plant, residents of the city, and business people. However, construction has not yet begun, even the site for the house has not been cleared. No matter where I turn they all evade making a decision. I just fail to understand this. I am no diplomat, I am an entrepreneur responsible for my enterprise and my workers. This is why I must overcome the obstacles I encounter.

For example, in the last three or four months I have approached the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Machine Building on several occasions about, among other things, my suggestion to invest an additional 150 million marks [M] in the USSR. However, there are no decisions; worse yet, there aren't even intelligible responses to my numerous proposals. Is this the lack of time or of interest?

Here is another fact which, to my mind, is impossible to comprehend. Over the last half year, the Stankoimport has failed to pay us M10 million; altogether it owes us as much as M14 million for the equipment and services provided. I was supposed to receive the first M6 million as early as September of last year, and the rest—last month. As a result, the Deutsche Bank is refusing to give me a loan, and this means a noose around my neck... If I take the Stankoimport to court a big scandal will ensue, and then the desire of West German businessmen to cooperate with the Soviet Union will diminish even more. Meanwhile, Deputy General Director of the "Stankoimport" Yu.A. Simonov responded in a phone conversation that he could not help me in any way, that he was not aware of the situation, and that he was about to go on a business trip anyway.

The USSR Minstankoprom is no help either. Is it not clear that the KhOMATEK is an example, a yardstick of success or failure of the joint ventures and international cooperation in general? There will be people in the FRG who would be pleased to see us fail. It looks like the managerial echelons here work only for their own sake. The issues of the enterprise are of no concern to them; this means that the future of perestroyka does not bother them either.

There are numerous problems, big and small, in relations with the partner in our joint venture, the S. Ordzhonikidze Plant. As I see it, the general director is not interested in profits. There are people who do not need either the KhOMATEK or its new, up-to-date technology. It seems that they do not need anything at all. This amazes me because I have been leaving all the profits, to the last pfennig, to the Soviet partner suggesting that it be used to build a residential house for the worker-machine tool builders of the S. Ordzhonikidze Plant, as our contract calls for.

I am beginning to get the impression that, as some people see it, I am a very troublesome person. I believe in the success of perestroyka, and some people find this alone suspect. One might think that they are deliberately testing the strength of my sympathy for perestroyka. Actually, there are people for whom it is advantageous to leave everything as it is. I for one would also prefer to remain in my house rather than live in a Moscow hotel. However, I cannot abandon my endeavor and turn off the path I've taken, and not because I am afraid for the effort and funds invested. I feel responsible for the workers. I am a capitalist, an entrepreneur. However, I believe that the individual should be the focus of everything, and that the way to a more stable and prosperous world lies through the development of international economic cooperation. This is the only way to ensure the survival of civilization. This is my conviction which prompts me to work almost 20 hours a day. This is the reason why I, for example, want to set up a joint venture with the participation of enterprises from the USSR, the FRG, and China.

[Lopukhin] What avenues do you see for overcoming difficulties in the economy?

[Lang] Why did I approach PRAVDA? I believe that the party which has initiated perestroyka should now take responsibility for the economy without waiting for the anarchy of a multi-party system to set in. A strong party which is responsible for the state is necessary for the economic policy to become stable. You should not make the economy excessively ideological. At present, the party should be the one to take care of meeting the material and non- material needs of every person. Among other things, this calls for ensuring the regular, efficient operation of enterprises which need help and protection rather than orders. It is just that the people are needed who make decisions and execute them. Perestroyka cannot be left to its own devices, it needs to be steered. Perhaps, I am putting it too sharply, but now is the time to act.

The KhOMATEK is just one step toward a planned market mechanism. Our joint enterprise should survive in order to confirm that international cooperation is realistic and promising.

Agricultural

TRUD Examines Extent of Food Rationing

18200493 Moscow TRUD in Russian
3 Mar 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "We Live by Ration Cards"]

[Text] I am long used to buying sugar and meat only on coupons. How widespread is this phenomenon? (I. Petrov, Cheboksary)

According to USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] data for December 1989, meat products were sold by coupons in every fifth oblast, animal fats and alcohol products in every sixth, tea in every seventh, and sugar is being sold by coupons practically everywhere.

From the readers' letters department: According to economists' estimates, in some rayons, the actual coupon ration of meat per person is no more than 400 grams per month.

Scientific

Orbital Space Experiments Aboard Mir Continue

LD0703115490 Moscow TASS in English 1152 GMT
7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—TASS special correspondent reports from the flight control centre:

Anatoliy Solovyov's and Aleksander Balandin's work programme included unloading the automatic Progress-M-3 transport craft, which brought new equipment to the orbit. They will also carry out several technological, technical and biological experiments.

In keeping with the piloted complex's maintenance service plan, the crew installed a new set of storage batteries on the station and replaced separate elements in the electric supply system.

The cosmonauts carried out a smelt to obtain gallium arsenide, a special semi-conductor material.

A series of experiments to check the influence of open space on physico-mechanical properties of polymer and composite materials was carried out. The working bloc of the equipment used was installed on the external surface of the Kvant-2 module by the previous crew.

Experiments are being continued to measure and evaluate the levels of ionising cosmic radiation in near-earth space. The obtained data is used to control and forecast the radiological situation on the complex's flight route.

A long-term biological experiment has been started on the Mir complex to study the influence of space flights on the development of a bird organism and its heredity. Used for the purpose is the Incubator-2 equipment, developed jointly by Soviet and Czechoslovak specialists. The experiment will be carried out on a Japanese quail.

Work on the orbit is proceeding in keeping with the approved schedule. The cosmonauts feel well.

Cosmonaut Pronina Profiled, Scheduled for Flight

LD0803055590 Moscow TASS in English 1827 GMT
7 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova]

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Bert Viz from the Netherlands, who monitors the Soviet spaceship Vostok-1 stand-by crews, believes that Irina Pronina will participate in a 1991 space flight to the Soviet space station Mir.

Reporting a carrier rocket September 27, 1983 fire that occurred on the launch of the Soviet spaceship Soyuz T, foreign news organisations asserted that some mysterious "woman cosmonaut, Irina, whose fate is unknown, was a member of the crew which included Vladimir Titov and Gennadiy Strekalov. Titov and Strekalov returned to earth."

Pronina was a stand-by of Svetlana Savitskaya who made her first spaceflight in August 1982. But she was never a member of the Soyuz T crew.

Nobody knew anything about Savitskaya's stand-by all these years, since that was a forbidden topic. At a news conference held after Savitskaya's first flight, the question was asked about that mission. Head of the cosmonauts training centre Georgiy Beregovoi said then: "She is a very nice woman with splendid light hair."

Irina, who will soon turn 37, was born in Moscow. She is a graduate of the Moscow Higher Bauman School.

"I was very disappointed when Yuri Gagarin, the world's first cosmonaut went into space on April 12, but not on 14—my birthday," Irina recalls. "My father's work is linked with space. Once he told me that they were enrolling women for the cosmonauts' group."

When Pronina became a member of the cosmonauts' squad, she had both joys and disappointments. Nevertheless she likes her work and wouldn't change it for anything.

"In the cosmonaut's work anything unexpected may happen, and therefore the flight probability may appear at any time," Irina believes.

"If I am not destined to go to space, I will do my best to see to it that my son Alyushka flies to Mars. He is now three," she said. Irina also has a 12-year old daughter, Tanya.

When Irina was asked whether she was ready to fly to Mars, she was thoughtful for a while and then said: "I think of children, in the first place. Who will take care of them on earth in a way their mother does."

Military

Yazov Addresses Moscow Conference on Conscription

LD0703175190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] A conference of the leading staff of the conscription organs of the military okrugs and the oblasts, kray, and republican military commissariats took place in Moscow today. Colonel General Krivosheyev, the deputy chief of the General Staff of the country's Armed Forces, has reported on the results of the autumn conscription campaign and the tasks for the spring conscription. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member, USSR Minister of Defense Army General Yazov has addressed the conference.

Republic Attempts To Impede Conscription Viewed

LD0703140190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1235 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 March (TASS)—Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, has stated that "actions directed at impeding the spring call-up to the Soviet Army and Navy" have become more frequent in certain regions of the USSR in recent times.

In an interview to TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy, he noted the intensification of anti-Army propaganda "on the part of certain informal organizations."

"They are whipping up an atmosphere of hostility toward the Armed Forces," General Moiseyev said. "They are defaming their past and present, and pinning labels on them that cannot be called anything but blasphemous."

In the opinion of Gen Moiseyev, the methods and means being used to counteract the call-up "are acquiring a more and more unlawful and anti-constitutional character." In attempts to thwart the call-up, the informal associations, in addition to picketing induction centers and engaging in anti-Army agitation, are organizing the badgering of conscripts, attempting physical reprisal against those conscripts who have not given in to pressure, and distributing leaflets.

Gen Moiseyev noted that informal groupings in the Baltic republics have unfolded a campaign to make conscripts hand back their draft registration certificates. The Popular Front of Azerbaijan, the Armenian Liberation Movement, and the informal organizations of Georgia and the Baltic republics are demanding that provision be made for conscripts to undergo service only within the limits of "their own republics" and that national formations be created.

And all this, the general considers, is taking place "with the connivance and even approval of local authorities." Criminal proceedings were instigated last year in all cases of evading the call-up for active military service. However, no one has been convicted in the Baltic and Transcaucasian Republics for such a crime, said the chief of the General Staff.

In the opinion of the general, the anti-Army propaganda "contradicts the fundamental interests of the Soviet people, exerts a destructive influence on its patriotic and internationalist awareness, and does direct damage to the cause of the defense and security" of the Soviet Union. The general remarked that "the need to uncover and nip in the bud actions directed at undermining the Constitution, legality, and defense awareness of the people is obvious."

It is his conviction that the USSR Supreme Soviet must pass a corresponding decision about the fulfillment of the USSR Constitution and the Law on Universal Military Service Obligation. The need to declare the latest call-up decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and demand their fulfillment is evident, the Soviet military leader believes.

"The informal organizations that are boycotting service in the Army must bear responsibility for this under the full severity of the law," Army Gen Mikhail Moiseyev said in conclusion.

Moiseyev Comments on Reduction of Troops

LD1402225590 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1600 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The agreement in principle between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of troops in Central Europe will considerably change the European military scene. According to a timetable, to be negotiated later, the United States and the Soviet Union will withdraw altogether hundreds of thousands of troops from Europe. Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, who is currently visiting Finland, thought the agreement achieved in Ottawa would concern a couple of hundred thousand Soviet troops in East Germany and Poland.

Matti Vaeisaenen reports:

[Vaeisaenen] [passage omitted] When asked in Helsinki about the effects of the agreement, Army Gen Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, referred to the unilateral troop cuts announced by the Soviet Union and said that the Soviet Union would withdraw a couple of hundred thousand soldiers from East Germany and Poland.

Moiseyev does not here include the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia and Hungary because the Soviet Union is directly negotiating with the governments of these countries on their withdrawal. If we assume that the Soviet Union withdraws, according to separate agreements, all its troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as these countries desire, and a couple of hundred thousand men from East Germany and Poland on the basis of the (?TAE) agreement, almost exactly the same figure is reached as the number agreed for the United States in the whole of Europe.

The deployment of conventional armed forces may, however, become a problem for the Soviet Union. As Poland also wants to have direct talks with Moscow on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, only East Germany may remain among the allies as a country of deployment; it has up to now had clearly the largest number of Soviet soldiers on its territory. On the other hand, the negotiations on the reunification of the two Germanys and the position of the future united Germany are already making rapid progress. The question emerges, among others, how to reconcile the presence of Soviet troops, for instance, in the eastern part of a Germany which belongs to NATO or which is neutral.

Baltic Republics

Gorbachev Discusses Independence With Brazauskas

AU0703130190 Paris AFP in English 1233 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 7 (AFP)—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev discussed "independence" proposals for Lithuania in a telephone call with the republic's Communist Party first secretary, Algirdas Brazauskas, INTERFAX, the magazine published by Radio Moscow, said.

It said only that "plans to restore the statute of an independent state" were discussed during the conversation Monday, but did not say what tone had been taken.

It said some members of the Lithuanian Communist Party expressed "concern" over the drive by the Lithuanian independence front, Sajudis, to try to secure a declaration of independence by the Lithuania Parliament as early as next week.

The Lithuanian Communist Party passed a majority vote in December to split with Moscow and to endorse the move towards independence. This caused an internal split in the party, with a small minority still loyal to Moscow.

But the communists still lost out to Sajudis candidates, who won an overwhelming majority in the first round of local parliamentary elections at the end of February.

The second round will take place Saturday, and Sajudis wants the Lithuanian parliament to meet immediately Sunday to vote on a declaration of independence for Lithuania.

This would keep them a step ahead of the vote Tuesday for the country's new post of executive president, which Mr.Gorbachev is certain to win.

The post would give him sweeping new powers, notably that of naming a temporary presidential representative to Soviet republics.

Lithuania is one of the three Baltic states along with Latvia and Estonia that have gone the farthest in testing the limits of autonomy in the Soviet system.

Brazauskas Discusses Independence-Related Problems

LD0703223490 Moscow TASS in English 2149 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius March 8 TASS—By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila: President Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania has pointed to the need to make well-balanced political decisions relating to the sovereignty of this Baltic republic. "If political steps are taken without due account of the actual situation," he said, "they can substantially complicate the life in Lithuania."

In an interview with Lithuanian Television late on Wednesday, Brazauskas spoke about his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev on March 5 to discuss the future of Lithuania, the possible decisions of the newly-elected republican supreme soviet (parliament), many deputies to which do not conceal their desire to press for Lithuanian independence.

The conversation focussed on economic problems, Brazauskas said. Mikhail Gorbachev, he noted, said that if Lithuania proclaimed independence, its economic relations with the Soviet Union will have to be legalized as relations between two independent states, and accounts between them will have to be settled in freely convertible currency.

This would be an extremely difficult task for the republic to accomplish, the Lithuanian leader said, as the republic imports fuel, metallurgical products, transport means and raw materials at prices which are approximately three times lower than world prices.

Brazauskas told viewers that during the meeting other problems came under discussion that require consideration taking into account the emerging situation. He stressed that the newly-elected parliament and the republican government should prepare thoroughly for talks with the USSR leadership.

Commission Develops Lithuanian Independence Plan

LD0703123390 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Today the ad hoc commission to work out a plan for restoring Lithuania's independence held its last meeting in Vilnius. It discussed the principles underlying the restoration of the republic's independence. They define the concept of independence and formulate the stand of the policy, economy, culture, and international relations of the independent state. Lithuania's independence is restored, the document says, by legally confirming the Independence Act of 16 February 1918. The country's independence is effected by taking over total management of its territory, renewing old agreements, and signing new ones with the Soviet Union and other states on reaffirming the international status of the independent Lithuanian state.

The principles worked out by the commission will be submitted to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. The document reportedly says nothing about the need to at least temporarily recognize as acting the last constitution of the Lithuanian Republic, adopted in 1938. Quite a number of MP's, and firstly those backed up by Sajudis, as well as the Sajudis leadership itself, are of the opinion that unless this step is taken, international recognition of independent Lithuania as successor to the rights of the pre-war Lithuanian Republic will be (?encumbered).

Anyway, the ad hoc commission, set up at the end of November to elaborate a plan for the restoration of Lithuania's independence, has concluded its work. The document turned out by it will be considered by the new Supreme Soviet. As is reported, the document is not to be published in the press, so the first session of the parliament is expected to be convened this Sunday [11 Mar].

Today's press, however, carries the document worked out by the above commission which reviewed the problems connected with creating Lithuania's economy in the most important field of foreign ties. The document emphasizes that the current economic structure of Lithuania is not characteristic of a sovereign, independent state. Although Lithuania has several enterprises of all-union importance, the country's economy can be easily reorganized not to depend on Lithuania. The Soviet Union's State Planning Committee is already dealing with this problem.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet 10 Mar Agenda

LD0803111190 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Excerpt] It has become clear today that Lithuanian deputies of the new convocation will be convened to the first session on Saturday, 10 March, late in the evening. The session will begin at 9 p.m. Lithuanian time [1800 GMT] The decision to convene the first Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session on Saturday has been made by the Supreme Soviet Presidium today.

The following questions have been proposed by the Presidium for the session's discussed:

1. Election of Credentials Commission

2. Confirmation of the plenipotentiary powers of the deputies

3. Procedure of election and recall of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania

4. Election of chairman, deputy chairman, and the secretary of the Supreme Soviet

5. Ending the powers of the out-going Council of Ministers and appointing the new Lithuanian Chairman of the Council of Ministers. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Control of Lithuanian KGB Suggested

LD0703113790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Report from the Sajudis Information Agency]

[Excerpts] This is an official document. A decision of the State Commission for the protection of the Lithuanian Committee for State Security [KGB] archives.

While implementing the decision of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted on 3 February 1990 concerning the establishment of a commission for the protection of the archives of the Lithuanian KGB, the state commission decided:

1. To recommend that the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet change the status of the Lithuanian KGB making it subordinate to the government of this republic only. The recommendation should be carried out on the basis of Lithuanian Constitution Article 70.

2. To recommend that the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet cancel the validity of the following decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers on the territory of Lithuania which regulate the use of the archives, on the grounds that these run counter to the Law on Archives of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.

A) Decision of the USSR Council of Ministers concerning granting the right to the KGB to permanently keep topical material which is connected with the activity of the USSR KGB. The activity of the Lithuanian KGB is based on this decision. [passage ommitted]

The document was signed by Kazimieras Motieka, chairman of the commission.

Economists Discuss Economic Blockade of Lithuania

LD0603152590 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Report by correspondent Rima Jakutyte]

[Excerpts] [passage oimitted] Two economists who are now deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, Academician Eduardas Vilkas and Kestutis Glaveckas, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, were on Lithuanian TV on Saturday. [passage omitted]

We learned that the situation will become even worse: The Soviet Union has already started the economic blockade. Individual republics and enterprises ceased to sign new contracts and those which had been signed are now being terminated. It seems that the Soviet Union is seriously getting ready to live without goods manufactured in Lithuania.

According to Academician E. Volkas, enterprises of the same kind as those here in Lithuania are being planned to be built, or perhaps are already being built in other parts of the USSR. It has been predicted that a significant part of Lithuanian enterprises will be forced to stop operation because of undelivered raw materials or spare parts. A whole list of goods, of which the supply to Lithuania has been either cut down or stopped altogether, was presented by the speakers. Among those were ambulance cars. [passage omitted]

After the sad conversation of the two economists it has become clear that it was not Lithuania which was blamed for aspiring to sever all the economic ties with the East—on the contrary, it was the mighty USSR who cut off links with us.

According to the speakers the situation could be stabilized only if an agreement is reached on the level of governments that at least those contacts and agreements which had been signed were carried out. However, Academician E. Vilkas remarked, that during a brief encoutner with M. Gorbachev in Moscow at a break at the session of the Supreme Soviet, when economic contracts were mentioned. M. Gorbachev said: First secede and then we will see. [passage omitted]

K. Glaveckas maintained in his election program that in order to put the economic relations right, the independence of the republic is an objective necessity. It is impossible at the moment to achieve normal economy by economic means because we are once again getting into a political deadlock. Moscow imposes its will constantly through taxation system, prices, and property ownership". He also repeated that "in striving for independence and efficient economy we do not want to dissociate ourselves from the East, we want to cooperate with time. This is an example for the whole Russia, it is help to Gorbachev.

Whether we want it or not, the question arises after the pessimistic converstaion on Saturday on television: Does Russia understand it, or does M. Gorbachev understand it? Or perhaps this is a diplomatic game led by this great politician. Or perhaps this economic blockade is the last attempt to keep Lithuania in the USSR. [passage omitted]

Polls Show Lithuanian Support for Elected President

LD0803110690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0230 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] This bulletin opens with a story from Lithuania. In response to a questionnaire published in the Sajudis newspaper RESPUBLIKA, 2,850 of the republic's inhabitants phoned in within a matter of hours to the paper's editorial office. Of these, the majority—2,228—maintained that Lithuania needs a parliament. Some 2,380 of the callers thought he should be elected not by the deputies from the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, but by all of Lithuania's citizens. Most are also in favor of a referendum on this issue. Hundreds of letters and telegrams from various corners of the republic have been arriving in recent days at the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. All the senders are concerned for the destiny and future of Lithuania, a prominent part in which will be played by the chairman of a democratically elected Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR. Many letters and telegrams voice approval for the open letter from the electorate of Kaisiadorys Rayon to the people of Lithuania, who support the suggestion of electing Brazauskas chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. There are thousands of signatures on this collective letter.

Lithuanian Decree on Enterprise Directors Viewed

18200494A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 1

["Decree of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet on the Suspension of Points 1, 2, 3, and 5 of Article 6 of the USSR Law on State Enterprises (Associations) on the Territory of the Lithuanian SSR"]

[Text] In accordance with Article 70 of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Constitution, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

1. To suspend points 1, 2, 3, and 5 of Article 6 of the USSR Law on State Enterprises (Associations) on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR concerning the appointment by election of directors, until the adoption of a law on state enterprises (state joint stock enterprises) by the Lithuanian SSR.

2. To establish that the director of an enterprise is confirmed and relieved of his duties by the proprietor of the enterprise, the functions of which are carried out by the corresponding organ of state management (ministry, department, or Council of Ministers) and for an enterprise of local self-management, by the Soviet of Peoples' Deputies.

3. To charge the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers to establish a system of designating and relieving enterprise directors by March 15 of this year.

[Signed]Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet A. Brazauskas;
Secretary of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet L. Sabutis, Vilnius, 14 February 1990

Law on Bank of Lithuania Adopted

PM0603154590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Leonid Kapelyushnyy report: "Republic's National Finances"]

[Text] Vilnius—A Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] law on a Bank of Lithuania has been adopted. As the preamble states, the law "enshrines the legal foundations for instituting a Bank of Lithuania and expresses Lithuania's desire for independence."

The new institution is directly subordinate to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. The republic's entire finances will fall within its sphere of activity. The bank will represent the Lithuanian state's interests with international banks and other credit institutions. It has the exclusive right to issue the republic's money and control the money supply [pravo vypuska i obrashcheniya deneg].

Article 10 of the law points out that the bank, among its other tasks relating to the money supply, "shall establish the rate of exchange [koeffitsiyent obmena] of the republic's money into foreign currency pending the introduction of a convertible currency in the republic."

The Bank of Lithuania can borrow from foreign and international banks, accept deposits from them, and act as guarantor for monetary obligations assumed by legal entities in Lithuania and foreign states.

Future clients will undoubtedly be interested in the article on banking secrecy. It makes it obligatory for information on clients' accounts to be kept secret and for such information to be provided only to a court, arbitration tribunal, or financial organs on taxation issues.

The bank's activity in regulating the money supply and the purchasing power of the currency is also stipulated.

Sweden-Based Estonians Refused Entry to USSR

LD0803114890 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1030 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Estonians, who in Sweden have been elected as members of the new Independent Estonian Congress, are being refused entry to Estonia by the Soviet authorities. Two of the eight, who were to take part in the session of the congress, have been refused visas, the other six, among them the writer Andres Kueng, have been told by the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm that they will not be permitted to enter the country despite the fact that they have been granted visas. The whole group will, however, try to go into Estonia today. Among the persons on the trip is also Carl Bildt, chairman of the Swedish Moderate Unity Party, and Birgit Friggebo from the Liberal Party.

Moscow TV Airs Estonian Situation 6 Mar

LD0703134690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2012 GMT on 6 March carries a 59-minute "Political Dialogues" program entitled "What is happening in Estonia?" The program is presented by Yuriy Nikiforov, Moscow Television commentator, and V. Velman, a Russian and Estonian-language commentator on Estonian Television.

The program begins with an interview with Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, who stresses the stabilizing influence of Estonia's change-over to economic independence. The people are impatient for the real results which will appear as a result of financial autonomy, he says. One must get away from mass meetings and declarations. People have grown tired of this. Estonian policies must now focus on man and his problems. The video then shows footage of a polluted river; Estonians forming a human chain; Molotov, Stalin, and Hitler; naval cadets marching in wartime Tallinn; and a joint Soviet-Finnish enterprise for production of fish products, with a slogan in Russian outside, saying "Organizers of the show, where is the Soviet flag? Shame on you."

Next N. Chelokomnets of the political economy department of Tallinn Polytechnical Institute illustrates by means of a diagram that 90 percent of enterprises in Estonia now belong to all-union ministries, which receive their profits. He explains what will happen under financial autonomy: Estonia's only resource will be its labor. Sociologist A. Saar then explains people's attitude to financial autonomy: They feel that under it they will be in charge and will live better.

According to the program, the republic has been living an active political life for 18 months now. The video shows footage of various social groups demonstrating.

An interview with Ryuytel, chairman of the presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, follows. Nikiforov says it was shot in winter. Ryuytel speaks about the forthcoming [December 1990] local elections and regrets the boycott by Interdvizheniye. The video shows footage of "boycott" leaflets in a derelict barracks.

M.L. Bronshteyn, academician, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet is then interviewed on the need for mutual advantageous, equivalent exchange within the framework of Estonia's financial autonomy. He regrets that people are engaging too much in political matters.

An interview with Yu.Ya. Rudnyak, co-chairman of Intermovement follows. He favors autonomy for the Russian-speaking population of Tallinn, and says that Russians want to live on an equal footing with Estonians. A. Kiris, Estonian justice minister, says that the idea of republican financial autonomy cannot be implemented if it is not supported by the majority of the republic's population, whatever their nationality.

An interview follows with Ya. Allik, member of the Estonian commnist party central committee and first secretary of the Vilyandi Rayon Committee, who stresses that Soviet society should provide its people with the same range of choice as Swedes, Finns, and West Germans enjoy. Estonia's striving for independence should be explained in that sense. A collective farm chairman also explains his view that there is a need for a quick change in the situation. A. Kork, first secretary of Rakvere Rayon Committee condemns the boycott of elections by Interdvizheniye, describing it as an action against Soviet rule.

Rudyak, interviewed again, voices further objections to the local election procedures, objecting amongst other things to Estonians making up the majority of the central election commission of the city of Tallinn, even though Russians make up about half the city's population. Members of that commission, interviewed, in turn, deny there are any problems.

Rudyak goes on to complain about the law on language passed in January 1989, the law on republican financial autonomy passed on 18 May, and later the law on local elections, all of them being discriminatory and unconstitutional in his view; this resulted in strikes in summer 1989. The video shows "Vremya" coverage of summer 1989 strikes juxtaposed with Estonian TV coverage of the same.

At the conclusion of the program, Vyalyas stresses the full success of the December local elections, even though there were some bitter lessons. He says it is immoral to play on people's national feelings. He makes a plea for mutual understanding and says that anyone who respects the Estonians is welcome in Estonia. He is looking forward to the future with optimism.

Estonian Organizations Adjust to Multiparty System

PM0603153990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Leonid Levitskiy report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "In a Multiparty System"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution has legalized in the republic a multiparty system and equality for all parties. There are currently about 25 parties in the republic.

A law on parties has not yet been adopted, but the effect of the multiparty system is marked. It cannot be denied that unusual situations are being created. For instance, the decision of a general meeting of communists from the state chancellery on "concluding the activity of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs party organization" has been published. To put it simply, the party organization is being disbanded. The reason being that if parties begin to set up their own cells within the state apparatus, managers will be bogged down in interparty clashes, and party activity should be carried out in leisure time.

Communists working at the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium acted in a more restrained fashion. At their meeting they noted that the CPSU Statutes are at odds with the republic's constitution. The article regarding the party's leading role in society has been deleted from the constitution, while the statutes still assert this. Therefore, it has been decided to suspend the activity of the Presidium's primary organization until this contradiction is eliminated.

Estonian 'Consultative Committee' Meets in Tallinn

LD0703115190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Sajudis Information Agency report]

[Text] On 6 March, the seventh sitting of the consultative committee uniting all the leaders of all the political parties and unions that are presently functioning in Estonia took place in Tallinn. For the first time Igor Shepelevich, representative of the Association of Working Collectives, which coordinates the movement of the population of Russian nationality, also took part in it.

The commission investigating the period of Soviet power in Estonia made a report at the sitting. The report consisted of two parts:

1. Economic, political, and ethnic losses suffered by Estonia after the 1940 occupation.

2. The genocide of the Estonian nation in 1940-1953.

Further Reportage on Latvian Party Plenum

PM0703161590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Single Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent report: "Danger of a Split"]

[Text] Riga, 6 Mar—A Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum has been held here.

A republic conference of supporters of an independent Communist Party was organized in the republic capital at the end of February. It deemed it "an urgent necessity to create an independent Latvian Communist Party on the basis of the CPSU's Latvian organization." Although proposals were made not to be in a hurry but to put forward their platform at the upcoming Latvian Communist Party congress, a majority of the conference delegates (approximately 60 percent) voted for "independence."

As was pointed out at a session of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, that decision does not reflect the opinion of the majority of the republic's communists and runs counter to the CPSU Statutes. An enlarged session of Riga City Party Committee Bureau was held the day after the conference. It was emphasized that the decision by supporters of independence was "the final step leading a section of communists away from perestroyka and the struggle for democratic transformations in our party, a step toward a split in the Latvian Communist Party and toward an ideological-political and organizational break with the CPSU."

A temporary raykom [rayon party committee] on the CPSU platform has been created in Riga's Kirovskiy Rayon. It has expressed lack of confidence in M. Rukmane, first secretary of Kirovskiy Latvian Communist Party Raykom, and deemed her not competent to represent the rayon party organization.

J. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a report at the plenum on the situation in the party. He recalled the fact that the Central Committee plenum back in January had discussed the need to preserve the unity of the party's ranks, but the situation has subsequently reached a new level of tension because of the extreme stance of supporters of an independent Communist Party. An organizational split has begun in the Latvian Communist Party, and the situation has become one of crisis, the main speaker pointed out. The plenum participants had to determine how to act at this moment, for the very existence of the Latvian Communist Party and the prospect of its organizational renewal are at stake.

It was pointed out at the plenum that unless fundamental perestroyka takes place in the party, it is primarily Letts, who make up approximately one-third of the republic party organization, who will leave it. For, even though the Latvian Communist Party is even quite large, it will hardly be able to attain any real position in the spectrum of Latvia's political forces practically without Letts or with a minimal number of native inhabitants.

Those who spoke in the debate pointed to the inadequate activeness and the political inertia of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and its Bureau. It was emphasized that the struggle for economic sovereignty and movement along the path of democratic socialism must be the priority area of the Latvian Communist Party's activity. A proposal was also made to set up an organizing committee for the holding of the Latvian Communist Party congress.

The plenum resolution points out that a demarcation of communists and the creation of parallel structures of elected organs have begun in the republic's party organizations in the course of the detailed discussion of the status of the Latvian Communist Party. The decisions of the conference of supporters of organizing an independent Latvian Communist Party had the effect of intensifying the crisis in party organizations.

Under the conditions that have been created the plenum resolved to convene the next, 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress 6 April 1990.

Cepanis Address

LD0703202790 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1220 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Speech by Alfred Cepanis, member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum in Riga—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] In December 1989 the congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party took place, which, as is known, formed a party independent of the CPSU. We, too, are faced with such a tendency among people whom Eglitis, who spoke before me, referred to and addressed as communists and party members.

I am deeply convinced that if those agreements, decisions, and resolutions which were adopted at the 19th party conference—I still have all those six resolutions, I am reading them over and comparing with actual events—if they were only half implemented then neither in Lithuania nor Latvia, nor in our neighboring republics of Estonia or Belorussia, nor in Moldavia, the Transcaucasian republics or elsewhere would there be any talk that some kind of democratic centers, new parties, or other new socio-economic formations should be established.

I personally think that it was solely inconsistency, the regular inconsistency in the party, that brought our republic's party organization to this moment. Therefore, those people who have become tired of promises—beginning with, I do not know any longer, which party congress—should not be reproached. I personally began to become aware of these promises after the 22nd congress of the party; but non of them have, after all, been fulfilled.

I think, respected secretary, that even in your report today the mentioned new paragraph of CPSU Rules which envisages a very extensive democratization of the life and activity of the communist parties of all the union republics is, of course, good, but in the beginning there stands written: The framework of the CPSU program and rules. What has come of all that we have seen and experienced? This is why people are searching for a way out.

I am not able to boast, as Comrade Ramans did of having worked for a long time in the government—in my case it is only a little more than a year. However, even in the course of a year I have experienced that, well, deeply negative, at times even contemptuous attitude toward our republic's problems which I have noticed in the central state administration organs, that hopelessness, that despair which at times one has to encounter when dealing with questions of the republic's economic development.

Therefore, people—or most of them, I am not speaking on behalf of the entire people, I am speaking on behalf of the majority of Latvia's inhabitants, or at least of the majority of my electors—are searching, are despairingly searching for a way out from this situation. They have found it in the restoration of the statehood of Latvia and in the founding of an independent communist party of Latvia.

Evidently their preseniment is correct; evidently those people who possess a greater experience of live and work are able to judge about that more competently, and arrive at such a conclusion independently.

I do not think that any public or political organization—the People's Front is talked about especially concerning this I am reproached with being the mouthpiece of this front, although I have not been a member of this organization even for a single day—is endeavoring to seize power in the Latvian parliament. [passage omitted]

If on 18 March the greater, absolute part of Latvia's inhabitants votes or will vote for those persons, is that then a seizing of power? [passage omitted] Therefore, evidently the founding of an independent communist party of Latvia, the founding of an independent state of Latvia is not the goal of some kind of a handful of people, but I repeat, is the goal for which the greater part of inhabitants of Latvia have suffered. Could these people be then reproached with wanting to see the Latvian flag flying at the United Nations? Wanting the state of Latvia as a state among other states? I think that only those to whom the interests of this people is alien can talk and assess things that way.

Gruduls Speech

LD0703135690 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1054 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Speech by Anton Yanovich Gruduls, head of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology

Department, at Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum in Riga—live, in Russian]

[text] Esteemed comrades, we are living at a very complex, important, but interesting time. Our time is full of the exceptional activity of the masses, which is giving all social processes a great dynamism and profound changes. The process of changes—and cardinal ones at that—the process of reform—and a radical one at that—has also reached the party, to be sure very belatedly. Much has been lost and much is being lost. Perhaps I am not right, but I have the impression that up to now the party has concerned itself with anything you like, but not with itself. Now the question is posed very acutely about what heritage we are rejecting. I think that we should approach the process of perestroyka in the party from the bitter truth that communism, socialism, in their old form—I stress, in their old form, and everything connected with this old form—are objectively, unavoidably, and rapidly doomed. This process is being carried out before our eyes.

It is also true that the communist party as the leading organizing force of our society has not yet managed to ensure a qualitatively new level of prosperity of people, development of productive forces and democracy, or put the creative forces of the people, including communists, into effective action. Violation of democratic norms of party life and their virtual absence, authoritarian methods of leadership of the party, a dogmatic and utopian approach to tackling problems of economic and cultural construction and education of people, blindly following the political line of the leadership of the center, have engendered a low level of efficacy of party work in the republic. We are obliged to reject such a heritage resolutely.

All this must determine our approach to reform of the party and to its forthcoming congresses, in particular the 25th Congress of the Latvian Communist Party. Here there are very many questions and problems; after all it is a question of moving the party to a qualitatively new state. I feel that we must move toward ensuring that at the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress there is created an organizationally independent and ideologically renewed reublican party organization, capable effectively in conditions of a multiparty system, in conditions of the development of democracy, of fighting for the implementation of the principles of a socially just and free society.

I feel that, under perestroyka, reform and the most profound democratization of the party in our republic the following important starting points must be observed:

First, the renewed Communist Party of Latvia, or however it might be called under another name, is capable of carrying out the role of the party of the working people only if it forms and develops on the common social and common territorial basis of Latvia. In this connection the organizational split which has begun to show is very dangerous for the party: It can lead to us having two formations which will basically develop on a national basis. It must be quite clear that the party of the working people cannot develop only on a national basis, and especially in the specific situation in our republic, where it must act not as a divisive but as a uniting force of working people. It must also be quite clear that the party organization cannot develop also without representatives of the creative intelligentsia, science, students, and culture, such as in essence the party organization of the city of Riga has become. In effect I think it can be said that the party organization of the city of Riga has lost the status of party organization of the city of Riga as the capital of Latvia. After all, Riga is not only the working class and big industrial center. Riga is also a major center of culture, science, and education, as is written in all the encyclopedias. This situation, this trend worries me personally very much. I think that the Riga party city committee should think very seriously and hard about this.

Second, a renewed party in its internal party structure, must make every member clearly free, emancipated; it must facilitate in all ways the revelation of his creative capabilities and new thinking for every member of the party. The party member must be organized, but free. In this connection the failed dogmas, norms, and principles such as democratic centralism and so on must be decisively thrown out fully. Internal party life must be built on the basis of common democratic, common human principles.

Third, a mechanism must be worked out to ensure that in the party the decisive word lies with the rank-and-file members of the party, the mass of communists, the primary party organizations for tackling all issues of party life, especially personnel ones, at all levels and at all scales. Today the party is taking only the first, I would say very timid, steps along the path of its renewal. On this path, the path of renewal of our party, the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress, and especially the 28th CPSU congress, should be important advances. There is a hope that this is how it will be, because it is an objective requirement.

Thank you for your attention.

'Conservative' Latvian Party Members Act

LD0603225290 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1830 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] The crisis situation in the Communist Party of Latvia continues—that is, of course, if at the present moment anyone can talk about the existence of such a communist party. As we have already informed you, at the conference organized by the supporters of an independent Communist Party of Latvia, it was decided to found an independent party without even waiting for the convening of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress early this summer. The Latvian Communist Party

Bureau assessed this decision negatively, but the sharpest—as it could be predicted—was the reaction by the conservative forces of the party.

At the present moment these forces are grouping themselves around the Riga city party committee (gorkom); which, e.g. at its plenum on Saturday [3 March], expelled from its composition Marite Rukmane, first secretary of the party of the Centra [formerly kirova] Rayon, who was one of the more active organizers of the independent party. On Saturday, the Riga city plenum—and not for the first time—took place behind closed doors. Therefore, we do not possess exhaustive information on what was discussed there. It is, however, reported that the most reactionary speeches ever were heard there. Some speakers even appealed for armed force to be used if Soviet power is thretened. It is clear that the Riga city plenum was also a convocation of the conservative forces before the Latvian Central Committee Communist Party Plenum tomorrow, at which it is intended to evaluate the present situation. Tomorrow will also show how right or wrong was the separation decision, in other words, whether it was worth it, in the name of party unity, to continue to search for a compromise with the conservatives, be it an entirely hopeless undertaking.

At the present moment it is, however, being thought that the conservatives will already make use of tomorrow's plenum in order to reject, from all the leading positions, the representatives of the independent party, by simply making use of the majority of their adherents. This is be no wonder, if the representatives themselves of the party, which proclaimed openness, were able to avail themselves Saturday of letting the reins go as members of some secret lodge.

Latvian Decisions on Military Service Cited

PM0503101790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Session Continues"]

[Text] Riga, 1 Mar—The spring army draft will be the first test of the Law on Alternative Service adopted by Latvian deputies. It was thrashed out for a long time, notably during the two-week recess between the sittings of the current session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. After resuming work today, the participants in the sitting finally approved the document.

The law imposes an obligation of alternative (labor) service on citizens who cannot serve in the troops because of their pacifist or religious convictions. The period of the alternative obligations has been set at 36 months—18 months for graduates of VUZ's [higher educational establishments]. The republic's military commissar is henceforth in a difficult position: He must respect the law and at the same time obey his minister's orders and the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service."

Discussion of privileges with regard to provision of housing for retired and demobilized officers and their free choice of their city of residence began at the opening of the session.

The resolution adopted today says that in order to observe social justice and limit an excessive mechanical population increase in the republic, only those servicemen who have been discharged into the reserve or retired who lived permanently in Latvia prior to the draft will enjoy housing benefits. But those people who registered before 15 March this year are to be provided with housing under the former regulations.

On the basis of Article 71 of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution, which prescribes that USSR laws only come into force in the republic after ratification, the session put into effect on Latvian territory several union laws and resolutions. However its participants did not acknowledge the right of organs of USSR state power to supervise the constitution and laws of the sovereign Latvian SSR and urged the Congress of USSR People's Deputies to make amendments to the USSR "Law On Constitutional Oversight in the USSR."

Latvian 'Third Way' Association Formed

LD0303141490 Moscow TASS in English 1156 GMT 3 Mar 90

[By LATINFORM correspondent Galina Grishina]

[Text] Riga March 3 [dateline as received]—A new socio-political association calling itself "the third way" offers a way out of the crisis in which the republican Communist Party organisation, which is virtually on the verge of a split, has found itself.

The association is represented by Communists who are united on the platform of keeping the organisational unity and cohesion of the party on the principles of humane socialism.

"The third way" thus intends to steer clear of two diametrically opposite positions in the Latvian Communist Party—an immediate breaking away from the CPSU or the immutability of its former dogmas and stereotypes.

The advocates of the "golden mean" believe that only consistent democratisation of the party may become a guarantee of constructive approach to the solution of the problems of civil peace in Latvia.

Political and economic stability, the ensurance of equal rights and freedoms and high living standards for the republic's entire population irrespective of social status or nationality are recognised as an indispensable condition for the development of society.

Coexistence of various forms of ownership with equal conditions for their development should become an economic foundation of new society. "The third way" does not rule out a multi-party system.

Whether the right solution has been found in this case will be clear in the near future, since the 25th congress of the Latvian Communist Party is to be held in spring to finally determine the alignment of forces.

It is now clear that the founders of the new platform are looking for a compromise version. Many Communists associate this desire with the hope to get out of the crisis. There is no doubt that the crisis is deep.

Over the past year the republican party organisation has diminished by almost 8,000 members. It now has a membership of over 170,000. Those who withdrew from the party motivated their action by lack of belief in the party's policy, the loss of prestige by the party, and their disillusionment with the course of perestroyka.

RSFSR

Preliminary RSFSR Election Results Reported

113 Assembly Seats Filled

LD0703124390 Moscow TASS in English 1212 GMT 7 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—As of 1000 Moscow time today, 113 out of the 1,068 seats in Russia's local and republican assemblies had been filled, according to reports from the Central Electoral Commission.

By that time, the commission had received telegrams from a total of 1,030 constituencies, spokesman Valentin Timonin told TASS.

After Sunday's vote, run-off elections will have to be held in at least 893 constituencies, since none of the candidates won the required 50 percent of the vote.

Fresh elections will be held in 24 constituencies.

In one constituency in the city of Norilsk the elections have been annulled since only 48 percent of prospective voters turned out.

"Quite a few party chiefs and senior executive officials won the election," Mikhail Kukushkin, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, told TASS.

"This is due to several reasons. Several regions, for instance in Lipetsk and Belgorod, had recently seen a considerable improvement, especially with the food supply. This swayed voters in favour of current leaders. Other areas have fairly new leaders, but they fared very well from the onset. [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1135 GMT on 7 March also carries a report on preliminary results in the RSFSR elections. TASS Russian here says: "In some regions there were no alternative candidates, this also played a role."] In other areas, the leaders are new people, but are people who positively revealed themselves to be those who want to get things done ever since their first steps in these posts. There are only two workers among The winners, many economic managers and three senior officers. [The TASS Russian report here says: "Deputies' seats have already been secured by three military commanders."]

There are few much-needed lawyers and economists among the deputies, according to Kukushkin.

So far, only four lawyers have won parliamentary seats in Russia, he said.

Election Results Updated

PM0803121790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the general heading "Elections Are Over, the Campaign Continues"]

[Text] The 4 March elections of Russian Federation people's deputies and local soviets have not concluded the election campaign. There will be runoffs and, in a considerable number of okrugs, repeat elections too. According to preliminary figures deputies' mandates to the Russian parliament have not yet been won in some 800 okrugs.

The picture for the republic as a whole varies. Thus, in Kamchatka and the Udmurt ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] the winner has not been determined in a single electoral okrug, in Krasnodar Kray only eight out of 35 deputies have been elected, and in Gorkiy Oblast the figure is one out of 25.

Among those who have been elected are workers, writers, academics, journalists, and representatives of various strata of the population. In particular, people's deputies in North Ossetia are 29.7 percent workers and collective farm members; 11.7 percent workers in science, culture, the arts, education, and health; and 13.5 percent leaders of enterprises and associations. Despite the active propaganda by a number of informal associations against party and state apparatus workers, voters in most okrugs placed their trust in those regions' leaders. Thus, in Penza Oblast B.F. Zubkov, second secretary of the CPSU obkom [oblast party committee], and A.F. Kovlyagin, chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], became RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies. Forty-two party and soviet workers were elected to the kray soviet in Krasnodar Kray.

At the same time, the party and soviet leadership in a number of autonomous republics and oblasts suffered a tangible defeat. For instance, the secretaries of the Udmurt CPSU Obkom and the Izhevsk party gorkom [city party committee], have left the campaign. Only P.S. Grishchenko, first secretary of the party obkom, is still fighting for a people's deputy seat in the Autonomous Republic. But this will be decided by a runoff.

The voting results for Norilskiy Territorial Okrug No. 210 in Krasnoyarsk Kray were discouraging. More than half of the voters did not vote. In the overwhelming majority of okrugs in this polar city, where people's deputies were to have been elected to the kray soviet, the elections have also been declared null and void because voters did not turn out. The same situation arose in certain okrugs in Kamchatka Oblast.

Thus, the runoffs are ahead. They will be held 18 March, while the repeat elections will be held 22 April.

Election Official Comments

PM0703162590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Single Edition p 6

[Interview with V.I. Kazakov, chairman of the RSFSR Central Electoral Commission, by V. Mamontov: "Elections Continuing"; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] On 4 March Russians voted for candidate deputies of the republic soviet and local soviets. The final election results have not yet been summed up; but more and more new reports are reaching the desk of V.I. Kazakov, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Central Electoral Commission, from krays, oblasts, autonomous republics...

[Mamontov] Vasiliy Ivanovich, could you inform readers of at least some results?

[Kazakov] I wish to say right away that the election campaign is not over, and the corps of deputies can be formed in the main only after 18 March. A runoff will take place before that date. It is already clear that repeat elections will be held in 14 okrugs. At present 85 deputies can be considered elected. This figure is constantly changing as reports come in from the provinces... But something can already be said in all certainty. Valid elections took place in all the okrugs apart from Norilskiy Okrug—there less than 50 percent of the registered electorate went to the ballot boxes. Consequently, Russians realized what is what and did not heed the recent extremist calls to boycott the elections and thus express lack of confidence in the party, the government, and perestroyka. Of course, there was varying activity in the precincts—between 55 and 89 percent of the electorate went to them last Sunday.

[Mamontov] Was everyone able to express his will clearly?

[Kazakov] Unfortunately, this cannot be said. In that situation, with that number of candidates, not everyone could properly understand the ballot papers' approximately 10 percent of them have been deemed invalid. But it is not just a case of some people being unable to grasp electoral science. Uninvited advisers also hampered the free expression of will. Your newspaper has already reported on the situation in which elections took place in Leningrad. Many complaints have been received from that city, as well as from other places in the republic, about the "coercive" nature of the actions of certain persons who went to the electoral precincts in the guise of a kind of "people's control," "representatives of collectives," and so forth. Pressure was essentially brought to bear on some voters. Nevertheless, it may confidently be claimed that in general the elections proceeded in an organized manner and the majority of voters made their choice quite consciously. This is also indicated by some observations that we made during the voting.

[Mamontov] Some people were predicting a crushing defeat for "apparatchiks" in these elections...

[Kazakov] Forecasts are unreliable. It is better to deal in facts. For example, nine of the 24 oblast party committee first secretaries who were running have been elected, and 13 have gotten through to the next round. Only two received a "vote of no confidence." I will remark that rayon-level party and soviet workers, the majority of whom are hardworking and are well known to the people, have been elected in a considerable number of cases. And if a person's better features were really well known, not even competition from a dozen candidates was a hindrance to him...

[Mamontov] I will not hide the fact that readers are interested in how the elections turned out for the republic's leadership.

[Kazakov] Well, it can already be said that the following have been elected deputies: V.I. Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; A.V. Vlasov, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers; Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee... In other respects, let us be patient: The elections are continuing.

Moscow Plenum Decree on Draft CPSU Platform

90UN1041A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Decree of the 16 February Moscow Gorkom Plenum: "Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress"]

[Text] Having heard and discussed the report entitled "Results of the Party Central Committee February (1990) Plenum and the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress," the Moscow Gorkom [city party committee] observes that the draft platform as a whole defines the main political reference points for the transition period and is the basis for discussion geared to the democratic renewal of the party and society.

At the same time, a number of fundamental problems of party life which have gained the support of the majority of Moscow's communists are not reflected in the draft platform.

The Moscow Gorkom plenum:

1. Proposes that during the period February-April of this year the raykoms [rayon party committees] and the

primary party organizations conduct a discussion of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee at party meetings and secretary councils and in debating and party clubs.

That members of the CPSU Central Committee delegated from the Moscow City party organization and members of the Moscow Gorkom report in the labor collectives on the work they have done.

2. Regards as a principal task of the pre-congress period wide-ranging public dialogue and the cooperation and consolidation of various social and political movements adhering to democratic positions and sharing the idea of the socialist choice.

3. Considers it necessary to create working groups in the Moscow Gorkom and raykoms for collation of the communists' proposals and observations and formulation of a mechanism for their realization. To sum up the results of the discussion at a gorkom plenum, having earlier published material in the press and the Moscow Gorkom information bulletin. Finally formulate at a city party conference the position of the city's communists for the 28th party congress.

4. Considers of fundamental importance the election of delegates to the rayon and city party conferences and delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress on the basis of direct, secret, and multiple-choice elections by party district, in connection with which it is essential that the raykoms embark on determination of the mechanism of their organization.

5. Proposes that the raykoms, party organizations, mass media, and all communists emphatically rebuff the irresponsible calls, extreme nationalist and chauvinist manifestations, and attacks on the principle of internationalism, which lead to deformations and division in society and the party and frustration of the policy of perestroyka.

Moscow Gorkom Plenum Appeals to CPSU

90UN1041B Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Appeal to the CPSU Central Committee from the Moscow Gorkom]

[Text] Taking as a basis the opinions of the capital's communists, we participants in the Moscow Gorkom [city party committee] plenum express serious concern at the slowness of the CPSU Central Committee to implement specific measures pertaining to democratic transformations in the party. We insist on the implementation of direct, secret, multiple-choice elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress by party district, with the rayon party organizations being accorded the right to finally determine the election mechanism.

We call for the next CPSU Central Committee plenum to be held in an atmosphere of the maximum glasnost with television and radio coverage, publication of the stenographic report, and the invitation of secretaries of party committees of various levels.

We consider it essential that it discuss urgent measures to stabilize the situation in the country and the party and to enhance the responsibility of Politburo members and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee for their personal contribution to the restructuring of the economy, ideology, and policy.

We consider it necessary also that this plenum adopt the following decisions:

—on the primary party organizations and party committees being accorded the right to themselves determine the time of the reports and elections;

—on the creation from the ranks of the delegates elected to the congress of the organizational committee and the commissions for preparation of the 28th CPSU Congress;

—on the commissioning prior to the 28th CPSU Congress of a number of provisions broadening the rights of the primary party organizations and democratizing the process of elections in the party;

—on up to 50 percent of membership dues being left in the primary organizations for local needs;

—on the exclusion from the effective sets of CPSU Central Committee instructions of regulations binding the activity of the lower party components with financial and organizational restrictions. To authorize the party committees to engage in independent economic activity for the purpose of replenishing the party budget and reinforcing the material resources of the party's ideological and propaganda work;

—on briefing communists on the question of the formation and expenditure of the party budget.

The Moscow Gorkom expresses solidarity with the communists of Lithuania adhering to the positions of the CPSU.

Supporting the idea of the organization of a Russian Republic party conference prior to the 28th CPSU Congress, we deem it essential that the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau assemble this March in Moscow a meeting of representatives of okrug, oblast, and kray party organizations of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on questions of convening a conference and discussion of the organizational structuring of a Russian Communist Party.

We believe that in the atmosphere of the decline in state, labor, and social discipline and the growth of lack of responsibility and nihilism, crime and the shadow economy, interethnic conflicts and other negative phenomena, the Supreme Soviet and the government of the country should immediately take advantage of all measures provided for by law to bring order to bear, stabilize the situation in society and prevent chaos, lawlessness, and anarchy and at the same time should not accelerate the introduction of the institution of president of the country before extensive discussion of this proposal.

Adopted at the Moscow Gorkom Plenum on 16 February 1990.

Yakovlev Delivers Syringes to Moscow Hospital

PM2102160890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "For Sick Children"]

[Text] A consignment of 200,000 disposable syringes was handed over 15 February to the republican Children's Teaching Hospital in Moscow by A.N. Yakovlev, USSR people's deputy, Politburo member, and CPSU Central Committee secretary. It was a gift from R. Sasekawa, president of the Japanese Peace Foundation, who had presented it to the Soviet Union through the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by A.N. Yakovlev which visited Japan at the end of last year.

In a discussion with doctors, the Central Committee secretary noted that the noble and philanthropic act of the president of the Japanese foundation is one of the examples testifying to the endeavors in the Land of the Rising Sun to warm relations with the USSR and to expand peaceful cooperation.

A.N. Yakovlev looked around a number of hospital departments.

What was given to the Moscow hospital is only a part of the gift. The remainder was distributed among USSR people's deputies who were in the delegation, who decided to give the syringes to hospitals in their electoral okrugs.

Bogdanov Reviews Moscow Militia's Activities

LD0802154490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] The results of the work of the Moscow militia last year were summed up at a press conference at Petrovka 38 today. Lieutenant General Bogdanov, chief of the City Internal Affairs Directorate of the Moscow City Executive Committee and USSR deputy minister of internal affairs, noted that the situation in the city has been complex. The peak of the growth in crime was reached in June. Approximately 800 firearms were confiscated from criminals. There were more frequent instances of armed resistance to arrest. About 180 members of criminal groupings were arrested. It has been proved that it is the shadow economy which is the breeding ground of the groupings. In connection with this, the role of the service engaged in the struggle against pilfering of socialist property comes to the fore. Law and order in the city is influenced by various sociopolitical measures which distract considerable militia forces. For example, at a rally held last Sunday, over 7,500 members of the law-enforcement bodies were drafted. The large number of refugees is influencing the operational situation.

Irregularities Mar Chechen-Ingushetia Elections

PM0803101590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent M. Mikhalkov: "Incident at Elections": "Counterfeit Ballot Papers"]

[Text] Groznyy—An unusual incident was how the Vostochnyy Electoral Okrug No. 108 electoral commission for the elections to the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] Supreme Soviet described the situation.

To be frank, an unprecedented incident in our electoral practice. When the boxes were opened at the Ekazhevskiy Electoral Okrug there were considerably more ballot papers for the election of deputies to practically all types of soviets than had been issued during the vote. The ballot papers had been dropped in the boxes in batches of 20-30. For example, one batch contained 23 ballot papers with one candidate's name crossed out, the same pen having been used in each case...

In the elections to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] in territorial okrug No. 884, some 1,163 ballot papers ended up in the boxes, although according to the register only 699 had been issued. The commission was bewildered by the fact that the total number of ballot papers considerably exceeded the number that had been officially obtained for the election campaign. Where had the surplus come from? No one can provide a convincing answer at the moment. There is only the hypothesis that certain committed individuals gained access to printing works staff who were printing official forms and managed to secure an "unofficial" stock of papers.

That it was a well-thought-out and planned action is also indicated by the fact that the surplus ballot papers were in the hands of people from all over the republic. I called G. Mezhiyeva, chairman of national-territorial okrug No. 138 for elections to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (its center is in the city of Gudermes). Here is her account:

"Something inconceivable occurred at electoral precinct No. 99, located in school No. 4. A crowd of people surged toward the commission's tables, where the ballot papers had been set out. Amid the hurly-burly, people were grabbing entire packets of papers. It was a difficult job establishing a semblance of order. But we were dismayed by the results of the voting: the number of ballot papers in the box exceeded the number issued by 15 percent. For some reason the voters had particularly "favored" R. Beysultanov. He lives in Nozhay-Yurtovskiy Rayon. He is practically unknown here. But he was well ahead of the other 16 contenders for the RSFSR people's deputyship."

The commission declared the elections results null and void.

Events developed at electoral precint Nos. 21 and 22 in Surkhokhinskiy Electoral Okrug No. 114 as follows. By midday, according to the register, 399 people had not yet voted in the former. Anyone arriving after that hour was greeted by smiling members of the precinct electoral commission and told: "No ballot papers. We are out of papers..." The same situation was repeated at electoral precinct No. 22. Some 340 people were illegally deprived of the right to vote...

Unfortunately, as the documents sent to the central electoral commissions and RSFSR Supreme Soviet show, the precinct electoral commissions were formed in contravention of constitutional norms. At Kavkazskiy Electoral Okrug No. 164's electoral precint No. 39, a single voter would often be presented with the ballot papers of five, 10, and even 20 voters. Incidentally, the ethical norms governing the election of precinct commission members were violated there. Four of the 11 people were close relatives of candidate A. Khasanov.

The facts I have enumerated are not exceptional. There were many breaches of the rules in the election campaign in Chechen-Ingushetia and they indicate a poor standard of preparation for them, a haphazard approach, and lack of supervision. It is apparent from voters' frank admissions that large sums of money were exchanging hands. On election day certain unauthorized persons entered precinct voting booths, monitored what was happening, and then even crossed out the names of the candidates they did not like. In many places members of people's fronts broke the law by brazenly urging people to reject candidates not nominated by them. In Shalinskiy Territorial Okrug No. 888 for elections to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, cooperative Chairman V. Datsayev had managed to get some large posters printed somewhere bearing his portrait and his program. The posters had been pasted up on every available surface. The program was clearly playing the "Islamic card": V. Datsayev was promising to build several mosques, open schools teaching Arabic (for the purpose of reading the Koran), and much else. An economist reckoned that the cooperative chairman would have to spend 3.8 billion rubles to implement his program.

New Dagestan Obkom First Secretary Elected

PM0703143790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "Plenums Held"]

[Text] Makhachkala, 6 Mar—A plenum of the Dagestan obkom [oblast party committee] has been held to examine an organizational question. In connection with Comrade M.Yu. Yusupov's appointment as deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the plenum relieved him of his duties as first secretary of the CPSU obkom.

After the discussion at primary party organizations and party gorkoms [city party committees] and raykoms [rayon party committees] eight candidates were nominated for the post of CPSU obkom first secretary.

The plenum elected Comrade M.G. Aliyev—who had previously been chief of the Dagestan CPSU Obkom Organizational Party and Cadre Work Department—as first secretary of Dagestan Obkom.

Gorkiy Obkom Bureau Survives Plenum

90UN1040A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by V. Pinigin, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's own correspondent: "Reasons and Counterreasons That Did Not Find Each Other (Notes From the Meeting and the CPSU Gorkiy Obkom Plenum)"]

[Text] The wave of localized "revolutions" that swept the country did not bypass Gorkiy. The social and political events that took place in the city in the last several days were of interest to everyone; they were the gorkom [city party committee] plenum, the all-city meeting, and the expanded plenum of the CPSU obkom [oblast committee]. I must state right away that the power of the party both in the city and in the oblast did not collapse. But does this fact mean nothing has changed at all?

"Politically, we are in the stage of diving," V. Menkov, first secretary of the CPSU Gorodetskiy gorkom, described the situation, as he spoke at the obkom plenum. In my opinion, Valeriy Petrovich found a very precise comparison. Diving is the flight stage at which not everything has been lost yet. There still is a possibility to get out of it, even at the cost of certain overloads. But as we can see, not everybody can do this: More and more often they go from diving into a spin, and the consequences of that are quite unpredictable.

It is hard to say at present whether the high party officials in Gorkiy possess sufficient political experience and, putting it bluntly, mere professionalism to regain control of the steering wheel and to lie back on course. The situation in the country and in the oblast is too complex to enable any forecasts, especially because of the many strategic and tactical mistakes that have been made.

"The party reminds me of a passenger who was late and now is running to catch up with the departing train," said a locomotive depot engineer, V. Piskunov, when he spoke at the obkom plenum.

He meant the CPSU Central Committee platform that is being drafted for the 28th congress, but those words can be fully applied to the oblast party committee. The local party and soviet bodies showed a rather delayed reaction to many of the problems the people are worried about. They started to react only when there was no opportunity for further delay. These problems were quite numerous in the last year or two: filling of the Cheboksary reservoir; construction of subway lines in the historical part of the city; construction of a nuclear heating power station; transfer of the restricted access hospitals, of state-owned dachas, of the gorkom building, and of a hotel to the people of the city for their needs; and so forth. The prolonged inactivity of the local party and soviet authorities was seen as their unwillingness to consider public opinion. Even though the problems would be eventually resolved, the people accumulated a lot of dissatisfaction with the way the changes came about in the oblast as well as in the country. Last Sunday this feeling made thousands of people go out into the square in front of the ancient Nizhegorodskiy fortress which houses, behind its thick walls, the oblast and city authoritative bodies.

The meeting was organized by the informal association "Candidates for Democracy" and was very emotional, as are all similar meetings. More fuel to the fire was added by the gorkom plenum the previous day, where they had discussed the problem of confidence in First Secretary Yu. Marchenkov. The CPSU obkom bureau severely reprimanded him for his indiscretion when buying a Volga car for his personal needs and improving his living conditions. Yuriy Aleksandrovich did not want to tempt fate any further and offered his resignation. The gorkom plenum discussed the case and did not find it serious enough for the corresponding conclusions. The plenum did not accept the resignation. Clearly, the gorkom members know better; however, the usual complete absence of any information on the plenum, with the exception of a very brief official item about it, could only lead to a negative reaction under the present conditions, enhanced by lack of any special affection for the first secretary on the part of the population. Because of this, there were reasons for the meeting's demands that the entire gorkom resign and for the expression of political "no confidence" in it.

Similar demands were directed also at CPSU obkom First Secretary G. Khodyrev and the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] Chairman A. Sokolov. Both were among the first to speak at the meeting; they stated their positions and answered questions, including some provocative ones. It was rather obvious that they were not used to functioning under such conditions.

The democracy of a meeting has its outward logic and inward rules. The apparent democratic quality and pluralism are very often quite different in essence. They were not very evident at the meeting in Gorkiy. The unwanted speakers were booed, and some of the candidates for people's deputies were simply not allowed to speak at all if they did not share the platform of the "Candidates for Democracy." Of course, there was a lot of sober judgement and there were calls to be reasonable, to consolidate all the public efforts, to renew the party and revive its prestige, and to take an active part in the coming elections. But some of the statements were rather extreme in their concept; however, they were not duly rebuffed.

Two days later an expanded obkom plenum convened to discuss the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th congress. The plenum definitely could not ignore the recent events in the city. It reminded one of a meeting in its emotional content. In spite of myself I was thinking: Why was this clever and passionate reasoning absent in the Minin and Pozharskiy square? It would have been impossible not to find support for it there. The people in the square were not only the ones who meant to bring confusion—there also were communists and workers.

A candidate for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy, L. Mikhaylov, said exactly this when he spoke at the plenum:

"According to some people, the party officials are now all on the defensive. It is not true: We are not even defending ourselves. We are just sitting and waiting for something. We should immediately lock up all these big buildings in the center, board up all these doors, and leave the warm offices for the factory shops, for the farms, for the streets—where the people are."

The party and social situation and the CPSU Central Committee platform draft for the congress were assessed with respect to the local events.

"Why are we waiting for the communists to resign from the party when they reject its organizational and ideological basis instead of unloading them ourselves?," asked the director of "Gipropolimer" [State Planning Institute for Polymer Industry] V. Neyman point blankly. "Why do we allow people to violate the Charter? It has not been canceled, has it?"

The first secretary of the CPSU Gorodetskiy gorkom, V. Menkov, and many others suggested that the report and election campaign in the party be conducted after the 28th congress. They also suggested that delegates to the congress be selected only by straight and secret ballot by party districts, with more than one candidate for each seat.

The obkom plenum unambiguously supported the removal of Article 6 from the USSR Constitution; it also supported the idea of electing the delegates to the 28th congress by party districts and the concept of creating a communist party of the Russian Republic, and they spoke of how unadvisable it was to hold the report and election meetings before the 28th congress. It is too early to determine whether the oblast communists find the decisions of the plenum satisfactory. The plenum minutes will be published and will be discussed widely, together with the CPSU Central Committee draft program, in the oblast party organizations. The final decision is to be adopted by the March plenum.

Tatar Obkom Chief Gets Vote of Confidence

90UN1040B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by M. Zaripov, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's own correspondent: "Confidence Expressed"]

[Text] The results of the Sunday preelection meeting in the capital of the Tatar Autonomous Republic were discussed at the extraordinary plenums of the Kazan CPSU gorkom [city party committee] and of the Tatar obkom [oblast party committee]. The meeting was held on the initiative of the obkom, informal public organizations, and voters' clubs, with the participation of candidates for people's deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic, and local soviets. Some of the participants spoke at the meeting about their dissatisfaction with the pace of perestroyka, with the election campaign procedure, and with the shortcomings and errors evident in the work of the party organizations. They demanded resignation from the bureaus of both gorkom and obkom.

At the plenums the communists summed up the discussion results, the criticisms, and the proposals of the participants of the meeting. They all spoke, basically, about the same thing: members of the elected bodies should hold a series of report and election meetings before the congress; they should report to the communists about the work they had done in the primary organizations. The members of the Tatar obkom bureau insisted that the plenum participants take a secret vote of confidence by each of the names. The majority of ballots proved that the political headquarters of the Autonomous Republic have the confidence of the people. Of the 117 people who voted, 112 voted for the obkom First Secretary M. Shaymiyev.

Western Republics

Results of Elections in Belorussia Reported

LD0703230490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 7 March broadcasts a three and one-half minute report on today's session of the Belorussian Central Electoral Commission in Minsk. During the program, correspondent Petr Makritskiy interviews Professor Stepan Grigoriyevich Drobyasko, member of the commission, who states that the turnout at the elections was 87 percent, that is, more than 6 million voters. He adds that two-thirds of the candidates will have to run in repeat elections. A total of 148 people have been elected people's deputies of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet, he says, of whom 98 are from territorial constituencies and 56 from public organizations. Eight women and 140 men were elected in the territorial constituencies; and two workers, nine collective farmers, 139 party members, and nine nonparty individuals were elected.

Asked about the members of nonformal movements in the republic, Drobyasko replies: "For the moment it is difficult to judge. In Minsk there were two representatives out of five, but there are no final results for the republic as a whole yet." He explains that only five deputies were elected in Minsk because there was an intense struggle there with as many as 19 candidates running in some constituencies.

Only one-third of the deputies to the Belorussian Supreme Soviet have been elected, so there will have to be repeat ballotting in 194 constituencies, and there will be repeat elections in 18 constituencies. He says they have not had official complaints of any violations of the election laws, but there have been complaints by telephone of irregularities in some constituencies, and these are to be examined by the Central Electoral Commission.

330 Run-Off Elections Necessary in Ukraine

LD0703145790 Moscow TASS in English 1432 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Kiev March 7 TASS—The names of new people's deputies of the Ukraine have become known only in 112 constituencies out of 450. Run-off elections will have to be held in more than 330 constituencies. Most of them are in Kiev, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Vor[illegible] people's deputy was elected in the [illegible] capital.

[illegible]ns will be held in seven constituencies of five Ukrainian regions, where only two candidates were slated and neither polled the required majority vote. They include chairmen of Dnepropetrovsk and Kherson regional executive committees.

The Ukrainian Central Election Commission has not yet published the final results of the elections. But it is clear already that the Ukrainian Parliament will include quite a few representatives of new public organizations.

The elections were well organized and the election law was on the whole observed, although there were a few cases when it was violated.

Further on Ukrainian Election Results

LD0703123990 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1945 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Let us start on the topic of greatest interest to us all—yesterday's elections. No final results are available at this time. All the same, what can be said today is that the elections reflected (?the real mood) of the people.

The first reports show that among those who have become deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet are party workers and also representatives of party organizations and movements. According to the preliminary results, deputies' mandates have been won by Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko, second secretary of the Communist

Party of Ukraine Central Committee, and Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, Central Committee secretary. Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee, will be obliged to continue his struggle for the deputy's place in the republic's Supreme Soviet.

Writers Ivan Drach and Volodymyr Yavorivskyy have been elected to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Scientist Miroslav Popovych [Rukh leader] was defeated.

Vitaliy Boyko, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, in in our studio.

[Boyko] [passage omitted] Almost on the eve of the elections, nearly 200 candidates withdrew from running; but in an overwhelming number of constituencies there were enough candidates from which to make a choice.

Here is the picture in Kiev. In all, there are 22 constituencies in our capital. Only in one of them was the deputy elected. In the rest a second round will be held. The second round will apply to approximately one-half of the constituencies in the Ukraine. Although, judging by the reports arriving at the Central Electoral Commission, second-round elections will be held in a considerably larger number of constituencies than that. Vote counting in constituencies has so far produced nearly 100 elected deputies.

New elections will be held in five constituencies, in each of which only two candidates competed. Since none of them managed to poll the necessary number of votes, all of them have been disqualified from running again in those constituencies.

Donetsk Strike Committee, Party Officials Debate

PM0603121090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[RATAU-TASS report: "Television Debate Ends"]

[Text] Donetsk, 3 Mar—Yesterday evening city and oblast inhabitants participated in a television debate, on which the strike committee had insisted, between representatives of the local workers' (strike) committee of the "Donetskugol" Production Association and party obkom [oblast committee] secretaries. Not one question remained unanswered.

It will be remembered that the strike committee called for a one-shift warning strike on 1 March with the aim of getting the obkom and the city party committee to resign. However, the majority of miners not only in the city but also in the oblast spurned the call.

Telephone calls and telegrams constantly flooded in for those participating in the live broadcast. Here is one of them: "The Zuyevskiy thermal electric power station collective supports the obkom's measures to stabilize the situation in the region and to tighten up discipline and law and order, and rejects the 'Donetskugol' Association strike committee's arrogant demands."

Nor did it help the strike committee that a number of its members and representatives of enterprises began a hunger strike outside the House of Soviets in Donetsk's October Square. Only three of the oblast's coal enterprises—and then only partially, in some sections—stopped producing coal. So as not to disrupt the production cycle in the drifts, regular maintenance and repair work is being carried out there.

Frolov Visit to Vinnitsa Oblast Considered

PM1402115790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Meetings in Vinnitsa Oblast"]

[Text] What should the renewed party be like in a society undergoing renewal? What is the meaning of democratic socialism, which was defined as the goal of the party's entire work in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the forthcoming 28th party congress? These and many other questions of the CPSU's contemporary policy and of the theory and practice of perestroyka were at the center of attention during meetings between I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and PRAVDA chief editor, with working people and the party aktiv in Vinnitsa Oblast 9-11 February.

The concept and policy of perestroyka, elaborated as a result of intense intellectual work by the party, are now entering the "denser layers" of our social reality. Hence the exacerbation of numerous problems which have accumulated in the country, and the crystallization of positions and diverse interests manifested in the public mind is becoming all the stronger. The CPSU Central Committee February Plenum laid down political guidelines for the party's activity at this complex and crucial stage of society's development. The task of accelerating reforms in all sectors of the process of perestroyka has been brought to the forefront.

A debate about ways to renew the party as the most important condition for radical transformation of the economy and positive changes in the social and spiritual spheres took place during a meeting with Vinnitsa Oblast party aktiv. The Central Committee secretary drew the attention of party and soviet officials and of trade union and Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] activists to the need to take into account the fact that the CPSU's activity is taking place in conditions of a real political struggle, of competition between different sociopolitical forces. Rejecting the legislative enshrinement of its leading role and ceasing to be an integral part of a party-state hierarchy, the party will struggle for the status of a vanguard ruling force by working out and offering to society scientifically substantiated and realistic programs for renewal based on humane and democratic principles. By the time the party arrives at its upcoming congress, it must be radically renewed, having focused its entire intellectual and political potential on solving the immediate and long-term strategic tasks of socialism's renewal and must have seriously restructured its cadre policy.

We are facing a vast field of problems in interpreting and elaborating the theory of socialism, reviving and developing Lenin's concept of socialist building as living creative work by the people, and imparting a "human dimension" to all our deeds. The priority tasks of developing education and culture—a most important condition for advance along the path of civilization's progress—are coming to the fore. This was the topic of conversation at a meeting with education and culture workers in Tilchinskiy Rayon. When defining priorities in budget and investment policy, the Central Committee secretary emphasized, it is necessary to be guided as much as possible by humanist criteria, which ultimately determine the success of social development. The party advocates the flourishing of national cultures, traditions, and languages; it is against standardization and in favor of the free development of all peoples within the Soviet federation's framework.

The organically combined solution of social and economic tasks is typical of many farms in Vinnitsa Oblast. The CPSU Central Committee secretary saw for himself the work of Shargorodskiy Rayon's "Mir" kolkhoz [collective farm], where Yelena Ivanovna Podolyanina has been chairman for 18 years now. A new hospital is ready to admit patients, and districts of individual homes are spreading. The transition of all subdivisions of the multisector farm to lease contracts has made it possible to sharply boost the efficiency of production activity. The kolkhoz earns an annual profit in excess of 1.5 million rubles. The main point is that people now feel that they are real masters of their lives. Another typical detail: More than 100 babies are born each year in Murafa village, where the kolkhoz is situated, and young people are not leaving their home.

The key direction of perestroyka is the democratization of Soviet society and the implementation of political reform. While in Tulchinskiy and Peschanskiy Rayons, I.T. Frolov, USSR people's deputy from No. 409 Tulchinskiy Territorial Electoral District, met with his voters and answered their questions.

The mass media have an important role in the implementation of perestroyka polic. Replying to journalists' question, the CPSU Central Committee secretary and PRAVDA chief editor emphasized the responsibility of the press for objectively reflecting perestroyka processes in people's minds and the role of mass media workers in shaping public opinion. Truthful and accurate information, profound analysis of reality, and the shedding of ambitions—this is the form that active assistance from the press should take in our complex time.

I.T. Frolov was accompanied on his trip by A.P. Nekhayevskiy, first secretary of Vinnitsa party obkom [oblast committee].

Caucasus

Azerbaijan, Armenian Interior Ministers Meet

LD0703182990 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Gyandzha, Azerbaijan March 7 TASS—The Azerbaijani and Armenian interior ministers, Major-General Aydyn Mamedov and Major-General Usik Arutyunyan, met in the village of Azad today, accompanied by party and local government officials as well as police officers from both republics.

The meeting was arranged and conducted, on instructions from Soviet Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, by Colonel-Generl Yuriy Shatalin, who had arrived here from Moscow especially for the purpose.

Participants stressed the need to stop lawlessness, protect people's constitutional rights and demonstrate composure and reason. The dialogue between officials of the two republics did not come easy and was sometimes interrupted by mutual accusations.

On the whole, however, the meeting was constructive. It showed that the problems of the region should be resolved through talks, through dialogue between the sides.

Official Reports Baku Curfew, Other Violations

NC0703125290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Notice by the Baku City Internal Affairs Administration—read by Lieutenant Talibayev, of the Political Department]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, good evening. During the past day, 10 criminal incidents were recorded in Baku. Many of them were related to the theft of personal property. [passage omitted]

During ther past 24 hours, 33 persons were detained, 18 of whom were detained for violating the curfew, 12 for violating the passport regime, and one for violating the demands of the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree.

Editor Discusses Military 'Persecution'

NC0503130790 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 4 Mar 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] On its front page, the paper publishes the appeal sent by Maksim Ovanesyan, editor of KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH, to Davityan, editor of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN; Mkrtichyan, editor of KOMMUNIST; Vartanyan, editor of YEREKOYAN YEREVAN; and the editors of progressive Soviet papers.

Ovanesyan writes: KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH is the target of unceasing persecution from the military.

What is more, a serious threat to its continued operation has arisen. Major General Safonov, commandant of the emergency situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and adjacent areas in Azerbaijan, hiding behind the cloak of the emergency situation and acting at the orders of the Azerbaijan Organizational Committee [words indistinct] in Stepanakert and possibly in complicity with it, is attempting to silence by all means KHORHRDAYIN KARABKH, the mouthpiece for the Armenians of Artsakh [NKAO] in an effort to prevent them from expressing their will on their national aspirations.

Since the very first day that the commandant's office began to operate, [words indistinct] it has been trying to denigrate [word indistinct] the paper and the editorial board. The editor writes: Faced with our resolute resistence to all these efforts, the commandant of the emergency situation has, at the instigation of the Azerbaijan Organizational Committee, been trying to place the paper under his jurisdiction and has banned its distribution outside the oblast. The commandant's 31 January decree on the paper is regarded by Armenian workers as a gross infringement on press freedom and an attempt to suppress our people's will by (?controlling) the press.

Not satisfied with this, the commandant's office and the Azerbaijan Republic's Organizational Committee [words indistinct]. Commandant Safonov has been resorting to blatant pressure and terror, threatening to stop the work of the editorial board.

The editor of the paper appeals to journalists to raise their voice to obstruct such arbitrary acts and all other attempts to trample upon the policy of openness. The editor points out that any news media could be targeted to receive the same treatment KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH is receiving today. He called on them to protect KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH in the name of free speech, openness, and democratization in our country and in the name of the just struggle of the people of Artsakh. KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH will not die.

Armenian, Azerbaijani Informals Confer in Tbilisi

PM0603165190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent B. Urigashvili report: "One Step Closer to Each Other"]

[Text] A meeting between some Armenian and Azerbaijani informal organizations has been held in Tbilisi on the initiative of the Georgian National Democratic Party.

The Azerbaijani side was represented by the People's Front the Committee for Aid to the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], and the Republican Party. The Armenian side was represented by the "National Self-Determination" and "Constitutional Right" organizations. I must remind readers that the first attempt at dialogue was made on the initiative of the Baltic People's Fronts and took place in Riga. But the attempt to achieve at least some positive results failed on that occasion. Now a meeting has been held in Georgia. The central issue was the NKAO.

In particular, all the participants in the meeting were unanimous in the opinion that a Caucasian coordination council of all informal movements needs to be formed.

There was one more result. This was the first time that representatives of the two republics' informal movements were able to describe their views to each other in a calm, businesslike atmosphere, without any excessive emotion.

Armenian Operational Staff Reviews Situation

NC0703200490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] During the Operational Staff's regular meeting, members were briefed about measures that the republic's leadership is taking to normalize the situation in some villages in the Khanlarskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan. In this rayon, the Armenian inhabitants are being compelled to sell their houses under the local authorities' pressure and are abandoning the villages. Work is being done every day in this regard, and the people of the republic will be briefed when we see positive results.

The situation along the republic's borders remains tense, though no incidents occurred yesterday. The highway passing through the Marneul'skiy Rayon in Georgia still cannot be used.

According to the Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry's data, unidentified persons attacked one of the Army's armored defense units and stole a Nagant revolver. Meanwhile, six automatic guns, a few homemade grenades, nearly 150 bullets, and a hunting rifle have been returned. Though returning the arms is progressing slowly, it is continuing.

The Civil Aviation Department helicopters are making regular flights to Stepanakert. The press has reported that Major General Safonov, commandant of the state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NAKO], has ordered armored vehicles be depolyed on the landing strip of Stepanakert Airport to limit the number of flights from Armenia to Stepanakert. However, the general's superior commandant has instructed him not to take any initiative and not to obstruct the air transportation between Yerevan and Stepanakert. These helicopters made one flight to Getashen subrayon and another to Shaumyanovskiy Rayon on 5 March to transport passengers.

According to the Armenian Health Ministry's information, 193 refugees are being treated in the Armenian hospitals. It was pointed out at the Operational Staff meeting that these patients could in fact be discharged from the hospitals today, but this is not being done because they are lonely, homeless, old people. So a decision was made to quickly arrange dormitories for them. Again the Health Ministry confirmed its readiness to provide quality medical assistance in any region of Armenia, in NKAO, or in the Armenian villages in Azerbaijan. During the last two months, nearly 300,000 rubles worth of medicine has been dispatched to these areas.

Armenian Village Renamed Andranikavan

NC0703145190 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1300 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Report by Lida Kazaryan]

[Excerpt] For decades only a single Armenian family lived in the Azerbaijani-inhabited village of Zangelar in Masisskiy Rayon. Today, the village has 700 (?Armenian households), that is nearly 2,000 Armenian inhabitants. As a result of the developments over the last two years, our compatriots who were forcibly uprooted from Sumgait, Kirovabat, Shankhor, Khanlar, Baku, and Nakhichevan have arrived in Zangelar. Today they are engaged in restoring their new home. The nearby polyvinyl acetate plant is playing a major role in the restoration work. It has allocated nearly R200,000 to cater to the socioeconomic needs of the village and improve the living conditions of the villagers. With its assistance, natural gas has been brought to the village, the water distribution network has been renovated, and village roads are being repaired and paved. A 250-line automatic telephone exchange will be commissioned soon. Additional land has been allocated to 110 families for building houses. A health care center and a kindergarten are under construction.

The inhabitants were gravely concerned over the name of the village. On the occasion of the 125th anniversary of the birth of General Andranik, they unanimously decided to rename the village after the great general. A ceremony was held yesterday on this occasion. A commemorative stone was erected in the middle of the village where a monument to the general is to be raised. Albert Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Masisskiy Rayon party committee, addressed the meeting.

[Begin Arutyunyan recording] Andranik dreamed of returning to a free Armenia and dying there, but he died abroad. However, Armenia, the fatherland of all Armenians, will keep alive the memory of Gen Andranik, the luminous son of the Armenian people, as a symbol of justice, daring, and struggle. Today is a memorable day for the inhabitants of our rayon. This new village will bear the name of the great son of our people. (?I am convinced) that the workers of Andranikavan will glorify the name of the magnificent general by their work. I wish Andranikavan an auspicious future. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Armenia To Resume TV Transmissions 8 Mar

NC0703143790 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] The Armenian Council of Ministers has instructed the Armenian Republic's State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting and the Armenian Republic's Communications Ministry to resume morning and evening transmissions of central and republican television programs as of 8 March 1990.

KGB Arrests Kidnappers of Young Armenian

PM0703153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Criminal Act Curtailed"]

[Text] Yerevan, 6 Mar—It took just four hours for Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] KGB officers to successfully carry out a difficult operation, work out the criminals' intentions, and save someone.

Citizen A appealed to the Armenian SSR KGB for help 5 March—the previous day her grandson Armen had been kidnapped by persons unknown. The kidnappers were demanding a large ransom.

As the Armenian SSR KGB Press Office reported, the intelligence officers had to solve an equation with several unknown quantities: They not only had to establish the criminals' identity but arrest them and, above all, free the 24-year-old guy from captivity. This task was successfully resolved as a result of operational investigations. Yerevan citizen S who came to collect the ransom and who, it transpired, was unemployed and had previous convictions, was arrested. An hour later the handcuffs were on the two other criminals. They were armed with firearms and knives and were residents of Yerevan and Rostov Oblast leading a parasitical way of life. One of them tried to use his revolver. It later transpired that both criminals were being sought nationwide in connection with a robbery. Moments later the grandmother was embracing her beloved grandson.

Internal affairs organs were actively involved in investigating the crime. They have instituted criminal proceedings and an investigation is under way.

Goals of Armenian United Front Organization Noted

NC0603140790 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] We have already reported that representatives of 34 Armenian public organizations operating in Armenia and Soviet Union held a conference in January 1990 to launch the United Front for Pan-Armenian Struggle in order to participate in the solution of urgent problems facing our nation, organize the people's self-defense, consolidate the reunification of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] with Armenia, and restore the earthquake zone. It issued a statement calling on the forces in Armenia and in the Armenian diaspora in the

Soviet Union and abroad to mobilize and join the United Front for Pan-Armenian Struggle.

War and labor veterans are actively participating in the pan-Armenian movement. Two years ago they had formed a War and Labor Veterans Union for the Struggle Against the Crime of Genocide. This group has its own by-laws and constitution and seeks to enlist the support of similar organizations in the USSR and abroad for its activities.

One of the main aims of the union is make Armenia a member of the United Nations with the rights of a sovereign state. This is a a pressing issue, for our struggle will achieve no results unless we enlist the support of international organizations as well as state and other public organizations in addition to mobilizing our own forces.

Another of the union's objectives is to bring about the condemnation at the International Court of the perpetrators of the genocide committed against the Armenian people in Azerbaijan, to carry out an international trial of the criminals of Sumagait for crimes of genocide, and to have the blockade of Artsakh [NKAO] and Armenia recognized as a new manifestation of genocide against the Armenian people and submit this to the consideration of the International Court.

The union also wants to have the 1 December 1989 decision of the Armenian Supreme Soviet on the reunification of Artsakh with Armenia debated and endorsed at the United Nations. It will also ask the United Nations to recognize the 1915 genocide of the Armenians.

The union has declared that it will halt its activities after it achieves these objectives, after the Armenian people's security is ensured against genocide, and after all requirements of the Armenian question are achieved in line with the relevant international laws.

Armenian Patriarch of Turkey Dies in Armenia

NC0803135290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 8 Mar 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] On Page 4, the paper publishes the following message from Catholicos of All Armenians Vazgen I to the highest sees of the Armenian church, prelates, and all the faithful: In deep sorrow, we hereby inform the highest sees of our holy church, the prelates, and all the faithful that Arcbishop Shnorhk, his holiness the patriarch of Constantinople [Istanbul], died early in the morning, at 0130 on 6 March in Yerevan's Nork Hospital.

The holy patriarch came to holy Edzhmiatsin as our welcome guest. He was in good spirits the evening of 4 March. He wanted to go to Leninakan and Spitak the morning of 6 March to convey his fatherly words of consolation to our disaster-stricken people. While he was coming down the stairs in the Catholicos' residence at 0800 in the morning [on 5 March] he slipped on the marble staircase, fell, and sustained serious head and arm injuries.

Adzhar Obkom Plenum Releases First Secretary

LD0703202190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] A plenum of the Adzhar Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, which considers organizational issues, has taken place. The plenum released Cormade Emiridze from his duties as first secretary of the Oblast Committee in connection with his transfer to other work. Comrade (Khakhva), who previously worked as a secretary of the same Oblast Committee and during recent times as a senior organizer in the party building and Cadre Work Department of the CPSU Central Committee, was elected first secretary of the Adzhar Party Oblast Committee. Comrade Gumbaridze, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, took part in the work of the plenum.

Deputy Chairman of Georgian Ministers Profiled

90US0570B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 1

[Georgian Supreme Soviet Presidium edict on the appointment of V.G. Lordkipanidze as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers]

[Text] The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To appoint Comrade Vazha Georgiyevich Lordkipanidze deputy chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers.
[signed]G. Gumbaridze, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
[signed]V. Kvaratskheliya, secretary of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
Tbilisi, 30 January 1990.

Vazha Georgiyevich Lordkipanidze was born on 29 November 1949, is a member of the CPSU and has higher education. He graduated in 1973 from the Tbilisi State University Cybernetics Faculty. While a student and subsequently upon graduation from the higher educational institution, he worked first as a senior laboratory assistant and later as a scientific associate. In the years 1973-76 he was elected secretary of the Tbilisi State University Communist Youth League Committee. From 1976-80 he was head of a Georgian Leninist Communist Youth League [LKSM] Central Committee department. In 1980 he was made instructor of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Culture Department and in the period 1980-86 was elected secretary and second and first secretary of the Georgian LKSM Central Committee. In the period 1986-88 he was first secretary of Tbilisi's Kalininskiy Party Rayon Committee.

In 1988 he was made head of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Culture Department and, following reorganization, was from January 1989 until the present, head of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology Department. He is a member of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and a deputy of the republic's Supreme Soviet. He has been elected a candidate member of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau. He has been awarded the "Badge of Honor".

He is married and has a daughter.

'Mass Unrest' in Georgia as Elections Near

LD0803152690 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 8 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature in the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] On the run-up to the Georgian parliament elections due on 25 March, informal parties and radical political movements are conducting meetings in many regions of the republic, urging the people to boycott the elections, and urging candidate deputies to refuse to stand. As a result, mass unrest has already affected many centers population in Georgia. As the INTERFAX correspondent reports, monuments to Lenin have been pulled down in (?Utaiki), (?Rusaive), Zugdidi, (?Kamtriga), (?Selave), and also a number of small population centers in the republic. On 7 March, alongside the monument to Shota Rustaveli in Tbilisi, the People's Front organized a many-thousand strong meeting designed to protest against the presidential authority being introduced in the country. As you will recall, People's Deputy [name indistinct] has stated at a USSR Supreme Soviet session that the Georgian democrats would not take part in the elections for the country's president if they do not receive convincing explanations that the president's rule will not reflect on the republic's soveiegnty.

'Vandalism' of Georgia Lenin Monuments Deplored

PM0803113390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by Major Yu. Semilet: "Vandalism"]

[Text] Tbilisi—At around 1900 hours on 6 March, a monument to V.I. Lenin which stood on one of Tbilisi's central squares was pulled down by an agitated crowd. Somewhat earlier a Lenin monument at the Georgian Technical University had been daubed with paint. The hastily cleaned-up traces of the vandalism are visible today. Incidentally, the higher educational institution in question was until quite recently called the Georgian V.I. Lenin Polytechnic Institute.

The distressing observations on this have not, however, been exhausted. At the end of February the city's central street, which bore Lenin's name, was suddenly renamed. Groups of jeering youths hastily tore down the nameplates from the fronts of buildings and affixed new ones. Lenin Street no longer exists in the republic's capital, there is Merab Kostava Street instead. I have no intention of casting aspersions on this man, a leader of the Georgian national independence movement who tragically died last year. No, it is something else: After all, it was originally proposed that his name be given to a quite different street—that was the city soviet executive committeee resolution.

Incidentally, something else also strikes one: The decision on such an unexpected renaming of Lenin Street was not made by anyone at an official level. The city fathers and law-enforcement agency workers, before whom this unlawful act was perpetrated, have held their peace.

Yes, when the law stays silent, when voices of reason and conscience are not heard amidst the rally uproar, and when the word "occupier" is flung in one's former brother's face, anything is possible.

Central Asia

Decree Issued on Organization of Uzbek Oblasts

LD0403214590 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Decree of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium on the break-up of Syr-Darya Oblast and the restoration of Dzhizak Oblast as part of the Uzbek SSR:

The Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees:

1. To break up Syr-Darya Oblast and restore Dzhizak Oblast with its administrative center in the town of Dzhizak as part of the Uzbek SSR.

To transfer the town of Dzhizak, and Arnasaiskiy, Bakhmalskiy, Gallyaaralskiy, Dzhizakskiy, Dustliksiy, Zaaminskiy, Zarbdarskiy, Mirzachulskiy, Oktyabrskiy, Pakhtakorskiy, and Farishskiy Rayons in Syr-Darya Oblast to Dzhizak Oblast.

2. To move the administrative center of Syr-Darya Oblast from the town of Dzhizak to the town of Gulistan.

3. To put this decree into effect as of 1 March 1990
[Signed] M. Ibragimov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; L. Bekkulbekova, secretary of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; Tashkent City 16 Feb 1990

Decree Criticized

PM0603093190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent A. Orlov report: "Sign Costing One Billion. That Is How Much the Former Authorities' Hasty Decisions Cost the Republic"]

[Text] Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]—A new oblast—Dzhizak Oblast—appeared on the map of Uzbekistan 1 March.

But what is new in this?—the reader may ask. After all this oblast appeared quite recently following an administrative partition. True, it appeared, but...

More than a year ago an Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet decree was adopted on amalgamating Dzhizak and Syr-Darya Oblasts. Many people simply failed to realize what caused this amalgamation. Some people seriously believed that the aim was a desire to wipe off the map an oblast and a rayon which had for many years been a "zone beyond criticism"—the homeland of Sharaf Rashidov. Now there is no one to ask about this: It is well known that I. Usmankhodzhayev, then first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, under whom all this was organized, has been convicted. There are no longer any of the former "top men" in either the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium or its Council of Ministers.

The leaders who staged the experiment have left their posts, by no means always "of their own free will."

Then working in Dzhizak as editor of the oblast's newspaper, I like many other people asked the republic's leadership for explanations but was greeted with evasive and reassuring speeches. But when the plan conceived in the heart of the apparatus took real shape, serious negative aspects became obvious.

Two oblasts meant that the oblast organizations, which were literally swamped with plenums, sessions, meetings, and sittings, shouldered twice as many problems.

At first people thought that at least the health service would stand to gain. I remember the tremendous pomp and noisy delight when a number of buildings that had been abandoned by apparatchiks were handed over to medical establishments. Admittedly, the delight soon abated: It turned out that administrative buildings are not totally suitable for medical purposes. For instance, a children's hospital treating infectious diseases was housed in the building belonging to the former Dzhizakskiy Raykom [rayon party committee] and Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee]. A year later they had been unable (or, possibly, unwilling) to organize a sewerage system, construct a laundry, and bring it into line with sanitary norms. Now that Dzhizakskiy Rayon has once again been rehabilitated, directive bodies have taken the building back and are quietly preparing to move the sick children out without the knowledge of the Ministry of Health. Questions are resolved with such unbelievable thoughtlessness.

Sh. Mirsaidov, deputy chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers and chairman of Gosplan [State Planning Committee], told me:

"Mistaken decisions regarding the reorganization of the territorial structure of ministries and departments have affected the fate and morale of hundreds of thousands of people and run into a round sum of approximately 800 million rubles [R]."

So changing the signs cost almost R1 billion. And now, a year later, a new about-face is on the way. It is as if kids are playing at chess. If I do not like the move, I'll move back.

For the sake of objectivity, I must admittedly point out that whereas in the past amalgamation was prepared in secret away from the people—no one knew ahead of the relevant decree where the oblast center would be—now sociological studies and economic calculations were carried out in advance.

This time people were certainly talking aloud about the latest restructuring. But no more than that. Judging from the telephone calls to the IZVESTIYA office, people are very concerned: Have conclusions been drawn from what has happened, has anyone taken responsibility for the funds which have been cast to the wind? After all millions more rubles are being spent on restoring Dzhizak Oblast which could, you will agree, in the current complex economic situation find a much more fitting use.

Uzbek Party Plenum Elects First Secretary

LD0703205690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] In Gulistan, the center of the restored Syr-Darya Oblast, an organizational plenum of the Syr-Darya Oblast party committee of Uzbekistan was held today. A new membership of the Bureau was elected. Comrade Aydarkulov, previously working as chairman of the Syr-Darya Oblast executive committee, was elected first secretary of the Syr-Darya Oblast party committee. Comrade Karimov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, spoke at the plenum.

Situation in Dushanbe Reportedly 'Stabilizing'

LD0803053790 Moscow TASS in English 1720 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Dushanbe March 7 Tajikta-TASS—The situation in Tajikistan's capital Dushanbe is gradually stabilising. This is illustrated by a brief official report published in the republican press today.

A meeting and a concert on the occasion of International Women's Day have been allowed to go ahead in Dushanbe by decision of the Tajik Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The celebrations will be held at the S. Aini State Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre. Matinees will begin at the music and drama theatre on Friday.

Daily official press reports by the Tajik Interior Ministry press centre on the situation in the city and its suburbs nowadays rarely mention any trouble. The football match at the Dushanbe stadium between the Dushanbe Pamir and Kiev Dynamo was unmarred by violence.

All industrial enterprises and institutions are working smoothly. Tension in relations between people is gradually disappearing.

Many non-Tajik families left the republic in the disquieting February days. But the flow of Russian speaking people from Dushanbe has largely decreased owing to the efforts of party and local government bodies, the commission on interethnic relations formed under the Tajik Council of Ministers, and meetings in work collectives and in places of residence.

A special team of investigators are looking for participants in the February 12-14 pogroms.

The documentary film "Disquieting February", shown by republican television, partially reveals the culprits. The first unsanctioned meeting held on February 11 outside the Central Committee building by the informal organisation Rostakhes was a bitter prelude to the tragic events. It was at that meeting that the provocative slogan "Armenian refugees from Baku" was voiced out loud and a little earlier a Rostakhes member named alternative republican leaders in an interview with the republical youth newspaper.

Kazakhstan Muslim Leader Explains Views

90US0580A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA in Russian 8 Feb 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Mufti M. Yusuf, USSR people's deputy, chairman of the presidium of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, by M. Kirpichenko and T. Raufov; date and place not given: under the rubric "Timely Interview": "Mukhammad Sadyk Mukhammad Yusuf: 'We Need Peace and National Accord'"]

[Text] [Kirpichenko, Raufov] The demand for the resignation of the previous mufti and the election of a new one was an expression of Muslim dissatisfaction with the situation that had arisen at the SADUM [Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan]. The Muslims see a strong new leader in you, and they are expecting changes. What is being changed and what will be changed at the SADUM?

[Yusuf] Today changes are taking place not only at the SADUM, but in our relations with various social organizations.

But first about internal affairs. We are paying special attention, of course, to the imams and their training. Working in the mosques, they are constantly among people. There are many new mosques opening today in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This is a positive fact. And at the same time a new problem is appearing: We have to provide these mosques with theological cadres. We are currently working hard on the solution to this issue.

Another no less difficult matter today is the provision of religious literature to Muslims. We are about to purchase these books abroad, and we hope that a portion of them will soon be given to us. We are also considering increasing the circulation of our journal MUSULMANIN SOVETSKOGO VOSTOKA and publishing other books.

As for the participation of our spiritual administration in public life, we kept that to a minimum until just recently. Both the era of stagnation and the spiritual administration are to blame for that. We want to take an active part in the social life of our republics because Islam is not just a religion, not just a spiritual life, but a way of life. And a great many problems requiring solutions have accumulated in society today.

Interethnic relations are a very serious problem. They trouble everyone today, whereas Islam has already solved them. Muslims do not advocate any sort of interethnic discord and they live peacefully with members of other religions and other nations. That has been written in the Koran and our other sources. We must explain this to our people.

In this regard I would like it if we were given a wider forum: the pages of the secular newspapers, radio, and television. And I must say that today such work has already begun.

We have established good contacts with members of other religions. In particular, we are coordinating actively with the Tashkent diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church led by Bishop Lev of Tashkent and Central Asia and we are working together on the solution of those problems which can only be managed jointly: the struggle for social justice, rendering aid to the Childrens Fund, and the struggle for peace and accord among peoples. This is important today as never before. I hope that in the future our cooperation will expand.

[Kirpichenko, Raufov] Many non-Muslims generally associate Islam with the idea of jihad, a holy war for Islam with members of other beliefs. But times are changing. Today we speak of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Is the idea of the jihad changing in this regard?

[Yusuf] Our orientalists have greatly contributed to an incorrect notion of the jihad. When they superficially translated the verses of the Koran, the call to jihad was interpreted as a call for Muslims to kill non-Muslims. But that is an incorrect interpretation. Those verses which call for the unbelieving to be killed are meant for specific places: Mecca and Medina and their vicinity. These are the sacred places of Islam, and there this law remains in effect up to the present. According to it, not one non-Muslim will be admitted. But history itself is proof that Muslims have lived in peace with other peoples and with members of other religions. Today for example, Muslims live with Christians in complete harmony in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

Jihad is a very broad concept. Self-improvement and the expansion of one's knowledge is also a jihad. A jihad is not only and not so much an armed struggle as it is self-improvement—it is a struggle with false thoughts and feelings in oneself. As a result we do not need to change the interpretation of the word, we simply need to return to the original meaning of jihad.

[Kirpichenko, Raufov] Not very long ago our meeting would have been an impossible thing. But even more impossible would have been some of our questions. If you recall, there was an article in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI that caused a great sensation, "The Three Approaching Crises of Mikhail Gorbachev." The British author said that one of the approaching crises of the country's present leadership was the politicization of Islam and a broadening of its sphere of influence. What is your impression of this point of view?

[Yusuf] Regarding this I will say to you that Western propaganda plays a very subtle role in the deterioration of relations between the government and the Muslims. I know and feel this. Their articles may be separated into two types. The correspondents come here and study the life of the Muslims and their relations with the government. But it is a superficial study, not much good to them at all, and they already have a preconception of how and what to write. And so they write that the Soviet Government is against Islam, that the mosques are closed, that prayer is forbidden, and so on, setting the Muslim world against our government in this fashion. These reports are published "over there" with an eye to the Muslim world.

When they consider our audience, they speak differently. They say that Islam is arming itself, that there are fundamentalists "over there," that they have called for a jihad, that their ranks are growing very quickly, and that someday they will become the chief danger for the government of our country. This is done with the goal of sowing discord and provoking conflict. But in fact there is none of that. I am convinced that common Muslims wish to live peacefully. They are citizens of their country and they wish only to have complete freedom of religion. Today everyone is expecting a new Law on Freedom of Conscience. It will be one more real result of perestroyka. We only need peace and national accord for the further expansion of perestroyka. And I call upon all my fellow citizens to pursue this goal.

New Health Journal Published in Kazakhstan

LD0503234590 Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh 15 Feb 90 p 4

[Summary] In accordance with the decision of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, a new publication was created in the republic in the beginning of the year. Readers will receive the first issue of DENSAULIK [Health] JOURNAL very soon. The subscription index of the journal is 75,672. The subscription fee for nine months is 3 rubles 60 kopeks. Beybit Koychibayev is chief editor of DENSAULIK JOURNAL.

Results of Kirghiz Repeat Balloting Indecisive

LD0803153490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] The results of the repeat balloting on the elections of people's deputies for the republic and the local soviets, which took place on 4 March in Kirghizia, have been summed up. According to a report by the republican electoral commission, in sixteen constituencies where there were ballots on one or two candidates, no one received the required number of votes. In accordance with the Law on Elections of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet has decided to conduct repeat elections in these constituencies on 7 April.